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**The dependent ally: A historical-sociological analysis of postwar
German foreign policy**

Stadelmann, Marcus Alexander, Ph.D.

University of California, Riverside, 1990

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The Dependent Ally:

A Historical-Sociological Analysis of Postwar German Foreign Policy

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Marcus Alexander Stadelmann

March, 1990


Dissertation Committee:


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University of California, Riverside

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For my parents, Wolfgang and Heidi,
who always wanted me to be a scholar

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Dependent Ally:
A Historical-Sociological Analysis of Postwar German Foreign Policy

by

Marcus Alexander Stadelmann

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science

University of California, Riverside, March, 1990

Professor Arthur Campbell Turner, Co-Chairperson

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The following analysis of German foreign policy has two overarching objectives. First, it was written to familiarize the reader with the conduct of German foreign policy and the major foreign policy events concerning Germany during the past forty-one years. Not only will the reader find a detailed analysis of how West Germany reacquired its sovereignty by 1955, but he or she will also be introduced to subsequent German foreign policy.

Thus, this work will focus in on both Ostpolitik and Westpolitik from the Adenauer era to the Kohl era, highlighting major foreign policy events and changes. In addition, the changes that have

occurred in the past forty-one years in German foreign policy will be analyzed and explanations for these shifts will be presented.

The second objective of this work is the creation of a methodological framework to explain the making of foreign policy. Here, I will introduce Historical Sociology as the methodology used in this work and further present a model to explain changes in German foreign policy. For this purpose I will examine five independent and two intervening variables, which influence the making of German foreign policy. The first independent variable will be public opinion, measuring its influence on foreign policy-making. Next, I shall look at the structure of the state, comprising the German constitution, the Chancellery and the major policy-making bodies. Then, I will turn towards the role political parties and interest groups play in the making of German foreign policy. The role of individuals on the foreign policy-making process will be covered by looking at the four most influential Chancellors of postwar Germany, namely, Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl. The fifth and final independent variable will then be the international environment, because for this kind of work, it is imperative that it will not be disregarded, to avoid falling into a reductionist trap. In addition, two intervening variables will be introduced, namely, the primacy of foreign policy and the primacy of domestic policy, because both, dependent on the constellation of the five independent variables, do influence foreign policy-making.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Since the transformation of the world from a multipolar into a bipolar system with the end of the Second World War, Germany's position within the world has changed. Traditionally having enjoyed the role of a bridge-broker between East and West, the Second World War had put Germany into a position of utter defeat and occupation by the victorious allies. Not surprisingly the regaining of sovereignty became, therefore, one of Germany's most important foreign policy goals in the immediate post-war period. Together with integration into the Atlantic Alliance, European unification, German reunification, reconciliation with France and the restoration of German international prestige, the regaining of sovereignty became a priority in the first Adenauer administration. All of the aforementioned goals, with the notable exception of reunification, were achieved by Adenauer in a very short period of time, with the signing of the Paris Treaties on October 23, 1954. It will not only be the purpose of this work to analyze this process and the conduct of German foreign policy up to the present, but to also look at the way foreign policy has changed over time, to examine the causes of this change and to analyze its impact on the role Germany is playing within the international system.

When looking at the foreign policy of Germany in the period after the Second World War, one should keep in mind that foreign policy goals change in every period of a nation's history. Not only will they be affected by changes in the international environment, but also the constellation of domestic forces will have a major impact on foreign policy. It is, therefore, imperative to focus on both, the domestic and international environment when one examines the changes or continuities in a nation's foreign policy. To disregard the international environment would lead one in the terms of Kenneth Waltz into a reductionist trap.¹ For example, an explanation of foreign policy, rooted only in the economic structures of nations, would lead us to forget about the powerful influences our bipolar system exerts on foreign policy making. In addition, the shift from a multipolar system, as existed before the Second World War, to our current bipolar system and their influence on strategic choices taken by nations would be disregarded. On the other hand a purely systemic explanation of foreign policy will also be insufficient, because it will disregard the crucial importance of domestic variables; examples being interest groups, political parties, public opinion or even the personality and will-power of the leader of a nation. As I have already stated, it is imperative to combine the two levels of analysis, the international and the domestic one, which will be attempted in this work by using a traditional methodology, which has only recently come into prominence again, namely, Historical Sociology. A detailed account of the

history of Historical Sociology and the way it will be used in this work will be given in Chapter Two. Right now it is sufficient to say that Historical Sociology is a methodology which does allow one to fuse the international and domestic levels of analysis.

What then were the changes that occurred in the international environment and how did they influence German foreign policy and differentiate it from the earlier traditional German foreign policy goals. First, there was the destruction of German sovereignty, partition and the reorganization of German political, economic and social culture by the victorious powers. Second, a new danger from the East, the greatly strengthened Soviet Empire, had appeared on the international scene, directly threatening the existence of the new Republic. The third factor influencing German foreign policy making was the collapse of the old multipolar system that had existed in the pre-war period. Both Germany and Japan had been removed from the circle of great powers through their crushing defeats, while in addition France and Great Britain had been weakened to a point where they could not be looked upon as great powers. This left only two great powers, namely the Soviet Union and the United States of America. In sum, the world had experienced the political and economic collapse of Europe and Japan and the emergence of a new, bipolar world system, which would soon result in the Cold War.

On the domestic scene Germany experienced the destruction of most major political parties, the SPD being a notable exception, combined with the demise of the old aristocratic ruling classes. The

country was flooded by refugees from formerly German territories in Poland and Czechoslovakia, leading to the creation of a new and powerful interest group which now had to be taken into account, while other, older interest groups, the Agrarian League being one example, vanished. New people rose to power, while others returned to their old positions. In sum, not only the international, but also the domestic environment had drastically changed, which in turn had an impact on the course of foreign policy making.

As has already been pointed out the traditional role of Germany in the old multipolar system had been one of being a bridge-broker between East and West. Now with the destruction of the old multipolar system through the Second World War, brokerage, being neutral or not committed to either side, was not possible anymore. As the first Chancellor of the Republic, Konrad Adenauer pointed out, the logic of a bipolar world system did not allow for a secondary power like the new West German state to remain uncommitted to either side. According to Adenauer:

I considered neutrality between two power blocs as an unrealistic position for our nation. Sooner or later one side, or the other would attempt to incorporate Germany's potential on its side. . . . We had to join either one or the other side, if we wanted to prevent being crushed by both.²

Morgenthau seems to agree when he states:

The disparity in strength between major and minor powers is so great that the minor powers in the shadow of the superpowers have not only lost their ability to tip the scales, but they have also to a considerable extent lost that freedom of movement which in former times enabled them to play so important and often decisive a role in the balance of power. What was formerly true only of a relatively small number of nations . . . is true now of

many nations: they are in the orbit of one or the other of the two giants whose political, military and economic preponderance can hold them there even against their will.³

Domestic variables, too, played a major role in the making of foreign policy. Here it is especially the personality of the first Chancellor, Adenauer, who was deeply committed to the integration of Germany into the Western Alliance, which has to be taken into account.

In addition, this work will also deal with the ongoing debate on the merits of the primacy of foreign policy theories by showing that during the Adenauer years the primacy of foreign policy was dominant. Not only will I discuss the necessary preconditions for the primacy of foreign policy to become a driving force behind a country's foreign policy, but I will also show how those preconditions have been destroyed over time in Germany. However, especially in those early years (1949-1963) the "Primat der Aussenpolitik" seemed to be the driving force behind German foreign policy. As practiced by the Adenauer administration, the primacy of foreign policy can be characterized by concepts prevalent in the pre-World War II world order, examples being the primacy of statecraft and the belief in the balance of power concept. In sum, the role of Germany in the world was the dominant driving force behind German foreign policy, which led to political priorities coming before economic or internal considerations. A few examples might be helpful to demonstrate the influence of the primacy of foreign policy, which relegates internal economic or social consideration to an inferior position. In

September 1950, the foreign ministers of the United States, France and Great Britain agreed at a Conference held in London to revise the Occupation Statute governing Germany if Germany would not only enter the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) but also accept all the pre-war debts of the Reich, which amounted to eleven billion marks.⁴ Clearly the newly created Republic could not afford to make such payments in 1950, when it was about to re-industrialize. The payment of such a sum would have grave influences on a domestic economy desperate for investment funds. However, at the same time the Allies would make certain concessions, which Adenauer recognized as being imperative to re-establish Germany as a player in the international arena. These included the right of West Germany to speak for all Germans (Alleinvertretungsanspruch), the right to establish diplomatic relations with the Allied Countries, the promise to defend Germany in the case of an attack and the ending of the state of war between Germany and the Western Allies. Thus, foreign policy goals were clearly put before domestic and economic considerations by Adenauer, when he agreed to the previously mentioned repayment of all pre-war German debts.

Other examples which could be cited were the willingness to pay 715 million dollars to Israel as compensation for World War II atrocities⁵ and the payment for allied troops stationed on German soil. What then differentiates the "Primat der Aussenpolitik" from the "Primat der Innenpolitik"? Here I would simply argue that if someone believes in and follows the primacy of foreign policy, as for

example Adenauer did, he will emphasize foreign policy goals over domestic economic or social ones. A more detailed description of the primacy of foreign policy, and its impact on German foreign policy will be given in the second part of Chapter Two, where I will look at the founder of that school of thought, Ranke, and will also focus on its use in justifying German foreign policy during the Second Empire (1871-1918).

The decline of the primacy of foreign policy, which is usually associated with the post-Adenauer administrations and the subsequent rise of the *Primat der Innenpolitik* in turn has led to a more independent German Foreign Policy, exemplified by the Brandt and Schmidt administrations.

It is now time to bring the aforementioned points together to outline the methodological framework I will be using and the conclusions I hope to establish. First, I will analyze in detail the changes that have taken place in German foreign policy, namely the shift from a very pro-American to a more independent German foreign policy, by focusing on German-American and German-Soviet relations since 1949. Relations with Third World countries and the newly industrializing countries in Southeast Asia will not be considered in this work. Second, I will examine the replacement of the primacy of foreign policy concept by the primacy of domestic policy theory as a driving force behind German foreign policy, to be able to perceive how this switch has affected German foreign policy.

However, this work will not merely be descriptive outlining certain events, but it will also be theoretical seeking to analyze the causes of this shift that has taken place, hopefully enabling me to make predictions based on the empirical data assembled.

It is when discussing the causes of the change in German foreign policy where the previous discussions on domestic and international variables becomes relevant. Again, this work will combine the two levels of analysis, the domestic and international one, by using the historical-sociological method, to explain the changes in German foreign policy.

Thus, in this work, foreign policy itself will be the dependent variable, while I propose to break down my independent variables into five categories, following a typology employed by Peter Gourevitch in his book Politics in Hard Times.⁶

First, I shall take a look at public opinion, analyzing various polls, to be able to perceive the changes that have taken place especially in regard to perceptions of the United States and of the Soviet Union by the German public. Next, I will research the influence of interest groups and their impact on foreign policy. Here it is important to focus especially on the refugee movement and the two most powerful groups in Germany, namely, the "Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund" (DGB) and the "Bund Deutscher Industriellen" (BDI). The third independent variable does include political parties and their leaders. In this category I will place all the prominent politicians in Germany, past and present, therefore, including people


like Adenauer, Schmidt, Brandt, Erhard and Strauss, to see, how they through the personal power they were wielding, influenced foreign policy.

The fourth independent variable will comprise the structure of the state. Again, it is not feasible anymore to exclude the structure of the state, because the institutions through which power is wielded, an example being the Chancellor's Office in Germany, can be used to directly influence foreign policy-making. Finally, to be able to avoid second-image explanations,⁷ the effects of the international environment, especially the previously mentioned shift from a multipolar to a bipolar system will be discussed.

In addition, two intervening variables will be introduced, namely, the primacy of foreign policy (Primat der Aussenpolitik) and the primacy of domestic policy (Primat der Innenpolitik). These two were already briefly discussed in the previous pages and they both do, indirectly affect foreign policy-making.

In conclusion, my theoretical framework will look like the following diagram:

FIGURE 1



As can be observed by looking at the diagram, all of the five independent variables must be in the right constellation for the primacy of foreign policy or the primacy of domestic policy to be able to come in as major intervening variables. To be more precise let me briefly outline two hypothetical examples of how this framework works. For example, for the foreign policy of a country to follow the path of the primacy of foreign policy model, public opinion must be either supportive of this position or remain indifferent to the foreign policy making process. As soon as it starts to place an emphasis on domestic economic success over foreign

policy goals, it will become increasingly difficult for a leader to pursue a policy along the lines of the primacy of foreign policy. At the same time powerful domestic interest groups, too, must be supportive or indifferent to the foreign policy of a country. For example, if Adenauer's policies, which will be used in this work as a prime example of the triumph of the primacy of foreign policy, would have been actively opposed say by the refugee movement or the major labor unions, their chances of success would have declined rapidly.

Next, the structure of the state, undoubtedly, helped Adenauer to force his program through. Here we have to remember that in his position as Chancellor and Foreign Minister at the same time, he, and he alone, negotiated with the Allied High Commission, drawing up most of the deals leading to the regaining of sovereignty, in turn leading to a readmission into the international world order.

Again this would not have been possible if he had not been able to dominate his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Lastly, of course, the personality of the Chancellor himself, especially in a "Chancellor Democracy" like Germany, was of vital importance for the success of the primacy of foreign policy during his years in office. Again I would argue that if another man would have been at the helm of the German state, not committed to the previously mentioned goals, this in turn would have made the triumph of the primacy of foreign policy questionable.

Finally, the international environment itself was very conducive towards the primacy of foreign policy. For example the changing

international environment, the transformation from a multipolar to a bipolar system, had given Western integration and European unification additional significance. With the new threat from the East, economic collapse and occupation, foreign policy needed to assume a priority, a fact not only Adenauer but also the German people realized.

If, however, all of the five independent variables would have been conducive towards the primacy of domestic policy clearly it would have been impossible for the primacy of foreign policy to triumph. Again, if public opinion and the major interest groups are pushing for economic success at home, it will be impossible for the leader of a nation to disregard their wishes. Here it should be remembered that I am not claiming in advance that such a transition has yet taken place in Germany. However, when this work will be completed I should be in a position to give the reader a definite answer to this question. To be able to answer all of the previously raised questions and to test my model, I shall cover American-German and Soviet-German relations from 1949 up until the present time.

When focusing on the special relationship between Germany and the United States of America, one can clearly perceive that it began under the able leadership of Konrad Adenauer during his first administration in 1949. Not surprisingly Adenauer had recognized that only the United States could guarantee German security and, therefore, had made German-U.S. relations a central aspect of his foreign policy. On the other hand, as one of the occupying powers,

the United States early on recognized the importance of a strong, rearmed West German state in containing Soviet expansionism and, therefore, proceeded to rebuild Germany with the Marshall Plan. Under the threat of the Cold War, a convergence of views between the United States and Germany took place, resulting in a special relationship between the two nations. Adenauer clearly expressed his gratitude and friendship for the United States in the following statement:

"I do not believe that once in history a victorious nation has tried to reconstruct a defeated country like the United States did in the case of Germany.⁸

Cemented by the close friendship of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary of State Dulles, the relationship between the two countries soon ended up in the United States being the "Shield" against any kind of Soviet aggression, while Germany became the "Sword."

However, in the early 1960s relations started to deteriorate with the advent of the Kennedy administration, which abandoned the "Junktim."⁹ Only the ouster of Adenauer in 1963 prevented a further weakening of ties with the United States at the expense of France. However, suddenly a new, more independent German foreign policy became more visible. This more independent foreign policy later became a groundstone on which Chancellor Brandt and especially Chancellor Schmidt could build upon in pursuing an active Ostpolitik. A very interesting puzzle is presented to us by Chancellor Kohl's foreign policy in regard to the United States. Did his administration return to the close relationship with the United

States as exemplified by the policies of the 1950s or are his policies just a continuation of the precedents set by the two Social Democratic administrations? This question will also be addressed in this work.

As can be observed from this very brief and reductionist overview a change has taken place in German-American relations, ending up in a more independent German foreign policy. This view is even more strengthened when we look at German-Soviet relations from 1949 to the present. During the Adenauer years, especially from the period of 1955, when Germany again became a sovereign state, until 1963, Ostpolitik had two dimensions; first there was the political, ideological one, in which Adenauer appeared to be a dogmatic anti-communist, objecting to any kind of detente with the Soviet Union before a reunification settlement in peace and freedom had been achieved. Second, there was Adenauer the "Realpolitiker," who proposed personally, using traditional diplomacy, several solutions to the German problem to the Soviet Union.¹⁰ However, detente, without any Soviet concessions was out of the question for the Chancellor. With his forced resignation in 1963 German Ostpolitik became less dogmatic and by the late 1960s, with the advent of the Brandt administration, a shift towards detente had occurred, culminating in the "Renunciation of Force Treaty" between West Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1970. Finally the Soviet Union had achieved its major objective in Europe, the recognition of the post World War II boundaries by Germany. Brandt's policies of

detente were later continued by Chancellor Schmidt until his resignation in 1982. To the surprise of many observers the new conservative Chancellor Kohl did not return to Adenauer's old policies of strength, despite having pledged to do so in speeches during the 1970s. For example, in 1976 Chancellor Kohl had said the following: "We have to use economic weapons to force the Soviet Union into making concessions."¹¹ The very important question of why a return to the policies of strength did not occur will also be dealt with in this work.

Clearly, when comparing the two brief summaries of West-and Ostpolitik, one can perceive that changes have taken place. German-American relations have clearly cooled off, especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and only a slight improvement has taken place since the advent of the Kohl administration. At the same time German-Soviet relations, strenuous at best during the Adenauer years, have considerably improved, especially during the Brandt and Schmidt administrations. Surprisingly, the coming to power of a new conservative government in 1982, after initial shocks, has not led to an increase in tensions between the two nations.

In conclusion, the purpose of this work is to examine the changes that have taken place in German foreign policy over the last forty-one years by focusing in on the special relationship between Germany and the United States and Germany and the Soviet Union. Not only will the changes be analyzed, but the underlying causes of these shifts in German foreign policy will be researched by examining five

independent variables, public opinion, interest groups, state structure, political parties and their leaders and the international environment, which in turn influence my two intervening variables, the "Primat der Aussenpolitik" (primacy of foreign policy) and the "Primat der Innenpolitik" (primacy of domestic policy), all of them influencing my dependent variable, German foreign policy. Through my historical-sociological methodological framework I hope to establish the causes of this change in foreign policy, which in turn should enable me to make future predictions regarding continuity and change in German foreign policy.

This question is most important, because Germany, being one of the foremost economic and military powers in the world cannot be neglected, but its role in the international system has to be analyzed and this work should contribute to a better understanding of Germany's role within the international arena of great power politics.

Before examining historical sociology and the way it will be used in this work, I will briefly outline the period of the "Stunde Null" (Hour Zero) in 1945 up until the creation of the West German political system by the Allies in 1949 to set the stage for my following analysis of German foreign policy.

The Period of Occupation (1945-1949)

In 1945 Germany had ceased to exist. According to the Yalta Conference, held in February 1945, Germany had been divided into four zones of occupation, each administered by Allied military commanders,

who had assumed supreme government authority under the "Allied Declaration" of June 5, 1945. This condition, including the subdivision of the German Capital, Berlin, was to remain intact until a peace treaty could be signed in which the territorial shape of Germany was to be decided. The agreement was however soon violated by the Soviet Union, which unilaterally annexed one quarter of the prewar Germany territory, sending ten million refugees to the Western zones of occupation. In a subsequent meeting, held at Potsdam, the Western Allies succumbed to the Soviet actions, but it was established that Germany should be governed as a central economic entity by the victors until a democratic German government could take over. However it soon became evident that neither France nor the Soviet Union intended to abide by the agreement, when the Soviet Union started to turn its zone of occupation into a communist "clone" of the Stalinist regime, while France, favoring a German confederation over a new single German state, vetoed every effort to establish a central authority. It became therefore painfully clear that the Potsdam agreements, which were to have established a single economic entity during the period of occupation assuring uniform treatment of the population and supervision by a Control Commission constituted of the four military commanders, were never to enter into force. The four zones of occupation now resembled four independent countries. Despite the increasingly worsening relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, each zone conducted a program of demilitarization, denazification and destruction of the German war

economy through the dismantling of the German economy in place of reparations. According to Potsdam, the Germans should only be left enough to provide for themselves!¹² Again the Soviet Union and France decided not to abide by the agreements and soon economic disaster struck Germany. Without the agricultural areas of Eastern Germany, which traditionally had been the food basket of Germany, the Western Allies were forced to strain their own resources to keep the German population alive.

It was, however, not the economic situation, but the beginning of the Cold War, which saved Germany from a desperate position. Quarrels over Iran, Austria, Eastern Europe and Korea with the Soviet Union had especially moved the United States to a position where it began to soften its stand on Germany, recognizing the important part Germany could play against Soviet expansionist policies.

As early as September 6, 1946, in a speech given in Stuttgart, Secretary of State Byrnes pledged United States support for the rebuilding of the German economy, the cessation of dismantling in the U.S. zone, the keeping of U.S. troops in Germany as long as any other power did, and the revision of the new Polish Border. In the words of Roy Macridis, West Germany was not only an offspring of bipolarity, but also a symbol of the Cold War.¹³ To alleviate the growing economic problems, by increasing industrial and agricultural output, the United States and Britain agreed to merge their zones of occupation into the so-called "Bizonia" on May 25, 1947. By then the Cold War had heated up, after the failure of a Foreign Ministers

Conference held in Moscow on March 10, 1947, where the only agreement achieved had been on the issue of repatriation of German Prisoners of War. Directly resulting from the failure of the Conference was the Truman Doctrine and the creation of the Bizone. From now on the United States pursued a policy of reintegration of Germany into a free trade world order and an anti-communist Alliance. For that purpose, Secretary of State Marshall presented his famous speech at Harvard in June 1947, announcing American aid for all of Europe to rebuild weak economies, thereby reducing the possibilities of communist electoral victories in Western Europe. Despite protests from France, the Marshall plan included economic aid to Germany, based on the assumption that a new Europe had to integrate the Western part of Germany into its economy. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), in which Germany was represented by the three Western commanders-in-chief, was set up on April 16, 1948 to distribute Marshall aid.

After the failure of the London Conference of 1947, the United States and Britain decided to set up "Landesregierungen" with administrative powers. Only months later the Allies moved a step closer to a German state by setting up an Economic Advisory Council with the Frankfurt Charter of February 9, 1948, which virtually constituted an economic government for Germany.¹⁴ With the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia on February 24, 1948, the French became finally convinced that they had to make concessions on the German question. For that purpose a Conference was held in London on June

4, 1948, where the French, under heavy pressure from the United States and the Benelux countries, which desperately needed a revival of the German economy for their own economic survival, agreed to form a "Tri-zonia" and call for a Constituent Assembly, to write a new constitution for a West German state, to be convened by the Presidents of the Länder. Additionally it was agreed to put the industrial development of the Ruhr under a common authority, the International Authority to supervise the Ruhr (IAR). The function of the IAR was to apportion the amounts of coal being used for domestic consumption and exports. Further an Occupation Statute, outlining the reserved powers of the Western Allies was established, to insure continuing Allied control over Germany.

Before the "Ministerpräsidenten" of the Länder were able to meet, the three Allies conducted a currency reform to establish the basis for a healthy economy of the new state. Protesting the introduction of the new currency into West Berlin, the Soviet Union, which was about to introduce a new currency into East Germany as well, cut off all roads to Berlin, starting the famous Berlin blockade on June 18, 1948.

Under Allied pressure and amid the threat of the Berlin blockade, the Ministerpresidents decided on August 10, 1948, that not a constitution, but a Basic Law was to be drawn up by a Parliamentary Council, appointed by the Länder, to stress the provisional status the new Basic Law was to have. Under the leadership of Chairman Adenauer, the Council presented a first draft of the Basic Law to the

Allies in February 1949, which was subsequently rejected by the Allies, who complained about the strong measure of centralism contained in the draft. After staunch Social Democratic opposition to any amendments, the Allies gave in and accepted it on May 8, 1949. Fifteen days later, on May 23, 1949, the new Basic Law entered into force, creating a unique hybrid between an independent state lacking sovereignty, and a colony. Under the Occupation Statute, the Allied powers reserved themselves the right to conduct foreign affairs and foreign trade on Germany's behalf. Also they reserved for themselves the right to veto any law passed by a German parliament. In addition dismantling of specific German economies was continued, and production ceilings on businesses were retained.

The right to rearm was denied, while the Military Directorate was replaced by a High Commission, supervising the new German State. On August 16, 1949, Konrad Adenauer was elected first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, a pariah state among the nations of the world.

ENDNOTES

¹See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).

²Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), p. 96.

³Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 363.

⁴Roy F. Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 107.

⁵Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer Era (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1966), p. 34.

⁶Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 54-66.

⁷See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

⁸Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer und Seine Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), p. 478.

⁹The "Junktim" stipulated that all future negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had to be tied to the question of German reunification on Western terms, thereby establishing a German veto over East-West relations.

¹⁰For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Marcus A. Stadelmann, "The Adenauer Era Revisited - German Foreign Policy 1949-1963" (M.A. Thesis, University of California, Riverside, 1987), pp. 33-44.

¹¹Werner Filmer, Helmut Kohl (Düsseldorf, Econ Verlag, 1985), p. 252.

¹²Volker Berghahn, Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 180.

¹³Roy Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1985), p. 77.

¹⁴Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 69.

CHAPTER TWO

THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In the following chapter I shall attempt to further clarify my methodological framework. First, I will present the reader with a brief overview of historical sociology. The term will be defined, analyzed and put into perspective. Finally an explanation of how historical sociology will be employed in this work will be given.

Next, I shall turn to analyzing two concepts namely the primacy of foreign policy and the primacy of domestic policy. Not only will a brief history of the two be provided, but their impact on German foreign policy will be pointed out. My own thoughts on the ongoing debate between the two theories will then be furnished in the concluding portions of this chapter.

First, however, let us take a closer look at historical sociology.

Historical Sociology

In the previous chapter I mentioned historical sociology as the methodological framework to be employed in this work. It is the purpose of the next few pages to further discuss what historical sociology is, how it will be employed in this study and, most importantly, why it is such an ideal framework for researching foreign policy questions.

However, I shall not present a long and very detailed history of historical sociology as a sub-discipline, because this has been already adequately accomplished in previous studies. For people interested in historical sociology and its history I would recommend the following readings on which the following analysis will be based: first, there is a very comprehensive work by Philip Abrams, entitled Historical Sociology;¹ second, I would recommend a work edited by Theda Skocpol with the title Vision and Method in Historical Sociology;² finally, there is a dissertation by George William Barger entitled, Historical Sociology: Its Nature and Methods,³ which is extremely helpful.

Before I begin my analysis of historical sociology, let me briefly point out that I will not use any of the established definitions of historical sociology in this work and, therefore, will employ the term historical sociology interchangeably with the term political historical sociology. A justification for this will be given later. Now, without further ado let us turn to an analysis of historical sociology.

The origins of historical sociology can be traced back to the nineteenth century, to the time of the three greatest social scientists, who still exercise an enormous influence over all of the social sciences, be they history, political science or sociology. They are, of course, Max Weber, Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim, who all can be labeled historical sociologists. However, soon thereafter the works of Pareto and Spencer succeeded in reducing the influence of

the historical as a category in social thought. Their critique, which is still influential in American social thought, focused on the subjectivity of the historians work. By reporting only historical events he finds of importance to his work, the historian is able to determine what is significant and what is not. In other words, for positivists, history writing is selective and, therefore, biased. While his search for facts can be scientific, using Ranke's historiography, it is his evaluations of events that will bias his research. Therefore, history according to positivists is particular, descriptive and selective, while, for example, sociology is in contrast general, analytical and objective. However, by ignoring history, positivism led us into the area of unverifiable universal theories, abstract to such an extent that they have lost all touch with reality, in turn making them useless. As Immanuel Kant stated long ago: "History without society is blind--and society without history is empty."⁴ C. Wright Mills seems to agree with Kant in the following quote: "Every social science--or better, every well considered social study--requires an historical sense of conception and a full use of historical material."⁵

Thus history will have to be taken into account by any social scientist! What then is the mechanism historical sociology uses to accomplish this task? To be able to classify this point, a definition of historical sociology is in order. As used in this work, the term historical sociology is understood to mean the following: "Historical sociology is an area of general sociology

which, utilizing historical materials, tries to analyze social structures and change over time." In other words, one poses serious questions about the contemporary or the past world, while couching them in historical terms. In clear contrast to the abstracted empiricism, anti-historicism and grand theory building associated with the behavioral revolution after the Second World War, a good example being the works of Talcott Parsons,⁶ historical sociology understands that the present is a product of the past and can, therefore, primarily be analyzed using a historical approach. For example, in the research I am conducting in this work I will have to focus on the past and show how historical patterns are relevant or irrelevant for the present day choices the German foreign policy makers have. The methodological framework in this work will, therefore, have to be historical, because actions are undertaken under circumstances influenced by the past. Historical sociology helps one to understand why certain events took place at certain times. The object is not to establish grand theories, coming up with universal explanations and causations, but to move towards a statement of causation for a specific event at a specific point of time.

Historical sociology is, thus, an attempt to merge history and sociology to answer questions of causation. Here I would also argue that it is imperative for the field of political science to bring about a similar fusion. Clearly a political explanation of events cannot solely be centered around the present, but must be rooted in

the past. We must turn to history for a deeper and more realistic understanding of the present. Especially in political science there is a need to look at history when establishing theories, because the present-day world is a creation of the past and we, therefore, do not only construct our future, but are constrained by the world as it is presented to us. In the words of Philip Abrams: "Men make history under circumstances encountered from the past."⁷ Excluding historical studies from the political science agenda, or more properly phrased, to look down on them, because they are not "scientific" enough, will lead us back to the abstract empiricist, pseudo-universal theories of the behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, this work does not make any general claims of establishing universal, ahistorical theories, but will bring history into its framework, trying to establish causal relationships resulting in foreign policy changes. Historical sociology as employed in this work is an interdisciplinary approach, fusing history and sociology and in addition bringing in political variables. My methodological framework could, therefore, more properly be labeled "Political-Historical Sociology."

So far I have given a definition of historical sociology and have pointed out why it is important to use it as a methodological concept in any kind of analysis. Next, I would like to turn to the vital question of how does it work? How can it be employed? Again, historical sociology asks the question: "How did it happen" and then

using sequential, cumulative causality tries to establish a pattern of significant explanations.

Therefore, the student of historical sociology, must first pick one event or more, which he has hypothetically related to the overall outcome he is trying to explain. According to Philip Abrams, events are specific happenings to be studied, elucidated and explained, which in turn will lead the scholar to a course of events resulting in a given outcome.⁸ How is an event studied? Here it is vital to put the event into a historical context, and to discover the relationships and interaction of structure and individual action which have created the specific event! Historical sociology thus treats events in history as the way social action and social structure create one another.⁹ It is here where we come to the essence of historical sociology; historical sociology is concerned with the relationship of the individual as an agent of change to society as a constraining environment of institutions, values and norms. In other words, events or causal relationships are being explained by focusing on the interplay of structure (institutions) and individual actions. In this process one has to discover, how institutions are being changed by actions, and how they constrain action. In other words, the relationship between individuals or groups and institutions (structure) is being examined to establish causal explanations for certain events. To quote Philip Abrams: "A society is constructed historically by individuals who are constructed historically by society."¹⁰ Here, can we find again the

essence of historicism: Individuals are shaped by society, which in turn influences their thinking. Therefore, the scholar must focus on the historical and social period of a thinker to be able to detect the true meaning behind a scholar's work. Karl Mannheim would have been proud of Abrams.

In conclusion, historical sociology is interested in change and the process of change. It demands the study of social structures, political and economic institutions, important historical personalities and groups. Through the examinations of historical and contemporary events and facts, the scholar is led to theorizing and to the testing of hypotheses to establish a valid explanation of a certain outcome. In George Williams Banger's words: "Historical Sociology is a general theory of institutional change which can be understood over time through the utilization of historical materials."¹¹

The following are characteristics of historical sociology and do provide a guide of how to use the historical sociological methodology. They are taken from the introduction by Theda Skocpol of her edited work Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. For Skocpol historical sociology implies the following: "Historical Sociology is a continuing tradition of research devoted to understanding the nature and effects of large scale structures and fundamental processes of change."¹² According to Skocpol the scholar using the historical-sociological framework must first ask questions concerning social structures and processes relevant to his

research and locate them in time and space. Next, he addresses these processes over time and takes the temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes. Then he has to attend to the interplay of meaningful actions and structural contexts to understand outcomes. Finally, he concludes his research by highlighting the varying features of the patterns of change. This strategy will enable the social scientist to discover causal regularities that account for specifically defined historical processes and outcomes.¹³

To clarify the aforementioned discussion on historical sociology I am now going to outline how I will use this methodology in my research by presenting a brief discussion of the steps I shall take in my later chapters.

First, I chose a subject matter significant to the present, namely, the change in German foreign policy, how it came about, whose actions and what kind of structures led to the processes of change and what its significance for the area of world politics will be. Again, this work will not be pure narrative, but will use a theoretical framework drawn from another discipline to establish the causal relationships leading up to a change in German foreign policy. Furthermore, this analysis will be comparative in focus, by looking at German-American and German-Soviet relations over time to be able to detect changes in those relationships. In addition, I will focus on the interplay between structure and action as demanded by historical sociology. In the structural category I shall include the institutional framework being used by German policy makers. Here I

am referring to the governmental framework, including such important institutions as the Chancellor's office, and the constitutional framework. In this category the Basic Law, and the constraints it places on foreign policy makers, will be examined. For example, the constitutionally limited strength of the armed forces, not to exceed five hundred thousand men, and the ban on German owned nuclear weapons, do clearly restrain the German foreign policy elite.

Finally, the international environment itself, exercising powerful constraints on a country's foreign policy making machine, will round out the structural category.

When focusing on the second portion of the interplay between structure and actions, namely, actions, the role of individuals and groups and their impact on German foreign policy, will be examined. Here, for example, one must investigate the influence of groups like the refugees and the two most powerful German interest groups, the "Bund Deutscher Industriellen" (BDI) and the "Deutscher Gewerkschafts Bund" (DGB) and their influence on foreign policy. Furthermore, the impact of individual leaders like Adenauer and Brandt on foreign policy must be analyzed. For example, would there even have been an active Ostpolitik without Brandt or would Germany have been integrated into the West without the person of Adenauer?

Finally, an adequate explanation for my research problem, the changes that have occurred in German foreign policy over time, namely, during the period from 1949 up to the present, will be the hoped for result!

In conclusion, I will thus look for explanations of changes in German foreign policy which are rooted in history, which will hold good over a certain period of time, and most importantly which will not make any claims to be of an universal nature.

Next, I will now turn to an analysis of my two intervening variables, namely, the primacy of foreign policy and the primacy of domestic policy.

The Ongoing Debate - The Primacy of Foreign Policy Versus the Primacy of Domestic Policy!

This section of Chapter Two will mainly deal with questions concerning the Primat der Aussenpolitik and the Primat der Innenpolitik. It is the purpose of the first part of the following section to go back in time to the writings of the founder of the theory of the primacy of foreign policy, Leopold von Ranke, to analyze them and to perceive the impact Ranke's theories exerted on subsequent historians in Germany and actual policies enacted. It is, therefore, not enough to look at Ranke's writings and discover his main ideas, but we will have to focus also on his influence on historians like Heinrich von Treitschke, Hans Delbrück, Max Lenz, Dietrich Schäfer and Gustav Schmoller, who all believed that the primacy of foreign policy needed to be the driving force behind a nation's policies. The importance of the aforementioned scholars did lay not only in their intellectual achievements, but also in their immense contributions in legitimizing the policies of the Second Empire, especially "Weltpolitik."

Therefore, I shall focus less on Ranke's life, but will thoroughly analyze his thoughts on the state, on the relationship of the individual to the state and especially on the role foreign policy plays within the framework of the state. For those interested in Ranke's personal life, I would recommend a fine book, entitled Leopold Ranke --The Formative Years by Theodore H. von Laue.¹⁴

In the second portion of this section I will then look at a challenging viewpoint, vested in the belief that the domestic, social and economic forces of a nation are driving forces behind a nation's foreign policy. Here I shall focus on the works of Eckart Kehr, the first German scholar who dared to challenge the authority of the theory of Ranke in the nineteen twenties and who subsequently paid bitterly by being ostracized from the academic community in Germany at the time. Finally, I shall then look at an approach, which mixes the two previously mentioned concepts in an analysis of the outbreak of World War I.

In the conclusion I will again reassert my theory that both the primacy of foreign and domestic policy are intervening variables in a nation's foreign policy-making process, depending on the interplay of internal and external variables.

Das Primat der Aussenpolitik--The Theories of Leopold von Ranke--

When looking at Ranke's writings we have to distinguish between Ranke as the founder of the school of historiography and Ranke the politician. Ranke the historian demanded on objective, value-free

science, being opposed to any kind of value-judgmental scholarship. In his works, which were very narrow and eurocentric, Ranke tried again and again to look at history in an objective fashion. The essence of his historiography was to show the past how it actually was without attempting to judge actions or events according to certain moral or ethical standards. His famous phrase "Wie es eigentlich gewesen" (How it actually was) incorporates the main idea behind his scholarship. It was only possible to understand the past, but to judge it, would lead to a subjective interpretation of it, because the scholar himself had already been inculcated with the moral and ethical standards of his own time. In other words, the task of the historian was not to preach or to make moralistic statements, but to look at a certain event and to derive certain objective facts from it. This, Ranke thought could be achieved when the historian would research primary sources, examples being diaries, diplomatic reports or original narratives and only then would he be able, using strict narration, to write about history as it had been, citing his supporting evidence. Using this strictly historicist approach Ranke rejected any kind of universal theories, and even the discipline of philosophy itself. It would, therefore, be easy to label him a-theoretical or a-philosophical. However, when looking at his political writings we can clearly notice that Ranke was a theorist, namely a conservative one, who intended to defend the established order of nineteenth century Prussia. Politics did especially dominate Ranke's scholarship from the period of 1831 until

1836, when he had been appointed editor of the Historisch Politische Zeitschrift, a conservative magazine, representing the views of the Prussian bureaucracy. Here it is imperative to point out that the era in which Ranke had grown up and did most of his political work, was the era of the Concert of Great Powers in Europe. It was the period of the Congress of Vienna, Metternich and Talleyrand and more important, it was the era in which the classical balance of power concept seemed to explain politics the best. Ranke was clearly influenced by his time, as we will see shortly when we look at his political writings.

Only when looking at Ranke's political writings which are all contained within his publications in the Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift, can we truly perceive Ranke's political theories. In the following pages, I will break down Ranke's theories into three different areas. First I shall look at Ranke's theoretical defense of the existing order in Germany against the influence of French liberalism. Next the theoretical foundations of the Prussian state and its relationship to its citizens will be examined and lastly and most importantly for this study, his theories on the primacy of foreign policy and the balance of power concept will be analyzed.

The first order of business for Ranke was to establish a political and theoretical foundation for the defense of Prussian conservatism against the onslaught of liberalism. He succeeded beautifully in this task by declaring that liberalism was unsuited for the German people. His theory went the following: First, every

nation had to develop itself and, more importantly, develop a specific culture with ideas or more properly stated political theories on which its institutions and form of government were based. "Our mother country . . . is in us--Germany is alive in us, we represent it in every country to which we go, in each climate."¹⁵ Ranke here clearly implies that we are born into a culture which precedes every constitution and that we can't change. Therefore, the theory of political liberalism, born in France, would not fit into the Prussian constitutional framework. In contrast to France, where liberalism had led to the excesses of the Reign of Terror, Germany had experienced a quiet, peaceful development. Imposition of a foreign idea on the German people would only lead to disaster; besides, according to Ranke, German princes had never abused their power, so there was no reason to change the system. In the following quotes, Ranke's philosophy becomes clearer:

German princes, unlike Napoleon, had never usurped their power and unlike the Bourbons they had never forfeited it. They do not desert us, we do not desert them; together we face wars and danger--we form one family. . . .¹⁶

Imitation is a form of slavery; individual development is life and freedom.¹⁷

To rephrase Ranke, liberal theory was not universally applicable and the imposition of it onto Germany would not only equal a cultural surrender to the French, but would ultimately lead to disaster, because it would be unsuitable for the distinct German political order based on an independent culture. To quote Ranke again:

You will never build your fatherland out of clever formulations, cut-and-dried constitutional schemes, of a few abstract assumptions about the Rights of Man, and of an

unhistorical notion of a contract between ruler and ruled.¹⁸

What belongs together by nature does not need the latter (liberal institutions). Among parents and children no compact is necessary.¹⁹

For Ranke, Parliaments were divisive influences, threatening the survival of the state itself, while the enlightened monarchy presented order and looked out for the welfare of the whole and not just segments of the population. As can be clearly observed Ranke was one of the most eloquent defenders of the absolutist order not only in Prussia but in the whole of Germany. To be able to analyze his thoughts on the relationship between the state and the individual, a closer look at one of his more famous pieces, "Ein Politisches Gespräch"²⁰ (A Dialogue on Politics), published in 1836 as an article in his *Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift*, is necessary. (For the English translation of this piece see Theodore H. Von Laue, Leopold Ranke--The Formative Years, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. 152-180).

As we have already seen, Ranke rejected any kind of citizen participation in the government in his critique of parliamentary styles of government. For him the duty of every citizen was to serve the state not through participation but through loyalty. The power of a state was not derived from the contributions of parties and people as liberalism claims, because these only created divergences and conflicts in a society by representing narrow interests in turn hurting the overall good. Only the monarch did truly represent the wishes of the majority not being committed to a particular faction in

society. In such a society every citizen performed to his best ability in the certain niche he was best qualified in. For example, politics was not to be engaged in unless you specialized in it, a function fulfilled by the bureaucracy. In turn when being a good citizen, loyal to the state and patriotic, you would be rewarded through public recognition. Therefore, by serving the state you did serve your own interests. The state in turn would be beneficial for you, granting you the freedom to perform to the best of your capabilities in your chosen profession. In Ranke's words: "Rich subjects make a rich state" and "a rich, benevolent state makes rich and good citizens."²¹ Only by serving his state could an individual be truly free. Why then would an individual choose to be subservient to a particular state? To answer this question Ranke went back to the concept of culture. Culture not only determined the kind of institutions one found in a society, thereby ruling out the import of foreign ideologies, but also shaped the prevailing values and ideas in a society. If the right ideas were dominant as in Prussia at the time, and if the state was good and just as the Prussian state was, the citizen would be tied spiritually to his fatherland. He would consider himself to be the member of an harmonious community, working tirelessly to enhance the common good, while at the same time feelings of individualism, localism or provincialism would be overcome. In turn he would be guided by a spiritual principle of patriotism, being bound to the state in a spiritual and irrational manner.

What kind of government represented people the best? Not surprisingly, Ranke opted for the enlightened monarchy, justifying his choice with arguments reminiscent of a future social-Darwinism. According to Ranke, nature did not create men equally, but had installed different talents in each of us. It was, therefore, a citizen's duty to find the profession he was best in and perform in it to the best of his abilities. Therefore, only certain sectors of the population were fit to govern, which did not represent a problem, because they, too, were born and raised in the same culture the other citizens had grown up in and, therefore, would share their values. That leaves us with a major question! Where does the state come from? Ranke clearly rejects any kind of contract theory--so how does he answer this important puzzle? Actually, Ranke never addressed this problem clearly, but from certain phrases one has to believe that he considered God to have given the German people their state.

"Through the difference in states, God gives the idea of humanity its character."²² This perspective of course, makes it impossible to criticize the present system! However, as Georg Iggers points out, Ranke did attempt to detect the metaphysical realities of the state to create a conservative political theory of politics to defend the status quo.²³ For Ranke the state was not an abstract creation, but a concrete one, assuming the characteristics of an individual. It wasn't just a collection of power, but a being with a spiritual idea behind it! Therefore, one couldn't explain the state using abstract theories, because it was organic and unique. "States

are spiritual beings, original creations of the spirit of humankind, ideas of God."²⁴

So far we have discussed Ranke's defense of the Prussian absolutist state against the doctrine of liberalism and the role citizen play in society. Next, I shall now turn to Ranke's thoughts on foreign policy.

As has already been mentioned, Ranke's thoughts were shaped by the social and political environment he had lived in. Not surprisingly Ranke was, therefore, an ardent believer in the balance of power concept, as can be clearly seen in his essay "Die Grossen Mächte" (The Great Powers).²⁵ In it he first attacked the notion of hegemony for destroying the cultural and political growth of other nations through cultural colonialism. If a hegemon should arise, as for example France did under Louis XIV and Napoleon, the balance of power mechanism would automatically bring the other European powers together to defeat the hegemon, as was the case in both Louis XIV and Napoleon's attempt for hegemony. He further stipulated that Prussia herself owed her existence to the balance of strength between the great powers, which in turn demanded of her to be sufficiently armed to be a military threat to any power attempting to break the balance.²⁶ "Kriegsmacht ist eine Notwendigkeit"²⁷ (a powerful fighting machine is a necessity), Ranke used to say. Ironically, Ranke always had pointed out that any attempt to achieve hegemony in Europe was doomed to failure due to the balance of power mechanism at

work in Europe.²⁸ This idea was the only one forgotten by his disciples in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Being a believer in the balance of power concept, it is not surprising that Ranke did develop the theory of the primacy of foreign policy.

The position of a state in the world depends upon the degree of independence it has attained. It is obliged, therefore, to organize all its internal resources for the purpose of self-preservation.²⁹

This is the famous sentence in which Ranke did establish the theory of the primacy of foreign policy. According to Ranke no state (here we have to remember that Ranke wrote on European history with Europe being the center of the world) developed independently, without being influenced by the surrounding powers. The constellation of power in Europe did depend on the internal strength of every country, while the position of the state in the world (Europe) depended upon the kind of independence it had achieved.

The world has been parceled out. To be somebody you have to rise by your own efforts. You must achieve genuine independence. Your rights will not be voluntarily ceded to you. You must fight for them.³⁰

Therefore, the state would have to fight for its independence and rights, necessitating a strong military force and good diplomacy. Following the words of Frederick the Great, Ranke believed that the state was "toujours en vendette." "Military power requires that the demands of the military be satisfied incessantly and unstintingly."³¹ Ranke, thus, expected that war was always imminent, because somebody would challenge the balance of power. In addition,

he did not look at war as being evil or a bad thing. "War is the father of all things--it tests the moral fiber of a state and rejuvenates a nation."³² Furthermore, statesmen were not bound by any kind of international morality, but their highest moral duty was to preserve the state at any costs. Agreeing with Machiavelli that the end justifies the means, Ranke like Hegel became one of the godfathers of subsequent German Realpolitik half a century later.

Thus, the major obligation for the state was self-preservation. All other goals would have to be subordinated to it. Identifying self-preservation with independence, Ranke argued that the moral duty of the state was to organize all of its internal resources for the purpose of achieving this overarching objective. The supreme law of the state was to achieve and maintain independence, the success of which would in turn determine the role the state could play in the international balance of power arena.

Being born through struggle, only the subordination of all kinds of domestic interests and a powerful military machine could guarantee true independence. Every domestic obstacle towards the achievement of the supreme goal, would have to be eliminated. It is here, in this line of thought, where the concept of the primacy of foreign policy, the subordination of internal politics to external politics, becomes the guiding principle of a nation's policy. For Ranke, the father of the theory of the primacy of foreign policy, foreign affairs was unquestionably the supreme factor in political life. Only the doctrine of the supremacy of foreign policy over domestic policy

could guarantee the establishment of a strong state and only a strong state would survive, while the weak ones would be crushed by their enemies or would be toppled by their dissatisfied citizens, an example being France in 1789.

On the other hand, if a nation followed Ranke's doctrine, it would be able to compete with the other great powers, and if they, as was the case in Germany, refused to cede certain rights or even to recognize the new state as a great power, this condition would have to be overcome through power politics and armed struggle. "Um etwas zu sein, muss man sich erheben aus eigener Kraft, freie Selbständigkeit entwickeln, und das Recht, das uns nicht zugestanden wird, müssen wir uns erkämpfen."³³ (To be someone (something), one has to rise up through one's own power, one has to develop one's independence, and the rights, which are being denied, will have to be fought for.) (Translation by author.)

In conclusion, Ranke believed in an almost god-given balance of power system, in which a state could only survive in, when it was internally strong and followed the logic of the primacy of foreign policy doctrine, stressing old diplomacy, and furthermore had the capability to fight a major war at anytime to restore the precious balance.

So far we have only discussed Ranke's thoughts up to 1836 when officially his active political life came to an end. In the following years, Ranke withdrew himself from politics, focusing on his academic work at the University of Berlin. However, from

lectures given to his students we can see that he never reneged on his belief in the primacy of foreign policy or his doctrinaire conservative theories. For example after 1848 it had become clear that Ranke perceived in rising industrialism a threat to the established order. He considered it to contribute to the disintegration of traditional social bonds on which the Prussian regime was based, because now the masses possessed political power and looked upon the beneficial state as an evil, the protector of large-scale industries. At the same time he did support an unemployment insurance system as early as 1848 as a guarantee against popular uprisings. Later on, he did come out in favor of academic censorship, again believing that internal dissent would weaken the state against its foreign enemies. Only once in his life, did Ranke actually support a liberal constitution, and that was for the sole purpose of bringing the Southern German states into a German federation under Prussia's control.

In the following brief paragraph I would now like to take a look at some prominent German historians during the time of the Second Empire (1871-1918), who had taken up Ranke's theory of the primacy of foreign policy and whose works were very influential in shaping the outlook of the German Bourgeoisie and in supporting the monarchy.

First, we find Heinrich von Treitschke, the god-father of German-nationalistic political history. Despising Ranke, for not being actively involved in contemporary German politics, he nevertheless accepted his theory of the primacy of foreign policy.

Considering pure, objective historical science a waste of time, Treitschke started out to combine history and politics to establish a historical basis for the newly-founded German Empire and its claims. The result was his famous nine-volume work "German History in the Nineteenth Century" in which he ingeniously combined historical facts with political diatribe. For him history was only a tool in pursuing political goals. Having been shaped by the ideas of Hegel, Aristotle and Ranke on foreign policy, Treitschke believed in the supremacy of the aristocracy which had the god-given right to rule and showed open contempt for the biologically inferior lower classes. Being a member of the German Parliament (Reichstag), Treitschke was an ardent advocate of a strong colonial policy to catch up or even overcome the other great powers on the European continent, thereby establishing Germany as a world power. Using Ranke's theory of the primacy of foreign policy, Treitschke emphasized the power needs of the state over everything else.

The importance of Treitschke for Germany was not only his tireless support of the primacy of foreign policy, his fervent nationalism, or his hatred for the French, British and Russian peoples, but his real-life influence on the German people through his books, which were the most widely read ones on German history and especially through the lectures he presented at the University of Berlin where he shaped the minds of thousands of future bureaucrats.

Next, I would like to take a brief look at the so-called "Berlin Historians," using Charles E. McClelland's term.³⁴

In this group one finds usually included the likes of Hans Delbrück, Max Lenz, Dietrich Schäfer and Gustav Schmoller, all active in teaching history at the University of Berlin in the late nineteenth century. In addition, they all shared a belief in the primacy of foreign policy, which they used to justify the German quest for colonies and a strong navy, commonly labeled "Weltpolitik." Like Ranke, they did engage in politics on behalf of the government, working on justifications for an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy which would give Germany the status and prestige of a world power in the late nineteenth century, while at the same time insuring her economic survival. Being a new world power they argued that Germany did deserve a fair share of colonies and that in turn justified the build-up of a new powerful fleet to protect the increasing commercial ties with the new German colonies and the rest of the world. The colonies themselves they argued were needed to face off an imminent overpopulation of Germany and more importantly to show the other great powers that Germany was now one of them and would play its predestined role in the concert of great powers. According to Dietrich Schäfer: "Germany must expand or die."³⁵ Only the creation of a powerful German fleet would give Germany the necessary foundation to be a partner in the balance of power games, which in turn were vital for the survival of the state. This clearly was a justification of the German fleet based on Ranke's theory of the primacy of foreign policy. Not any domestic demands necessitated

the build-up of the German fleet, but the justifications for it were layered in purely foreign policy arguments.

Again, the importance of these scholars does not only lay in the area of scholarship, but in their defense of the current regime and more importantly in their impact on the German middle classes, who widely read their works and listened to them in speeches. All of them were violently pro-colonial, anti-British and actively involved in the creation of the German fleet. Like Ranke, they served their government loyally and helped to turn the theory of the primacy of foreign policy into the dominant paradigm in German political thought during the "Second Empire."

As Fritz Fischer points out: "Lenz, Schmoller, Schäfer, Hintze --all saw Germany fulfilling her world mission . . . which her army and navy would ensure for her . . . against the cultural monopoly of the Anglo-Saxons and the Russo-Muscovite world."³⁶ They were a product of their times, an era where Germany had finally been reborn, united at last and where it now faced the envy and hatred of the already established powers, namely Great Britain, France, and Russia, attempting their best to keep the new German Empire from taking its rightful place among the great powers. Not surprisingly were the German patriots and nationalists, using the ideas of the greatest historian of the nineteenth century, Leopold von Ranke, in their defense of German foreign policy. As E. H. Carr stated over twenty years ago: "The historian is a social phenomenon, both the product and the conscious or unconscious spokesman of the society to which he

belongs; it is in this capacity that he approaches the facts of the historical past."³⁷

In the next section of this chapter I shall now turn towards an anti-Rankean viewpoint on foreign policy by examining the works of Eckart Kehr.

Das Primat der Innenpolitik-- The Theories of Eckart Kehr

At a time when Ranke's theory of the primacy of foreign policy was still a paradigm in German political thought, Eckart Kehr received his degree in history from the University of Berlin. In his writings he set out to challenge the contemporary paradigm, which led to his ostracism from the German academic community. Labeled a communist by the historical establishment, Kehr's works found only recognition abroad, especially in the United States in the person of Charles Beard. It was only after the Second World War that Kehr's works found the recognition they deserved in the German academic community. For a closer look at Kehr's life, I would recommend the introduction written by Hans-Ulrich Wehler in Kehr's collected essays, published in 1965.³⁸

In this section I will focus less on Kehr's life, but will conduct a thorough analysis of his collected essays, to be able to examine his thoughts on foreign policy, which constitute a direct challenge to Ranke's theories. In brief, Kehr theorized the following way:

Foreign policy is actually a product of domestic, social and economic conflict. Therefore, foreign policy is not a response to external causes, as Ranke had stipulated, but

is the result of manipulations by interest groups for their material, social and political advantages.

In one sentence, Kehr sought to refute the whole school of German historiography. Not surprisingly his faulting of domestic interest groups for the outbreak of the First World War, instead of the common view of blaming of the Allies, did not go over well with the conservative German academic community.

In his essays,³⁹ Kehr believed to have discovered that Bismarck was neither a great statesman, a broker in the balance of power game, as was widely believed, nor that the external policies of Germany were guided by the actions of the other great powers. He did so, by focusing on the issues surrounding the build-up of the German fleet in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. While traditional German historians justified the building of a powerful fleet to give Germany some leeway when dealing with other powers, especially Great Britain, Kehr focused in on the domestic situation. In his essay "Anglophobia and Weltpolitik"⁴⁰ he advances the following argument:

Foreign policy is not the key to understanding all other aspects of political, economic or social life and it does not fall in a realm of autonomous objective political norms, but it is directly the product of domestic infighting by interest groups.⁴¹

He then backs up his hypothesis by looking at German-Russo and Anglo-German relations in the late nineteenth century. Clearly the primacy of foreign policy theory would have demanded that Germany would remain on a good footing with both of those countries, to avoid having to fight a two-front war against the traditional enemy,

France. However, the ruling Junker aristocracy was directly threatened by cheap Russian grain imports, undermining its economic position, while the newly established German industries felt threatened by the power of the merchant nation of Great Britain.

Therefore, despite being ideologically close to the Russian ruling elite, the Junkers became more and more anti-Russian, while the German bourgeoisie turned anti-British. United through a fear of the proletariat, organized in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the two camps joined forces in Miquel's famous "Sammlungspolitik" in the late 1890s, resulting in policies harmful to the survival of the German state, namely the tariffs against Russian grains and the build-up of the German fleet, demanded by the big industrialists and the feudalized German bourgeoisie. With one stroke Germany managed to alienate two possible allies against France, the Russian and British Empires. In Kehr's eyes this was clear proof that the iron law of the primacy of foreign policy was not at work, but that foreign policy was determined by the social structure of Germany. "Foreign policy is, therefore, a means to domestic ends."⁴² Furthermore, Machtpolitik (policy of national strength) was used as a tool to unite all Germans, including the proletariat, behind the state. In other words foreign policy was used for domestic purposes, being in the process turned into one of the major causes of the First World War.

This new aggressive foreign policy, resulting out of domestic infighting was in turn only made possible through the feudalization

of the German bourgeoisie. As soon as the officers of the German Armed Forces could no longer solely be recruited from the Prussian aristocracy, it was determined that the middle classes would have to be included into the German army's officer corps. For this purpose the "Reserve Officer Corps" was established, mandating a one year service by all middle class young males, in turn feudalizing them in the process. An alliance between the state, dominated by the Prussian Junkers, and the bourgeoisie had been established.

In conclusion, Kehr proclaimed that foreign policy was not the product of purely external stimuli, but was actually a response to domestic problems.

To be able to contrast his arguments with those of a neo-Rankean, I will now give a Rankean explanation justifying the build-up of the German fleet. For a disciple of Ranke, the fleet was a necessity in the early twentieth century, being demanded by the classical balance of power concept. Germany now being a great power, clearly faced a hostile international environment, in which all nations had only one objective, the quest for power. Conflict was very likely to occur, necessitating a strong and powerful military machine to ensure the survival of the state. Clearly in such an environment, the state led by professional bureaucrats, would solely follow the dictates of its inner necessity. With the survival of the state on line all internal problems would be secondary to any external ones. Having suddenly become one of the major powers, Germany had new economic and political global interests. Colonies

had to be acquired less for economic reasons, all German colonies turned out to be non-profitable, but for political ones. Being a great power necessitated colonies. Without them, German prestige would have suffered, in turn undermining German security. As Ernst von Halle points out: "A state with maritime or global interests must be in a position to back up these interests and make its power felt beyond its territorial waters."⁴³ Therefore, the international environment itself necessitated for Germany to have a powerful fleet to ensure its prestige and more importantly its chances for survival. The expansion of the fleet was intended to provide Germany with a power base to conduct a successful foreign policy.

A middle of the road approach, though emphasizing the domestic variables more, is provided by Volker Berghahn in his book Germany and the Approach of War in 1914.⁴⁴ In it Berghahn focuses on the domestic aspects of German foreign policy, analyzing the build-up of the German fleet in detail. For him the fleet and later the army build-up was an attempt by the ruling elites, pre-industrial and violently anti-parliamentarian, to establish not only a ruling conservative coalition in Parliament, but also to unite public opinion behind the monarchy. However, the plan backfired when the build-up led to massive budget deficits, resulting in unpopular taxes. By 1914 the domestic situation had become so desperate for the ruling aristocracy that they had decided that only a war could prevent them from losing power. However, while pursuing this kind of analysis, Berghahn does not neglect the international arena, as, for example,

Kehr does. He clearly points out the desperate geopolitical situation Germany found itself in, in 1914. Having alienated Britain through the naval arms race, the Empire was now surrounded by enemies, who were getting stronger by the day, as, for example, the Russian Empire was, while Germany's main ally, Austria-Hungary, was declining at considerable speed. Therefore, facing a foreign situation equally desperate as the domestic one, Germany opted for a war, which it hoped would unite the nation behind the monarchy, at a time when there was still a small chance that Germany might win a war. Clearly by 1917, the Russian Empire would have been too strong to make such an outcome possible. Berghahn, thus, combines the two variables, the domestic and the foreign one, when analyzing the outbreak of the First World War.

Conclusion

As we can see both positions tend to be very doctrinaire and static. On one side we find Ranke's theory of the primacy of foreign policy, which totally disregards any kind of influence upon foreign policy located within the internal domestic sphere. The disregard of especially economic variables might have been justifiable in the early nineteenth century, but clearly as soon as Germany started to industrialize in the latter part of the century its economic policies did exert an influence upon foreign policy. At the same time one could disregard social influences during the period of absolute aristocratic rule, but as soon as the bourgeoisie gained political and, more importantly, economic influence, one could not

justify leaving this variable out. Kehr, therefore, makes a good point stating that the social and economic structure of a nation does exert a certain amount of influence on a country's foreign policy. However, at the same time he does fall into the same reductionist trap, many vulgar Marxists like him fall into, by making the domestic environment the sole determinant of a foreign policy of a nation, totally disregarding the many influences in the international environment that impact the foreign policy-making process. When looking at the period of the Second Empire, the era Kehr covers in most of his work, we can clearly observe international incidents which did influence German foreign policy. First, there was the Delagoa Bay incident of 1899, in which a British cruiser seized several German steamships, believing that they were carrying contraband for the Boers in South Africa, actively involved in a war with Great Britain, which did arouse anger in Germany, leading to the demand of a fleet able to protect German overseas trade. Next, we find the quarrel between Britain and Germany over the island of Samoa again pointing out the inferiority of the German navy. Here we could also include the 1905 Russo-Japanese war, in which the dangers of an old, outdated fleet could be observed and the two Moroccan crisis, in which Germany again was forced to back down, due to the lack of a powerful fleet. Finally, the international environment itself necessitated the construction of a fleet. In a multipolar system, as existed until 1945, a nation could not rely on allies, because they could easily switch sides, as we did see in the 1890s when the

Russians joined an alliance with the French, forcing in turn every nation to rely on its own power and prestige. Clearly a Germany without a strong navy would have been at the mercy of the French or British fleets in the case of war. Furthermore, the prospect of a blockade of Germany alone, destroying German international trade and leading to famine, would have justified the construction of a naval force. Therefore, any explanation solely rooted in the sphere of economics must be rejected, while one centering on the interdependence of the two variables, an example being the work of Berghahn, seems to provide for the strongest explanations. However, I would argue that a foreign policy made in isolation of domestic concerns can take place when certain variables, domestic and international, fall into the right place, an example being the Adenauer era, while on the other hand explanations of foreign policy-making in isolation of the international environment as Kehr seems to advocate are not possible at all. This hypothesis will be further explored in the next chapter. Interestingly, another theory, integral to the primacy of foreign policy approach, geopolitics, seems to stage a comeback in analyzing German history in recent years. For example, Michael Stürmer has rediscovered the powerful explanatory variable geopolitics provides when he discusses the German middle or center position in Europe. In his book Das Ruhelose Reich,⁴⁵ he explores the relationship between geography and the process of internal democratization in the Second Empire. For him the location of Germany is, therefore, a decisive argument regarding

all explanations of its internal structure. Being in the heart of Europe, always threatened by potentially hostile neighbors, Germany needed to be prepared for war all the time. This situation demanded the creation of a powerful army, based on a militaristic, cultural tradition. Only a moderate foreign policy, exemplified by Bismark, protected Germany from being crushed by its jealous neighbors, who preferred a weak European middle. It was, therefore, necessary to keep the popular democratic ideas out of the government, because the populace, uninformed and emotional as it is, would destroy the precious balance through irrational demands. For Stürmer it is, therefore, not the lack of democracy that contributed to the outbreak of the First World War, but the yielding of the nobility to bourgeois demands. Clearly Ranke's theory that internal freedom depends on external pressure can be seen throughout Stürmer's work.

Germany's fate lays thus in its geography. Stürmer makes a valid point when he discusses how the creation of a unified Germany destroyed the balance of power in Europe. Not surprisingly the French or Russians would have preferred a weak center, exemplified by a divided, Germany. In turn they did constitute a threat to the newly created Reich, which demanded a strong German army. However, his claims that a more authoritarian regime would have done better in dealing with its neighbors can be questioned. Personally, though, I would argue that a general point can be made that the exclusion of the populace, uninformed and passionate as it usually is, fosters a more pragmatic, flexible foreign policy. Clearly the traditional,

secret diplomacy of the nineteenth century demonstrates just that case.

Is geopolitics, therefore, old and outdated. In my opinion just the opposite is true. Geopolitics is an important independent variable in the ongoing research on foreign policy in any country. Regrettably it has been discredited through the works of people like Haushofer, which might explain its absence in German scientific circles. I would, therefore, argue that geography is an important variable in any analysis of German history. It has contributed to the problems Germany has been facing for the last centuries. Friedrich Meinecke's statement that Germany's geography presented it with a choice between "Depressionsgebiet" (area of depression), exemplified by the period of 1648 until 1871, and "Machtstaat" (power state) realized from 1871 until 1945 does still have a high degree of validity.⁴⁶

Another example of the return to geopolitics is presented to us in David Calleo's work, The German Problem Reconsidered.⁴⁷ In it, Calleo examines different theories of why a German problem, resulting in war, existed. He especially points out the importance of geography and the timing of German reunification. By uniting so late, the Germans did upset the existing balance of power, thereby incurring the wrath of the older powers. It was not that the Germans were more aggressive than the British, French or Russians, but their late challenge to the existing international order made them out to be so. Furthermore, geography presented a clear handicap to the

newly united Germans. Neither having the vast hinterlands, the United States or the Russian Empire enjoyed, nor being able to control a world empire like the British, enabling them to rely on free trade, the Germans were presented with two options. First, they could become a free trade export machine, which would have made them dependent on British assurances regarding free access to colonies on the world's oceans. Second, they could strive for autarky, which entailed an expansive war towards the East to get access to necessary resources and markets.

The "Great Depression" of the late nineteenth century soon required the imposition of tariffs due to internal pressures, undermining the free trade options and alienating the Russian Empire. It was, therefore, not a special aspect of German culture, or the German ruling elites, who were pro-British and anti-Weltpolitik, but geography and the timing of reunification which destroyed Germany. One cannot blame the German people for wanting to have a nation-state of their own. However, in their quest for an equal position among the world powers, they had no choice but to incur the enmity of the established powers. Only the creation of a bipolar world structure, coupled with the partition of Germany has been able to solve the German problem for now. Being integrated into their respective world systems, the two Germanies have finally overcome their isolation in the center of Europe. The "little" Germany version has been victorious and the West Germans turned into an export machine again, having their markets and resources guaranteed by the United States.

However, now, having become an economic superpower, again, West Germany may face the choice of choosing between an Atlantic Option or a Continental European one, resulting in a new "German" problem.

Now, after having briefly discussed two works based on the theory of geopolitics let us return to the previous discussion.

In conclusion, it seems that both theories, the "Primat der Aussenpolitik" and the "Primat der Innenpolitik" have obvious weaknesses. One disregards the influence of any domestic social or economic forces, while the other does not take the international environment into account. Logic would dictate one to assume that both would influence foreign policy-making at the same time. This would be my hypothesis, with one major exception! I am going to argue that it is possible for one of the two to dominate foreign policy-making for a time, as one of my intervening variables. In the next chapters I hope that, I will be able to demonstrate that during the "Adenauer Era" (1949-1963) one of my intervening variables, namely the primacy of foreign policy was dominant, while the primacy of domestic policy was dormant until the early 1960s when the forced resignation of Adenauer and a changing domestic and international environment brought it back into full force.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

PUBLIC OPINION

This chapter will in its entirety focus on German public opinion from 1949 up until the present. Public opinion as remarked earlier, is one of my five independent variables, influencing foreign policy. I will, therefore, attempt to show in this chapter how German public opinion has changed quite dramatically over the last forty years, especially in regard to German-American and German-Soviet relations. Furthermore, I hope to show that this change has directly contributed to a change in German foreign policy. In other words I claim that a shift in public opinion has contributed towards a more independent German foreign policy as demonstrated by the Brandt, Schmidt or even the Kohl administrations.

In addition, I hope to demonstrate that during the Adenauer era, public opinion, by being subservient to the Chancellor or even indifferent, directly contributed to the success of the primacy of foreign policy model. Again, my hypothesis is the following: "The primacy of foreign policy approach, as outlined in the last chapter, has only a chance of success, when public opinion is either supportive, subservient, or indifferent towards the Chancellor's conduct of policies or if the Chancellor is sufficiently secure from the impact of public opinion, so that he can ignore it. If, however, the public places more emphasis on goals falling into the category of

the primacy of domestic policy, it is impossible for a democratic leader to pursue a foreign policy based on the primacy of foreign policy model."

Let us now turn to the evolution of German public opinion over the last forty years.

German Public Opinion (1949-1989)

As explained above, this work will focus only on public opinion polls taken after the Second World War. The major reason is that in Germany it was not until after the Second World War that systematic public opinion surveys started to be taken. Clearly any unscientific polls taken during the second or third Empire are of little value for this study.

To begin with I would like to tackle the question whether there has been a rise in anti-Americanism in Germany in the last years. This should provide us with a starting point in analyzing changes in German public opinion in the last forty years.

In recent years, especially on the side of the Americans, more and more concern has been expressed about a rising anti-Americanism in Europe, especially in Germany. More and more the perception has arisen that Germany has become an unpredictable and unreliable partner. That special relationship that has existed between the two countries seems to be weakening. The fear of a more nationalistic, even undemocratic streak within German society is starting to be expressed on an increasing basis. This concern about a rise in anti-Americanism is one, which has to be taken seriously. More and more

has there been a trend in Germany away from the solid pro-American stands of the Adenauer or even the Brandt and Schmidt eras. Especially among the left parties, the Greens and the Social Democrats, anti-Americanism and talk about neutralism have become fashionable. Among the groups responsible for the rise of anti-Americanism we will also have to include the German Protestant Church, which by now has totally abandoned the concept of non-involvement in politics. The next few quotations from prominent left-wing politicians and members of the Protestant Church will show that anti-Americanism is indeed alive in Germany. Hans Magnus Enzensberger perceives the Federal Republic of Germany to be a satellite colony or even a protectorate of the United States.¹ Hans Jochen Vogel, the most likely social-democratic candidate for Chancellor in the December 1990 elections, calls upon the Germans to stop being vassals of the United States.² Heinrich Alberts, one of the most prominent theologians in Germany labels the Federal Republic a country occupied by the United States.³ One of his colleagues, Dorothee Sölle refers to West Germany as an American military colony.⁴ Egon Bahr, the most respected social democratic foreign policy expert, claims that not the Germans but others make decisions concerning their existence.⁵ Not to be outdone Oscar Lafontaine, another prospective candidate for the Chancellorship, proclaims that in the long run neither American nor Soviet soldiers have anything to do in Europe.⁶ An even more radical viewpoint can be found among the protestant clergy. Martin Gollwitzer, for example, states that

the Germans have unconditionally surrendered to foreign interests. Even though it is difficult to top the aforementioned statements, Dorothee Sölle manages just that when she proclaims that God practiced unilateral disarmament in Jesus Christ, that Adenauer sold the country out to the Americans and that the American culture is the most aggressive in the world.⁷

The Green party in turn has already called for Germany to leave NATO. An important factor to stress is that the above-mentioned personalities are not isolated, but very prominent spokesmen for the Social-Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Protestant Church. All of them enjoy a high level of respect, especially among the younger population.

Even a respected historian like Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who can clearly not be counted as a conservative supporter, suddenly feels the need to speak out against the left, which according to him plays down the Russian threat. Not the invaders of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, but the United States have become the aggressor for a large portion of the German left.⁸

Especially the Social-Democratic party which had recognized Western integration in the early 1960s seems to have abandoned that goal. It cannot be counted among the atlanticist parties anymore, if one of its leaders, Oscar Lafontaine openly calls for a leaving of NATO to follow the French principle. A recent analysis of party newspapers has shown that on an increasing basis the call for a new "socialist" Europe is to be heard. Even former Chancellor Schmidt

seems to have become a Gaullist in his old days, calling for a "Europeanization" of NATO under French and German leadership. He even advocates the belief that a joint French-German army can alone fight off the Soviets, while the United States has become an unreliable partner to him, as demonstrated by its actions in Reykjavik when President Reagan went over the heads of his European allies in his talks with Soviet Premier Gorbachev.⁹

It seems that the widespread belief in the decline of the hegemon has even moved conservatives to a position of less reliance upon the United States.

How has the public reacted to such a change in elite opinion. Not surprisingly, it has followed suit now increasingly believing that the Soviet Union is a satisfied power, wanting peace in Europe. The Soviet actions taken in the 1970s, its aggressive expansion in Africa, and its massive rearmament programs in turn leading to the NATO dual track decision in 1979, were widely ignored by the German political elites, including the media and the social scientists. Instead one focused on peace research, even calling the Soviet Union a "security partner."¹⁰ Not surprisingly the German public has been lulled into a sense of total security, not only by Gorbachev himself, but especially by the German political elites. At the same time a rise in anti-Americanism took place. For example, heavy protests against the American invasion of Grenada, or American involvement in Nicaragua were launched, while the Soviet slaughter of the Afghan people was ignored. In other words, the idealist notions of peace,

arms control, interdependence and especially detente prevented the Germans from being able to clearly perceive reality. This was not always the case. As late as the early 1980s, most political scientists still were able to claim that no significant rise in neutralism or anti-Americanism had taken place in Germany and they were correct to do so as the next section shows.

In the early 1980s most polls did not substantiate a claim of the rise of anti-Americanism in Germany as the following examples do clearly show!

TABLE 3.1

Question: If we had to opt between one of the two possibilities - what is more important for the future of the German people - a close relationship with the United States or a close relationship with the Soviet Union?¹¹

	1954	1975	1979	1981
	% June	% October	% November	% Mai
United States -	62	52	63	65
Soviet Union -	10	12	12	6
Tie -	28	36	25	29
	100	100	100	100

TABLE 3.2

Question: "Do you like the Americans, or do you not especially care for them?"¹²

	1957	1961	1965	1967	1973	1975	1979	1980	1981	1982
	Jan	Apr	May	Jan	Jun	Mar	Aug	Sep	Sep	Nov
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Like Them	37	51	58	47	48	42	50	51	56	53
Do Not Especially Care For Them	24	16	19	24	24	21	23	22	18	22
Undecided	39	33	23	29	28	37	27	27	26	25
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 3.3

Question: "With which of these countries should we seek the closest possible cooperation?"¹³

	8/1954	9/1959	8/1963	11/1968	8/1972	9/1975	8/1980	1983
USA	78%	81%	90%	81%	76%	79%	80%	79%
France	46	48	70	68	63	63	69	66
Britain	58	49	65	59	55	47	46	49
Japan	35	32	31	35	44	35	40	40
Russia	22	31	27	35	49	38	20	38

TABLE 3.4

Question: "If you would read tomorrow in the newspaper that the United States have decided to remove their troops from Europe, would you applaud or regret that decision"?¹⁴

	1956	1957	1962	1970	1973	1976	1978	1979	1981	1982
	Jul	Dec	Jun	May	Jun	Jun	Aug	Sep	Oct	Oct
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Applaud	57	34	12	22	23	15	17	11	17	21
Regret	22	34	59	51	45	55	57	60	59	55
Undecided	27	32	29	27	32	30	26	29	24	24
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

What kind of conclusion can we draw from the aforementioned polls? Clearly a rise in anti-Americanism in Germany had not yet taken place in the early 1980s. As polls show the feelings of support and friendship toward the United States had remained more or less constant over the last decade and a half. Indeed the polls do show that after an initial period of hostility toward the United States, explainable by the fact that the United States used to be an enemy and later on one of the occupying powers of Germany, the United States soon became the closest and most liked ally of the Germans!

Has, however, the German attitude toward the Soviet Union changed as dramatically in the last years? It is to this question that we turn to now by looking at public opinion data concerning the Soviet Union, taken over a period of forty years.

Not surprisingly do we find that there existed a large amount of distrust, even hate towards the Soviet Union early on. Clearly the experiences of brutality encountered by the German people at the hands of the Russian army could not be so soon forgotten. Furthermore, the blockade of Berlin, the destruction of the SPD in East Germany and especially the brutal put-down of the 1953 uprising in East Germany could not be forgiven. The next three tables will empirically demonstrate that fact.

TABLE 3.5

Question: "Do you think the Russians are still interested in making the whole of Germany communist, or would you say they are gradually abandoning these plans"?¹⁵

	September 1955
Still want to make Germany communist	56%
Abandoning their plans	15%
Do not know	29%

TABLE 3.6

Question: "Many people say that the Russians still consider it their most important objective to make the whole world communist. Do you think this view is right or wrong"?¹⁶

	Jun	Sep	Apr
	1955	1955	1965
Right	54%	60%	61%
Wrong	17%	14%	14%
Undecided/no opinion	29%	26%	25%

Clearly the last two polls show us that the German people felt threatened by the Soviet Union, which in turn led them to become more supportive of Adenauer's policies of integration into the West, which alone guaranteed their security.

However, in addition to the feeling of being threatened by Russia, the German public also seemed to dislike Russians personally as can be seen by the next three polls.

TABLE 3.7

Question: Would you like to go to Russia for a holiday if the Russians opened their frontiers to tourist traffic, or would you not consider it?"¹⁷ "How would you characterize the Russians?"¹⁸

	September 1955
Would not consider it	61%
Would like to go there	21%
Perhaps	13%
Do not know	5%

TABLE 3.8

"Characteristic of Russians"

Unpredictable	56%	Agree
Inconsiderate, brutal	46%	Agree
Pig-headed, obstinate	41%	Agree

TABLE 3.9

Question: "What, generally speaking, was your experience in 1945 when the country was occupied"?¹⁹

June 1950

In Zone Occupied By:

	British Troops %	American Troops %	French Troops %	Russian Troops %
Unpleasant	37	49	65	95
Pleasant	16	15	7	1
Noticed Little	47	36	28	4
	100	100	100	100

As the tables show, the German public perceived the Soviet Union to be an aggressor, feeling threatened by it, in turn leading to dislike of the Russian people itself. Clearly public opinion towards the Soviets was an outgrowth of personal experiences with Russian troops, Russian expansion in Eastern Europe and, of course, Russian refusal to reunite Germany along the lines of acceptable terms. These feelings in turn led to substantial support for Adenauer's policies, including integration into the Western Alliance and the policies of strength, especially up until sovereignty was achieved in 1955. Very interestingly, the East Germans, too, agreed in high numbers with Adenauer's foreign policy, especially the policy of strength, proclaiming that Soviet expansionism had to be counterbalanced by a united free world, which due to its superior

economic and political system would engage the Soviet Union into a defensive struggle, until the Soviet Union would not be able to cope with Western strength anymore and, therefore, would have to settle with or fold before the West. Only then would German reunification in peace and freedom be possible.

As can be seen, this theory rules out any advantage of being neutral and also has a strong anti-communist policy of the Western Alliance as its basis. Adherence to this theory further explains the rejection of any policy of detente with the Soviet Union by Adenauer.

Again, this policy was widely popular in both Germanies, because it secured both, reunification in peace and freedom and integration into the Western Alliance. So, for example, a vast majority of East Germans, to be precise seventy-nine percent,²⁰ applauded Adenauer's rejection of the Gotewohl proposal in March 1951. A Soviet proposal in spring 1952 and Adenauer's rejection of it elicited support by seventy-two percent of all East Germans for Adenauer's policies.²¹ Even West German rearmament tended to be supported by a majority of East Germans.²² In conclusion, Adenauer's foreign policies did enjoy wide popular support not only in West Germany but also in East Germany.

Not surprisingly Adenauer's foreign policies, especially the belief in the policies of strength, became deeply entrenched in German public opinion in turn turning the German republic into one of the most dogmatic anti-communist nations in the free world. It was

not until the advent of the first social-democratic administration under Brandt in 1969 that a new foreign policy towards the East was pursued.

In conclusion, Adenauer's policies towards the East were supported by a large majority of the German public, who still were extremely fearful of the Russians by the time he left office, in turn increasing dependence upon the United States. Most polls do show us that whenever the Soviet Empire reacts in an aggressive manner in the international system, this will have an adverse negative effect on public opinion. For example, when asked whether they felt menaced by Russia, the highest number of positive responses tend to come after a crisis situation involving Soviet use of force. However, Brandt's conciliatory policies towards the East, had a positive effect on public opinion, dramatically reducing the number of people feeling menaced by the Soviet Union. Interestingly Ostpolitik only provided for temporary euphoria and goodwill towards the Soviet Union. After initial hopes were largely disappointed, public opinion returned to a pre-Ostpolitik level, as Table 10 shows:²³

TABLE 3.10

Question: "Do you feel menaced by Russia, or not"?

	Menaced	Undecided	Not Menaced
1952	66%	19%	15%
1958	51%	22%	27%
1964	39%	24%	37%
1968	54%	14%	32%
1971	28%	26%	46%
1976	47%	15%	38%
1979	35%	19%	46%
1980	44%	22%	34%

However, after the initial shock of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had receded, German public opinion seemed to become fonder and fonder of the Soviet Union, culminating in what is today usually referred to as "Gorbimania." Here it is important to point out that already by 1983 a more optimistic outlook towards the Soviet Union had occurred as Table 11 shows.²⁴

TABLE 3.11

Question: "Do you believe that the Russians are showing today the goodwill for a better understanding with the West, or do you not think so?"

	1959	1965	1970	1974	1977	1980	1981	1983
	Apr	Apr	Apr	Jul	Feb	Jan	Jul	Jan
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
I believe	17	23	33	29	27	16	36	45
I do not believe	57	56	46	55	60	70	48	37
No opinion	26	21	21	16	13	14	16	18

This more positive outlook on the Soviet Empire then started to gain momentum with the accession of Gorbachev to power.

With the consolidation of power by Soviet Premier Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, elite and subsequently public opinion then continued to change at a faster pace. His policies of arms control and disarmament were tailor-made for the Germans, who, of course, know that they are going to be the first ones destroyed in the event of war. Now, they suddenly felt that there was a possibility to overcome this feeling of insecurity. Furthermore, hopes of German reunification, which were all but dead in the 1970s, started to reemerge. Not surprisingly, public opinion towards the United States and the Soviet Union began to change soon. By 1987 Germans considered Gorbachev to be more trustworthy than President Reagan.²⁵

More importantly, for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany did more people wish to have closer relations with the Soviet Union than with the United States, as the following poll will show:

TABLE 3.12

Question: "With which of these countries should we seek the closest possible cooperation"?²⁶

	1980	1983	10/1987
	%	%	%
USA	80	79	86
USSR	20	38	91

Furthermore, fifty-nine percent of all Germans proclaimed that they have a lot of confidence in the arms control and disarmament policies of the Soviet Union, while only fifty-two percent claimed the same for the United States.²⁷

By July 1989, the number of Germans desiring closer cooperation with the Soviet Union had now even increased to an amazing ninety-three percent.²⁸ A majority of the German public furthermore believed that the United States was more of a threat to peace than the Soviet Union.²⁹ In turn it can be observed how German foreign policy is becoming even more independent. A recent example is provided by the quarrel between the United States and West Germany over the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons in Germany. Despite heavy American pressure the West Germans so far refused to

give in. Clearly, public opinion at this point would not tolerate the modernization of American nuclear weapons in Germany and any government which would consent to such a move would be committing political suicide.

To conclude, by now the Soviet Union and Gorbachev have overtaken the United States and Bush in German public opinion polls, in turn directly impacting German foreign policy.

What is happening to West Germany? Are we, as Arnulf Baring suggests, going back to the traditional policies of being a bridge broker between East and West?³⁰ Do we believe again that we can defend ourselves alone without the help of the United States? Is Germany forgetting the times in history when it didn't compromise to get allies; when it, due to its geopolitical position was never secure; when it refused to accept reality in the international environment and when everybody was afraid of it and hated it? In other words, has Germany forgotten that it was only Western integration and the joining of the Atlantic Alliance which provided it finally not only with new and major allies, but also and more importantly with security for the first time in history. Finally when Germany has succeeded in solving its geopolitical problem, is it now about to destroy that framework which provides it with that precious security, just because Germans still refuse to look at the international environment in a realistic manner. These and other questions will be dealt with in the chapter on the influences of the international environment on German foreign policy, when I will

argue, following the path of Hans-Peter Schwarz, that the Second World War has turned us Germans into a people of idealists, refusing to look at reality, and in turn undermining our own security. Now, however, it is time to turn to the second portion of this chapter, where I will discuss the relationship between the primacy of foreign policy and public opinion.

In the second portion of this chapter I am now going to focus on my previously stated claim that the primacy of foreign policy was the dominant driving force behind Adenauer's policies. In the context of public opinion I would, therefore, like to focus on German public opinion during the Adenauer administration (1949-1963) to show how public opinion either allowed the primacy of foreign policy to succeed, or impeded it from becoming the foreign policy paradigm during the Adenauer era. As previously elaborated, my hypothesis that the primacy of foreign policy was dominant during the Adenauer era, would require for public opinion to be either supportive of the concept, or indifferent and deferential towards Adenauer's foreign policy. In the following pages I shall, therefore, make the argument that the German public was in certain cases supportive of Adenauer's policies, driven by the theory of the primacy of foreign policy, and in others either indifferent, an example being the joining of NATO, or deferential, allowing Adenauer to override public opinion, an example being the payment of indemnities to the state of Israel. In other words, I will show that in the early years of the republic, Germans were more concerned with their own economic survival than

with foreign policy, leaving the realm of foreign policy to Adenauer. In the few cases where the public felt strongly about a foreign policy issue, an example being reunification, it supported Adenauer. Furthermore, there still existed to a large extent the traditional German belief that the conduct of foreign policy should be left in the hands of the experts, in turn allowing Adenauer to pursue foreign policy goals which were opposed by the public.

To be able to verify the hypotheses mentioned above empirically I will now focus on public opinion polls in general and will furthermore cite two case studies to back up my claims. First, I shall analyze my claim that the German public was more or less indifferent towards politics in general. The next polls will demonstrate that especially during the 1950s people were first of all not interested in politics and secondly not inclined to become politically active.

TABLE 3.13

Question: "Generally speaking, are you interested in politics"?³¹

	Jun 1952	May 1959	Jan 1960	Apr 1961	Jul 1962	Dec 1962	Apr 1965	Aug 1965	Sep 1965
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	27	29	30	31	30	37	31	35	39
Not Particularly	41	36	40	44	40	39	41	43	43
Not at all	32	35	30	25	30	24	28	22	18

TABLE 3.14

Question: "If you had a son, would you like him to become a politician or not"?³²

	December	September	April
	1955	1961	1965
	%	%	%
Would not like it	70	60	51
Would like it	9	13	14
Undecided, immaterial	21	27	35

Clearly, politics did not enjoy a good reputation and most people did not care about it, both factors, of course, being related to the abuses of the third Reich. However, as the next poll demonstrates, many people also believed that Germany should purely focus on its economic problems.

TABLE 3.15

Question: "A suggestion has been made that the West German government should keep out of big politics altogether and concern itself with preserving and improving present living conditions. Do you find this proposal good, or not good"?³³

	June	November	April
	1954	1959	1964
	%	%	%
Good	49	39	33
Not good	29	36	44
Undecided	22	25	23

The next five polls will further demonstrate the low public interest in politics.

TABLE 3.16

Question: "Is there a deputy in the Bundestag who represents this constituency"?³⁴

	May	June	June	July
	1953	1956	1958	1962
	%	%	%	%
Yes	40	42	45	50
No, do not know	60	58	55	50

Shortly after Germany had achieved independence the following question was asked!

TABLE 3.17

Question: "What is the situation at present? Do you feel we are now a state with a large measure of independence"?³⁵

	May 1955		
	Collective	Men	Women
	%	%	%
Yes	9	9	8
With minor restrictions	20	25	16
No	22	30	17
No opinion	6	3	8
Not heard about proclamation of sovereignty	43	33	57

Another example of indifference or the ignorance of facts leading to indifference, concerns the agreement signed to regulate the return of the Saarland to Germany.

TABLE 3.18

Question: "A lot has been said recently about the Saar problem. Do you know whether an agreement on this question has lately been signed by France and Germany"?³⁶

	May 1955		
	Collective	Men	Women
	%	%	%
Yes, agreement signed	47	62	34
Not yet signed	8	10	6
Do not know	45	28	60

Another example of indifference, this time, however, caused not by a lack of knowledge, concerns the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Even though a majority of people heard about and were familiar with it, seventy-seven percent in June 1950 to be precise, indifference soon set in as the next table shows.³⁷

TABLE 3.19

Public Opinion and the ECSC Treaty, 1950-1956

Event/Date of Poll	Treaty Proposed Jun 1950	Treaty Initiated Jun 1951	Bundestag Debate Sep 1951	Treaty Ratified Jan 1952	ECSC in Operation Mar 1952	ECSC After Four Years Apr 1956
Attentive Public:						
Approved	39	25	18	21	19	10
Opposed	13	20	20	24	6	5
Undecided	25	15	27	12	15	4
Total	77	60	65	57	40	19
No Opinion/						
Uninformed	23	40	35	43	60	81
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

A more graphic example of German public inattention is provided if we look at polls concerning the Paris Conference of late fall 1954, where the treaties, returning sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, were negotiated by Adenauer and his colleagues.

TABLE 3.20

Question: "Have you followed the news bulletins and reports about the Paris Conference, or hasn't it interested you"?³⁸

	November 1954		
	Collective	Men	Women
	%	%	%
No, not followed the news	53	31	72
Yes, followed the news	47	69	28

Even when the new sovereign Germany joined NATO in 1955, over forty percent of the public was not aware of that fact, clearly demonstrating a lack of willingness to be concerned with politics.

Thus a look at public opinion polls taken during the 1950s seems to substantiate my claim that a high level of indifference towards politics existed in Germany. This in turn enabled Adenauer to proceed, pursuing the policies he favored without encountering much opposition from the public. In other words, I am claiming that the German public was indifferent towards most of Adenauer's foreign policy conduct, enabling the Chancellor to elevate the rejoining of sovereignty, international prestige and the restoration of Germany as a great power, to the top position among policy goals. Only a passive public allowed Adenauer to vigorously pursue the primacy of foreign policy.

Even when the public was opposed to his foreign policy, he was able to ignore public opinion, as the following case study will show!

The Reparations Agreement with Israel

As early as September 1945, the state of Israel announced claims of compensation against Germany for the loss of lives and property by European Jews. As soon as the Adenauer government had declared itself to be the successor to the German Empire, a decision resulting in the acceptance of all pre-war debts, totaling eleven billion marks,³⁹ the way had been cleared for the state of Israel to press its demands. In two notes, sent on January 16 and March 12, 1951,⁴⁰ to the four occupying powers, the Israelis outlined their case. Being referred by the United States to the West German government, the Israeli note soon became a major political issue in Germany. For Adenauer the acceptance of the Israeli demands, amounting to three billion German marks,⁴¹ was never in question. Even though it would impose a substantial burden upon the German economy, the potential foreign policy benefits did outweigh the domestic costs. Not only would it increase goodwill towards Germany among the four occupying powers, but it could also be used to pressure for a reduction of German debts and the returning of property confiscated during the war.

However, public opinion polls soon showed that a substantial majority of West Germans were opposed to the agreement. A poll taken in August 1952 showed that forty-four percent of all Germans

considered such a payment superfluous, while another twenty-four percent opposed the sum as being too high. Only eleven percent favored the agreement.⁴² Despite this kind of opposition by the German public Adenauer went ahead and met with Doctor Goldman, the Israeli representative and worked out an agreement with him, signed on September 10, 1952, and obligating West Germany to pay 3,450 billion German marks to the Israelis in goods over a period of twelve years.⁴³ It took Adenauer another six months to get the agreement ratified by the German Bundestag. Thus on March 18, 1953, the agreement was finally ratified despite a massive split in the governing coalition. Only the support of the opposition Social Democrats saved the agreement.

The case presented above does clearly demonstrate the workings of the primacy of foreign policy. Domestic opposition, including public opinion, interest group pressure and even the advice of party leaders were ignored, while foreign policy objectives were pursued.

Indeed, later on the agreement seemed to have actually benefitted the German people. The total of pre-war debt was cut from seven billion dollars to three-point four billion and German properties seized abroad were returned.⁴⁴ In addition German prestige had increased.

Another issue which demonstrates Adenauer's willingness to override domestic opposition concerns the question of rearmament. It was this issue which Adenauer intended to use to press for full German sovereignty. He knew that as a full member of a European

Defense community (EDC), or with its failure, NATO, sovereignty would have to be bestowed upon the Germans. In addition, the joining of the "Atlantic Alliance" would provide for German security and would finally rid the country of its geopolitical problem. Being able to receive these kinds of international benefits, Adenauer, following the dictate of the primacy of foreign policy, was not prepared to let public opinion destroy this opportunity. Thus, even though a majority of Germans clearly opposed the establishment of a national military force consistently throughout the early period of negotiations, Adenauer pushed for the ratification of the EDC treaties, establishing a new German army. Why did Adenauer succeed. First, a clear split existed among German interest groups and elites. While the Social Democrats and the Protestant Church were violently opposed to rearmament, Adenauer received support from the civil service elites, the major business organizations and the Catholic Church. Furthermore, as I have already stated, Adenauer was able to ignore public opinion, because he knew that it, in its deferential manner towards foreign policy, would go along with his wishes and that the promised foreign policy success, namely, the regaining of sovereignty would swing public opinion back in his favor.

Thus, the enormous prestige Adenauer enjoyed in the early 1950s did increase the public's willingness to defer to the "expert" on foreign policy matters. (For example, in the 1953 elections thirty percent mentioned Adenauer's personality and prestige in the world as

a reason for voting for the ruling coalition. Religious reasons came in a distant second with twenty-one percent.)⁴⁵

The last example I shall briefly mention as an example of Adenauer overruling domestic opposition concerns the Saarland dispute. Even though a majority of the German public opposed any concessions to France in return for the Saarland, Adenauer as he had done previously on the rearmament and compensation to Israel issues, ignored the public. As soon as he was successful in negotiating the return of the Saarland, public opinion changed dramatically, now being in overwhelming favor of the agreement.⁴⁶

In the final treaty, signed on June 5, 1956, he agreed not only to the payment of three billion dollars to France for lost investment in the Saar, but also to the annual shipping of 200,000 tons of coal and one-third of the Saar products to France.⁴⁷ Furthermore, he agreed to the joint financing of the Moselle Canal. On January 1, 1957, the Saar was returned to Germany.

In conclusion, my second claim that a passivity, even deference towards the leader in the making of foreign policy, existed, in turn allowing Adenauer to pursue the primacy of foreign policy, seems to be substantiated.

Finally, I shall now turn to one issue which most Germans felt very strongly about, namely, the question of reunification. Indeed, the issue seemed to increase in importance until the mid-1960s.

TABLE 3.21

Question: "Which, in your opinion, is the most important question we in West Germany should at present occupy ourselves with"?⁴⁸

	Reunification %	Berlin Problem %	Preservation of Peace East-West Detente %	Economic Problems, Wages, Prices Currency %
October 1951	18	--	17	45
July 1952	23	--	24	33
July 1953	38	--	12	25
January 1955	34	--	16	28
January 1956	38	--	13	22
January 1957	43	--	17	18
January 1959	45	16	16	15
January 1960	38	6	16	26
February 1961	35	4	18	23
August 1961	19	37	24	5
February 1962	30	23	26	20
January 1963	31	11	15	21
January 1964	41	7	11	27
January 1965	47	4	10	27

It was the issue of reunification which posed the most problems for Adenauer. He knew that his policies of Western integration made reunification in freedom less likely to occur and that the German public would, therefore, oppose him, unless he could show that Western integration actually furthered the chances for reunification. The previously discussed theory of the policies of strength accomplished this goal. By claiming that only a strong West could

force the Soviet Union to agree to reunify Germany, this theory, widely accepted by both the West and East-German public, allowed Adenauer to pursue his major foreign policy goals, namely, the regaining of sovereignty, integration into the Atlantic Alliance and Western integration, without much opposition by the German public on the grounds that it could impede reunification.

To conclude, I would like to restate my conditions, necessary for the primacy of foreign policy to succeed in a given period, outlined at the beginning of this chapter. First, public opinion has to be either supportive of the Chancellor's use of the primacy of foreign policy or indifferent towards foreign policy overall.

Second, a split in public or elite opinion will allow the Chancellor to pursue his policies freely.

Finally, a certain amount of deference by the public, coupled with high trust and prestige in and by the leader, will facilitate his ignoring of the public's wishes.

Next, I will attempt to prove my claim empirically that public opinion has changed in regard to the previously mentioned three principles necessary for the primacy of foreign policy to succeed.

First, I will test my hypothesis that the German public has become less indifferent towards the conduct of foreign policy, making it more difficult for a Chancellor to ignore it. As Tables 14 and 16⁴⁹ have already shown, a dramatic increase in interest concerning politics has taken place. Furthermore, after having successfully tackled the most urgent domestic problems, the public again shifted

its interest towards foreign policy making. First, the next poll will show us how an interest in politics has increased quite dramatically over the last years.

TABLE 3.22

Question: "Are you interested in politics?"⁵⁰

	1952	1961	1965	1969	1973	1976	1980	1981	1982	1983
	Jun	Apr	Sep	Nov	Feb	Apr	Jan	Jan	Jan	Jan
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	27	31	39	41	49	42	48	48	47	57
Not Especially	41	44	43	43	38	45	43	41	41	37
Not at all	32	25	18	16	13	13	9	11	12	6

In addition to being more politically interested, the German public is now also more willing to get engaged in politics, especially if they disagree with certain policies enacted by the Chancellor. The next poll will support this claim.

TABLE 3.23

Question: "There are always policies, which will lead to a dissatisfaction with your government. If you and your acquaintances do not like certain things, what can you do about it, even if not right away, but perhaps later on"?⁵¹

	1953	1979
Total Population	%	%
Use the suffrage	19	38
Other Possibilities Including: Initiatives, demonstrations, turn to your members of Parliament	14	21
Can't do anything about it	45	26
Don't know	22	16

Thus, changes have taken place. The German public cannot be considered indifferent towards politics anymore. It has now become an important player in influencing politics, be they domestic or foreign. This in turn makes the public less willing to be overridden by a Chancellor, initiating policies to which the public is opposed. While formerly the public might have been indifferent, even lethargic, to such an override by the Chancellor, it will now not only hold him accountable at the ballot box, but will also actively oppose him in the streets, an example being the recent peace demonstrations against the NATO decision of modernizing existing nuclear weapons stationed in Germany.

Furthermore, not one politician after Adenauer has enjoyed such an enormous level of prestige among the German public. Clearly the

level of prestige and trust a politician does enjoy, will influence the public's decision to accept him going against their own wishes. If a "The Chancellor knows best" attitude prevails, he will, of course, have a lot more leeway in the enacting of even unpopular policies. The next table will now show the level of prestige enjoyed by several important German leaders.

TABLE 3.24

Question: "Which great German, in your opinion, has done most for Germany"?⁵²

	1977 October %	1983 January %
Konrad Adenauer	42	39
Otto von Bismarck	13	11
Helmut Schmidt	2	9
Willy Brandt	9	4
Ludwig Erhard	6	4
Adolf Hitler	3	1
Poets, Artists	5	7
Philosophers (for example, Goethe, Luther)	3	5
Other democratic politicians	7	4
Monarchs/Generals	4	2
Scientists, Inventors	2	2
Don't know	14	17

Interestingly, Konrad Adenauer, over fifteen years after his death remains the most revered politician in German history. To be more precise he was the only democratic politician, who enjoyed such

prestige while being Chancellor, when over a quarter of the German population considered him to be the greatest statesman ever. Willy Brandt in contrast received such prestige from only three percent of the population, and Helmut Schmidt managed only a meager two percent when he was Chancellor.

What has the following analysis shown us so far? First, the indifferent German public of the early and mid-nineteen fifties has disappeared. In its place a public has arisen which is highly interested in politics, especially foreign policy, and is, furthermore, a lot more confident of being able to influence policy-making. It will now hold a Chancellor accountable if he should dare to go against its wishes. In addition, the high level of personal prestige and trust Adenauer enjoyed could not be duplicated by any other Chancellor since, in turn making it less likely that the public will defer to the Chancellor, because it implicitly believes in him. Thus, the two basic foundations on which the primacy of foreign policy rests, in regard to public opinion, have been destroyed, making it extremely unlikely that a future Chancellor will be able to pursue politics over or against the public's wishes. While Adenauer was able to ignore or even go against public opinion, his successors could not. So, for example, Brandt's Ostpolitik was successful, not because he, using the primacy of foreign policy concept, responded to an international demand for it, but because public opinion had changed quite dramatically, now supporting Brandt's policies of detente. While Adenauer could have achieved similar results against

the wishes of the public, Brandt had to rely on it. An actively opposed public in regard to Ostpolitik, would have led to its demise.

The next polls will support my claims empirically.

TABLE 3.25

Question: "Do you think we should resign ourselves to the present German-Polish border - the Oder-Neisse line - or shouldn't we accept this"?⁵³

	1951	1964	1972	Party Preference		
	Mar %	Sep %	May %	SPD %	CDU/CSU %	FDP %
Should resign ourselves	8	22	62	80	42	85
Shouldn't accept this	80	59	18	7	34	10
Undecided	12	19	20	13	24	5

TABLE 3.26

Question: "Do you believe that the West and the Soviet Union can coexist in peace on a long-term basis, or do you not think so"?⁵⁴

	1954	1956	1962	1976	1979	1980
	Dec	Nov	Jun	Jul	Sep	Feb
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Can coexist in peace	20	36	36	49	56	51
I don't think so	66	54	51	33	27	38
No opinion	14	10	13	18	17	11

Clearly, a public resigned to the territorial losses of the Second World War and one which does not perceive the Soviet Union to be an aggressive, expansionist, country, had to be out there for Brandt's Ostpolitik to succeed.

A critique to the aforementioned argument is usually provided by citing the decision of the Kohl government to implement the NATO dual track decision in 1983. However, if one looks at public opinion polls we see that a slim majority of Germans did always support that decision, allowing the Kohl government to proceed without jeopardizing its power. Therefore, this decision cannot be cited as an example of the primacy of foreign policy!

TABLE 3.27

Question: "Since a few years there exists the NATO double track decision. In it the NATO countries have agreed to station middle range nuclear weapons in Central Europe to counter similar Soviet weapons and to start arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Do you favor this double track position, or do you not?"⁵⁵

	1981 Mar %	1981 Jul %	1981 Aug %	1981 Oct %	1981 Dec %	1982 Jan %	1982 Jun %
Favor it	53	52	49	50	48	52	54
Do not favor it	20	21	26	22	22	22	24
Undecided	27	27	25	28	30	26	22

Therefore, it would be empirically wrong to claim that the decision to station American intermediate range nuclear weapons on German soil was made against the wishes of a majority of the German people!

In conclusion, the preconditions for the primacy of foreign policy to be able to succeed in Germany, namely, an indifferent and deferential public, have been destroyed over time. My own hypothesis would, therefore, be that it is extremely unlikely that changes will take place, which would restore the necessary conditions for a renewed triumph of the primacy of foreign policy in Germany.

In the next chapter I shall now turn to the institutions of the state themselves and see how they were used in making the primacy of foreign policy the guiding force behind German foreign policy during the Adenauer era.

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CHAPTER FOUR

INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter will deal with two more independent variables influencing German foreign policy, namely the two institutional ones. In the first portion of this chapter the institutional framework, or the state structure itself, will be discussed. Thus, I shall examine the "Basic Law," the German constitution, Parliament and most importantly, the Chancellor's Office which enabled Adenauer to pursue foreign policy, within the primacy of foreign policy framework. In the second portion of this chapter, the role of the major political parties in Germany, namely, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and their impact on foreign policy will be examined. In addition, the impact of the two most powerful interest groups, the "Deutscher Gewerkschafts Bund" (DGB) and the "Bund Deutscher Industriellen" (BDI), and the role of the two major churches in Germany, namely, the Catholic Church of Germany and the Protestant Church Germany's (ERD), will be analyzed.

After having accomplished this task, I hope that I will be able to demonstrate successfully how the institutional structure of the Federal Republic of Germany was used by Adenauer in his pursuit of the primacy of foreign policy. In addition, the question of whether the primacy of foreign policy model could have been used successfully by one of his successors will be dealt with.

First, however, let us take a brief look at the German constitution, the Basic Law.

The Basic Law

At this point it is imperative to point out that Germany was still an occupied country, when the Basic Law was written by a Parliamentary Council, appointed by the German states and headed by Konrad Adenauer. Even after the creation of a West German state, an Allied High Commission retained control over not only Germany foreign affairs, but also over most of Germany's domestic affairs. However, it would be wrong to claim that, therefore, Adenauer could not conduct a foreign policy, because all of his negotiations with the Allied High Commission could and should be considered as constituting the conducting of an active foreign policy. According to Adenauer:

Even if we do not have a foreign ministry, this does certainly not mean that we have to restrain from every activity in this field. The paradox of our situation is that, although the activities in foreign policy are made use of by the Allied High Commission, every activity of the federal government or Parliament, including internal affairs, encompasses an external connection. Germany is due to the occupation, the statute governing the Ruhr, the Marshall Plan, etc., closer connected to the external world as ever before. These connections will be dealt with by a "Staatssekretariat" to be created within the Chancellor's Office.¹

Furthermore, it needs to be stressed here that the Basic Law was supposed to be a temporary solution to the German problem. As soon as Germany became unified, the Basic Law would cease to be valid and a new constitution would have to be drawn up. Implicitly the Basic

Law called for reunification in its preamble which contains the following sentences:

Desiring to give a newer order to political life for a transitional period, . . . The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany.²

The Basic Law is, therefore, another reason why Adenauer had to come up with the previously mentioned doctrine of the policies of strength. Only by claiming that Western integration and the joining of the Atlantic Alliance would make German reunification more likely, was he able to avoid being in violation of the constitution. The Basic Law thus not only provides a Chancellor with power in the area of foreign affairs, but also restricts foreign policy-making.

Most importantly for this study, however, the Basic Law does make the Chancellor supreme in the foreign policy-making process. First, Article 64 allows the Chancellor to virtually appoint and fire ministers at his own will. In addition, in contrast to the Weimar constitution, cabinet members can no longer be removed by the lower house of Parliament, the Bundestag. Only the Chancellor has that power. Furthermore, by stating that the Federal Chancellor shall determine, and be responsible for, the general policy guidelines (Article 65), it does give the chancellor sole power over policy-making. It was Adenauer and his leadership style which turned Germany into a Chancellor's democracy, but without the Basic Law and its provisions to which I referred to above, this would not have been possible. Especially the weakening of the Federal Presidency, very

powerful during the Weimar Republic, in turn being blamed for its demise, allowed the Chancellor to be supreme in the policy-making process.

In addition, the treaties granting Germany independence do impose certain restrictions on the new sovereign West German state. A few of the more significant restrictions and Allied guarantees are listed below.

Based on the German Treaties, the Paris Treaties signed on October 23, 1954, guaranteed the Germans the following:

1. Alleinvertretungsanspruch (the claim to be the sole representative of the German people), precluding Western recognition of East Germany
2. A Western refusal to recognize the post-World War II boundaries, until a freely negotiated peace settlement could be reached
3. Western protection of West Berlin
4. Cooperation between Germany and the Western Allies in the case of German reunification under a liberal democratic system, integrated into the European Community.

However, at the same time, Germany had to agree to the following concessions, which clearly do restrict an independent foreign policy. First, the Allies retained the sole right to conduct negotiations on the question of German reunification, the questions concerning Berlin and especially the questions concerning a future peace treaty. While the Germans only had the right to be informed of any ongoing

negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, the real bargaining power remained with the Allies, demonstrated by the 1958 second and the 1961 third Berlin crises. In addition, the Allied troops stationed on German soil were from now on being paid for by the German government, changing their status from an occupying force to a friendly, invited, protective force.

Furthermore, the Germans had to renounce their right to construct atomic, biological or chemical weapons, while their newly created army was limited to half a million men. The most controversial point, only abandoned in 1968 by the three Western Allies, was the right they had retained for themselves to intervene in West German domestic affairs whenever they perceived the democratic system in Germany to be endangered.

As can be clearly observed the Paris treaties did constrain every Chancellor since Adenauer. However, for Adenauer the benefits, sovereignty and the joining of NATO, did outweigh the costs, a reduced mobility in foreign affairs. The most important factor in allowing the primacy of foreign policy concept to triumph, was, however, the creation of the Chancellor's Office in 1949, to which we turn to now.

The Chancellor's Office

If we talk about the term Chancellor democracy, we usually associate it with the name Konrad Adenauer and his use of the Chancellor's Office. Here, I am even making the claim that the primacy of foreign policy could not have succeeded in becoming the

driving force behind German foreign policy during the early Adenauer era, if it hadn't been for the Chancellor's Office. In the next pages I shall thus try to analyze how the Chancellor used it to support his foreign policies.

The following discussion will be based on one of the best books on the Chancellor Democracy I have read so far, namely, Arnulf Baring's "Im Anfang war Adenauer-Die Entstehung der Kanzlerdemokratie," published in 1969.³

The Chancellor's office was created on September 16, 1949, only a few weeks after Konrad Adenauer had been elected Chancellor of the newly created West German state. The first task for Adenauer was to pick a head (Staatssekretär) of the new office. His choice was Dr. Hans Globke, who, however, advised Adenauer not to pick him, due to his past activities in the Third Reich. However, Globke did agree to join the Chancellor's Office, where he became one of the closest advisers of Adenauer. Together they picked Dr. Otto Lenz to head the office. Interestingly, as early as September 1949, it had become clear that Adenauer would not tolerate any competition in the sphere of foreign affairs, when he decided not to pick Paulus Van Husen, a former judge and foreign policy expert, for the said reason. Lenz, not an expert in foreign affairs, presented no threat to Adenauer. The Chancellor's Office itself was based on several foundations. First, there was the "Referenten System." This term is used due to the fact that Adenauer had a tendency to call upon the great minds of Germany, be they political scientists, historians, or lawyers to

serve and head an agency in the Chancellor's Office. The most famous of them include Professor Wilhelm Grewe, Professor Walter Hallstein, Professor Blankenhorn and General Gehlen. This provided Adenauer with two advantages. First, he was able to receive advice from the best minds in Germany. This fact also helped to justify his policies to the German public, which still revered academics. Second, these intellectuals were not professional politicians. They did not possess a home base, as, for example, ministers in his cabinet did, which weakened them in a possible clash with the Chancellor. In addition, they couldn't rely on the backing of a political party or interest groups. Being politically powerless, they were totally dependent on the good will of the Chancellor, who was, of course, aware of that fact. This allowed him not only to fire them at will, as soon as they had become useless, but also enabled him to play them against each other, thereby controlling their influence. In the end, it was the Chancellor who had the last word and who reigned supreme in his Chancellor's Office.

Why then was the Chancellery so important? How was it used by Adenauer in the pursuit of the primacy of foreign policy? These questions can be answered if one looks at the functions of the Chancellery. First, it was used to coordinate and control the ministries. Not only did it judge and evaluate policy proposals made by the different ministries, but it also had the function of supervising the implementation of policies by the ministries and their bureaucracies. It did, therefore, present Adenauer with the

means to check up on his ministries and the bureaucracy. In addition, it was the duty of the different secretaries heading the various departments in the Chancellery to advise Adenauer on policy proposals and to even come up with their own proposals.

Especially in the realm of foreign policy was the Chancellor supreme. First, the Allies had refused to give in to the demands of German politicians to set up an independent foreign ministry, which allowed Adenauer to create a foreign department within the Chancellery, which he used in the making of his foreign policy. Therefore, foreign policy and defense policies were not made in Parliament or in the cabinet, but in the Chancellery, which was tightly controlled by the Chancellor himself. Not surprisingly, this made it very easy for Adenauer to circumvent his ministers, in turn not including them in the foreign policy decision-making process. Even when the Germans received the right to set up their own foreign ministry in 1951, Adenauer continued to rely on the Chancellery when making foreign policy decisions. This, of course, was simplified by the fact that he had chosen to become his own foreign minister.

The Chancellery, therefore, presented Adenauer with the option of not informing his cabinet or even Parliament of his conduct of foreign policy, an option he actively pursued. Only in the last stages of ongoing negotiations, conducted between the Chancellery and the Allies, were the two informed, and even then did they only receive very sparse and favorable information so that they would and could not jeopardize Adenauer's work. An example of just this is

presented to us in the "German Treaty" of 1954, which will be discussed later on.

Otto Lenz, the head of the Chancellery until 1953, when he was replaced by Globke himself, even went as far as openly saying that the Chancellery and not the ministries should make policies. He also used the Chancellery to make contact with big business to get it to finance the upcoming 1953 election campaign for the CDU, raising approximately thirty-six million marks in 1952 alone.⁴ In addition, he introduced Adenauer to the concept of private polls, which from now on were taken on a frequent basis by the Chancellery to be able to perceive the impact of Adenauer's policies on public opinion. In 1953, the CDU was, therefore, the only major German party actively conducting public opinion polls. Adenauer was thus aware of the public's indifference towards foreign policy, which allowed him to ignore public opinion in several cases. (This has already been discussed in the last chapter.)

Foreign policy, therefore, was conducted in the Chancellery alone by Adenauer and his advisors. It was he, who negotiated with the Allies, usually accompanied by a few advisors from the Chancellery, an example being Herbert Blankenhorn. The public, Parliament and even his ministers and his party were kept in the dark. Adenauer justified that in the following quote:

The negotiations with the Allied High Commissars had to be conducted alone by myself. The gentlemen did not wish that a lot of people were present and that also would not have been good. It was good that they were facing a united and resolute will.⁵

So, for example, were the treaties which would lead to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) negotiated by a delegation from the Chancellery headed by Professor Walter Hallstein. The ministries were not even informed of the ongoing negotiations.

Furthermore, Adenauer was able to rely on information given to him by the "Organisation Gehlen," a private secret service organization, attached to the Chancellery, at a time when the Allies still prohibited the Germans from having their own secret service. Thus, Adenauer was able to use the Chancellery to spy on his party and on the opposition so that he could use any kind of dirt which was dug up later on for political purposes.

Another point to be made concerns Adenauer's tendency to play out his departmental chiefs against each other, by switching favorites all the time, in turn creating jealous factions, which could not threaten him.

In addition the Chancellery with its "Bundespresse und Informationsamt," being separated from the Chancellery only in 1957, was used by Adenauer to gather information from abroad, taking the place of a still prohibited new German secret service. Instead of being able to use a secret service or diplomatic channels Adenauer had to rely on the Chancellery. In turn this meant that Adenauer possessed a monopoly on current information, which dramatically increased his position towards his cabinet and his party. Through the Bundespresseant he was able to provide favorable information about his foreign policy to the media. Believing that the public

should not be disturbed by media reports on his foreign policies, Adenauer tried to keep the press away as much as possible. On the other hand, he did use it, especially the foreign media to push his ideas and proposals. Only so could he insure that the Allied High Commissioners did actually send his proposals to their respective governments, instead of just shelving them. A good example would be his interview with the Cleveland Plain Dealer, in which he first mentioned the possibility of a German rearmament, to help the Western Allies in their fight against Soviet expansionism.

In conclusion, while Adenauer's cabinet or even his party had no real influence on the foreign policy-making process early on, it was the Chancellery, which constituted a "kitchen cabinet" for the Chancellor, providing him with policy proposals, and information. Only the use of the Chancellery enabled Adenauer to pursue the primacy of foreign policy. Through it, he was able to ignore Parliament and his cabinet, preoccupied with petty domestic concerns, which might have undermined his policies. By not having to inform the two bodies, he was additionally more flexible when dealing with the Allies. Knowing that in the long-run, short-term sacrifices and inequalities would disappear, Adenauer could thus pursue such policies, which might have the appearance of high current costs. However, in the long run, the costs would be vastly outweighed by their benefits. Practical examples of such policies would include the payment of indemnities to the state of Israel, the joining of the International Authority to supervise the Ruhr area (IAR) and the

concessions made to the French on the Saar issue. All of those agreements would have very likely failed if Parliament would have become involved in the negotiating process, because the concessions made by the Germans were looked upon by the public as being excessively high. However, Adenauer, being able to negotiate alone, circumventing Parliament and then only releasing certain information on the treaties during their ratification debates in Parliament, was able to push them through and in the long-run they all turned out to be very beneficial for the German people.

In other words, I am claiming that the Chancellery enabled Adenauer to ignore domestic concerns, reflected in the German Parliament and his cabinet, on larger foreign policy issues. Only this unusual bureaucratic construction did enable Adenauer to pursue the primacy of foreign policy. However, it is imperative to point out at this point that the international environment itself, in this case through the Allied High Commission which prohibited a foreign and defense ministry, did contribute to Adenauer's success in using the primacy of foreign policy. Furthermore, as will be shown later in this chapter, did only the weakness of his own political party, the CDU, and the total support he received from certain interest groups, namely, the Catholic Church and the BDI, allow him to ignore Parliament and his cabinet. In addition, the personality of Adenauer himself, his background, his ideas and his conduct of policies became especially important in a Chancellor Democracy. If he alone negotiated with the Allied High Commission, we do have to analyze his

motives, his ideas, which were the driving force behind his policies. Thus, it is necessary to look at Adenauer himself and his ideas, which will be done in Chapter Five of this dissertation. A closer look at individuals in the making of German foreign policy becomes, therefore, imperative.

In the following pages I shall now turn to the discussion of the role political parties play in German foreign policy-making. First, I will examine the German Christian Democratic Party (CDU), in power from 1949 until 1969 and again from 1982 until the present. Then I shall take a closer look at some of its coalition-partners, namely, the Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP), the German Party (DP) and the "Bund der Heimatlosen und Entrechteten (BHE). Finally, the major opposition party for the first twenty years after the establishment of the Federal Republic, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) will be analyzed.

My hypothesis, concerning the role of political parties in democracies and their relationship to the success of the primacy of foreign policy, is the following:

Only a weak, decentralized and factionalized party can be dominated by a party leader, in Germany the Chancellor, to such an extent that it will acquiesce to its leader making foreign policy of his or her own.

To test this hypothesis, we have to look at the structure of the CDU during the Adenauer era and the following eras to see if and how the party has changed, in turn making the triumph of the primacy of

foreign policy less likely. Thus, a closer look at the CDU is necessary.

The Christian Democratic Party of Germany (CDU)

With the defeat of the Third Reich in May 1945, there came also the collapse of most major parties of the imperial and the Weimar eras. Only the SPD and the KPD were able to reestablish themselves as major parties early on. On the other side, a new party was formed, which for the first time in German history would combine Catholics and Protestants into one party, namely, the CDU. Being founded in all four zones of occupation at approximately the same time, it was the CDU in the British zone of occupation under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, which soon became dominant. Being the former mayor of Cologne, Adenauer became the president of the Parliamentary Council in 1948, which had replaced the provisional government. It was this position, which not only turned Adenauer into a well-known politician outside of the Rhineland, but which also allowed him to establish full contact with the Allies. Furthermore, Adenauer soon succeeded in decimating the left-wing of his party, rallied around Jacob Kaiser, who represented the CDU in the Soviet zone of occupation, thereby turning the CDU into a conservative middle-class party.

Here it is imperative to point out that the CDU in contrast to the very well organized and centralized SPD, was a very decentralized party. Real power remained in the hands of the local and state party leaders. A national party was not even founded until 1950, about a

year after the first German elections had been held. In addition, the party was extremely factionalized. So, for example, did it include Catholics, Protestants, workers, unionists, farmers, businessmen, bureaucrats, refugees and house wives. Not only being weakly organized, but also being very divided among different interests, it was only the opposition to socialism and the prestige of Konrad Adenauer which held the party together.⁶ Thus, the Chancellor stood above the party, not being aligned with any faction of the CDU, making him a true people's Chancellor. In addition, the decentralization of the party itself and its many factions meant that it had to be very pragmatic, not being able to espouse a very radical ideology. In turn that meant that the Chancellor was able to play factions against each other, thereby dividing the party and strengthening his own position. It was Adenauer who led the party into general elections. Not being nationally organized, it was the Chancellor who through his Chancellery financed the election campaigns of individual candidates. It was the Chancellery, that conducted polls, targeting certain districts, in turn also recruiting candidates. In other words, the Chancellery was used to fulfill basic electoral functions instead of having a national party. This, coupled with the monopoly on information Adenauer possessed, allowed him to dominate the party. The CDU had no independent profile, being Adenauer's personal "Kanzlerwahlverein," until his position started to weaken in 1959. To be able to demonstrate Adenauer's domination over his party, a brief look at the German Treaty is in order.

First, this treaty which would have reestablished German sovereignty and made Germany a member of the European Defense Community (EDC), was negotiated with the Western Allies by Adenauer himself and the Chancellery. Both his cabinet and his party were only sporadically and inconclusively informed. Why did his party and ministers accept that? First, they knew that it was the Chancellor who held the party together. Any move against him might have jeopardized the whole party. Second, Adenauer had managed to purge the party of possible challengers, by sending them abroad in the form of ambassadorships, or giving them ceremonial positions, an example being the office of "Bundestagspräsident." (The same method was also used to assure the loyalty of his coalition-partners. Their leaders were promised good cabinet posts or ambassadorships.) In addition, Adenauer possessed an information monopoly through the Chancellery and his personal dealings with the Allies, which did not allow his party or the opposition to challenge him on facts. Finally, through the secret service Adenauer was also aware of certain personal facts of the members of his and the opposition parties, which could be used to keep them in line, an example being Jacob Kaiser. Not surprisingly, any kind of major opposition cannot be expected from a party so dominated by its Chancellor.

Next, I would like to conduct a thorough analysis of the CDU party organization and how it was able to transform itself at the end of the Adenauer era and especially after the 1969 defeat into a centralized party, not to be dominated by one man anymore.

The Party Organization of the CDU

When looking at the German constitution (Basic Law), one will notice a unique characteristic, not to be found elsewhere in the free world. In Article 21, as amended in 1967, party structure and party prerogatives are strictly defined. Therefore, political parties in West Germany are strictly regulated by the federal constitution itself, ruling out variances between party organizations due to state constitutions, and assuring similar organizations all over the country. A closer examination of Article 21 will yield the following set of characteristics, which have a direct influence on the overall party structure. First, political parties have to have territorial sub-divisions at the state and local level. Second, parties must be internally and externally democratic. If a party does not adhere to the principles of democracy, it can be declared unconstitutional. Third, there has to be a public account of financial resources, received outside of the federal funding, which is allotted according to votes received in the last election. Fourth, party membership cannot be refused to anyone, while intra-party conflict will be regulated by party courts. An important aspect which would seem to undermine the basis for a strong, centralized party system would, of course, be the German electoral system, which provides state parties with the opportunity to draw up state lists to fill 248 seats in the national Parliament. This should provide for strong state parties, while the national party should be enormously weakened by it. The

early history of the CDU to which I will turn now, underscores this point empirically.

When the CDU came to power in 1949, it was impossible to speak of it as a strong national party in the European sense. On the contrary, the party resembled more an electoral association than a political party, coming together only every four years to fight an election. Several possible explanations account for this phenomenon. First, there existed a strong ideological opposition to party machines, which were identified with totalitarian regimes. Second, the party itself had no organizational tradition, compared to the Social Democrats (SPD), a direct result of being created only in 1946/1947. Third, it had been the strong state organizations which had formed the national party, while retaining the organizational power in their hands. It was here, at the state level, where the majority of the professionals worked. In addition, by having the power to select half of the members of Parliament, most national party organs could be controlled by the states, which, of course, had no interest in seeing the national party become more centralized. Furthermore, at the local level, responsible for selecting the other half of the members of Parliament, local notables through personal networks were able to select their own candidates, further undermining the power of the national party.

Most importantly, here it should be remembered that the Chancellor himself, Konrad Adenauer, did the best he could to keep the national party weak and decentralized. Using the government

machinery, especially the Chancellor's office, Adenauer was able to provide information and personnel to the representatives of his party, making the body dependent on him. A strong national party was seen as a threat to the Chancellor, while control of the government machine enabled him to substitute it for a national party during election times. Furthermore, the parliamentary system provided for strong party unity, within the parliamentary party, by linking votes to the survival of the government. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that a national party headquarters did not exist until 1952. However, even with the creation of a central party organ, being notoriously understaffed, the link between the national, state and local level was extremely weak. Only with the electoral defeats in 1969 and 1972 was this situation to be changed.

Before looking at these changes, it is necessary to focus on two more factors that were to simplify the shift from a weak party structure to a stronger one. First, there was the impact of party finances. Until 1958, the CDU was mainly financed by large individual and corporate contributions, which were tax deductible in Germany. With the declaration of this practice to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 1958, party resources were severely drained. Having a small membership, only about 300,000 in 1968, the loss of finances could not be recuperated through dues increases. Not surprisingly, the CDU was outspent by its socialist opponent until 1975. It was, therefore, in the early 1970s that the party leadership decided to embark on an enormous member recruitment

drive, which almost tripled the party membership. In 1985 the CDU/CSU was able to report that it had 895,000 dues paying members. This, of course, changed the socio-economic foundations of the party, now being dominated by young professionals, who were no longer as opposed to a centralization of the party as the old elite had been. Using Duverger's criteria, the CDU/CSU had been now transformed into a true mass party. Table 4.1 presents the sources of income for the CDU in percent (incomes in million DM).⁷

As can be clearly seen in Table 1, membership fees have for the first time overtaken donations as the major source of income, reflecting, of course, the increased membership basis. Here it should be remembered that every dues-paying party member has the ability to cast a vote for his or her district candidate nominee, which in turn should undermine the power of local leaders.

Table 4.1

	Membership Fees	Contributions from Parliamentary Party	Income from Investments	Meetings and Publications	Donations	Credits	Reimbursement for Election Expenses
CDU 1980	28.4%	8.5%	1.8%	0.7%	27.2%	9.6%	21.5%

Table 4.2 will now present the changes in occupational structure of party membership for the years 1968 and 1982.⁸

TABLE 4.2
Occupational Structure of Party Membership,
Late 1968 and Late 1982

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1982</u>
Self-employed	31%	36%
White-collar workers	27%	28%
Civil Servants	18%	13%
Workers	13%	11%
Pensioners	12%	5%

Before further looking at changes in the party structure it is necessary to focus briefly on the CDU party constitution to be able to see how this document, apparently unimportant at first, could have been used by reform-minded politicians to restructure the party. First, membership dues were to be assessed in relation to income. When looking at Table 4.2, it is clear that membership especially increased within the ranks of the middle and upper middle classes, who in turn were able to contribute more financial resources in the form of dues.

The most central feature contributing to party cohesion, however, is the power invested into the party leadership regarding

expulsion. As has been previously mentioned, party membership cannot be denied to anyone. However, in the case of a party member, even an incumbent, violating the party constitution or advocating statements contrary to official policy, the party leadership on the respective federal levels has the power to expel the incumbent from the party, thereby denying him renomination. Here it should be remembered that candidate selection for the federal offices takes place both on the local level for single district candidates and on the state level, where candidates are placed on state lists for the remaining seats allocated according to proportional representation. How then are candidates selected?

On the district level, candidates are nominated through secret ballots cast by all party members within the district, while on the state level candidates are selected by a state convention. Those party conventions, called every second year, consist of incumbents and delegates selected by the district party members. The Executive Committee, chosen by the party convention, and consisting of the most prominent state leaders, a majority of them holding federal offices, then proceeds to draw up the state lists. Not surprisingly the state lists, therefore, include the most prominent party leaders within the state, who have the open backing of the federal party, and leaders of interest groups and organizations affiliated with the party, such as the party youth organization. Table 4.3 presents the group affiliation of the top fifty candidates on the Christian Democratic list for the state of Northrhine-Westphalia in the 1969 elections.⁹

TABLE 4.3

Positions	Group
1-5	Party leadership
26, 32, 36, 42	Industry
8, 12, 48	Middle-class groups
6, 14, 20, 34, 40, 46	Catholic-Labor groups
24, 28	Civil Service/Military
30, 38	Agriculture
10, 16, 50	Women's organizations
18, 22 ^X (double membership)	Protestant groups
22 ^X , 44	Youth organization

As can be seen, the land lists are used to satisfy the interests of all important groups within the state. This institutionalization of major interest groups within the party further contributes to a process of centralization by reducing interest group claims upon the parliamentary party, usually associated with a swamping of the representatives by interest group demands, leading to a factionalization of Parliament. Such a procedure would normally lead to open factionalism during the conventions. However, by being in the hands of the party leadership, the nomination process is very centralized, contributing to party cohesion. Furthermore, candidates are not independent when elected to office, because the party leaders can deny renomination to candidates or even expel them from the

party. With an overall tendency to vote for the party and not the candidate, independent candidates will not be able to run on their own, as it is commonly done in the United States.

It was not until the 1970s that the enormous powers vested into the leadership were used to restructure the party. Only the electoral defeats of 1969 and 1972 did move the party leadership towards reform, transforming the CDU from a factional, decentralized party into a more typical European party.

As previously mentioned, the campaign reform laws of 1958 and 1967 undermined the financial position of the party, while the new role of being the opposition party imposed new costs upon the party apparatus, especially in the field of information and campaigning where the Chancellor's Office had formerly provided the party with a substitute to an effective central party organ. It was, therefore, in 1971 that the party expanded its membership to compensate for financial losses incurred by the loss of the Chancellorship. The vast expansion of the dues-paying membership, coupled with local party reforms in 1975, which fused local offices into district offices, facilitated local control by party headquarters, staffed with professionals loyal to the national party. Local centralization, therefore, undermined the power of local notables, who could not control the massive, new professional membership anymore, while the new district branches were more open to national influences.

Furthermore, it was deemed necessary to strengthen the national party headquarters, which finally became bureaucratized, allowing it to coordinate national and state policies. Centers were set up to train party officials and provide information to candidates. The whole central party apparatus was directed by a Secretary-General, a professional, full-time administrator, replacing various departmental officials, who had previously supervised the old apparatus.

However, it should not be forgotten that the state parties are still a major source of power within the CDU party organization, resulting from federalism, as outlined in the federal constitution. However, there has been a clear trend towards centralization of the party apparatus, facilitated by the open-ended interpretations of the party constitutions, derived from the federal constitution. Concluding, it is, therefore, possible to say that the CDU is an important vehicle in the centralization of the German Federation especially since the reforms of the 1970s. According to Kurt Sontheimer:

There are no political decisions of importance in the German democracy, which have not been brought to the parties, prepared by them and finally taken by them.¹⁰

My hypothesis is thus that it is easier for one man, to dominate a political party, if that party is weak, decentralized, and totally dependent on him for electoral functions. If, however, the party becomes centralized, as the CDU did in the late 1960s in early 1970s, now being able to fulfill basic electoral and organizational functions by itself, it is very unlikely that one personality can

become supreme in a party, because now he will be challenged by other party leaders or his cabinet members. . The recent feud between Chancellor Kohl (CDU) and the late Franz-Joseph Strauss (CSU) would be an example.

The End of the Adenauer Era

Why was Adenauer's power declining by 1959. First, the "Presidential" crisis had led to a decline of support among not only the public, but also the party leaders. Suddenly the party was faced with the successor question. Who was to succeed Adenauer? Now it became clear to some party leaders that the CDU had to create an identity of itself, and that especially a strong national party organization had to be set up. Thus, only two years after his greatest electoral success ever, in the 1957 elections, in which he had received an absolute majority of the votes cast, did Adenauer's power decline. It had all started in early 1959, when President Heuss had decided to leave office, thereby establishing the two term limitation on the Presidency. The CDU, having an absolute majority in both houses was now faced with the question of who should succeed Heuss. Adenauer right away perceived the chance of being able to nominate a political foe to the office, which is largely ceremonial, to remove him from the political scene. The foe, of course, was Ludwig Erhard, minister of finance and father of the German economic miracle. Knowing that Erhard would very likely succeed him, Adenauer, despising Erhard for his Atlanticist and free trade positions, tried to avoid that succession by nominating Erhard for

the office of Federal President on February 24, 1959, without consulting Erhard. After Erhard had asked Adenauer for a few days to think his decision over, Adenauer went public the next day and announced Erhard's candidacy for the office of Federal President. However, both the public and his own party, for the first time, opposed Adenauer. They knew that Erhard's choice for President was only an attempt by Adenauer to remove him from the very small circle of candidates likely to succeed the Chancellor. On April 3, 1959, Erhard then withdrew his candidacy. Adenauer, being impressed with the presidential powers his friend de Gaulle enjoyed in France, now decided to announce his candidacy for the job. He did so on April 7, 1959, but at the same time demanded that the powers of the President would be increased. For example, he wanted to remain party leader, attend all cabinet meetings and most importantly he insisted on the sole right to nominate his successor after having become President. In other words, he wanted to remain the supreme foreign policy maker, by being able to pick someone he could dominate as his successor. This, of course, would also take care of the Erhard problem. Not only the public, but also his party opposed this move, which furthermore would have been unconstitutional. Realizing that, Adenauer withdrew his candidacy on June 4, 1959 and remained Chancellor for another four years. On July 1, 1959, Heinrich Lübke, CDU, was elected Federal President. However, Adenauer's formerly supreme position in the party had been weakened and his public

prestige had suffered. Thus by 1959, the era Adenauer had started to come to an end.

After the 1959 debacle, which instigated the demise of the Adenauer era, one problem after another seemed to follow. First, there was the building of the Wall in August 1961 by the East German government, which further undermined the credibility of Adenauer's Ostpolitik in the eyes of the public and which cost him his absolute majority in Parliament in the 1961 elections. Only the replacing of foreign minister von Brentano with Gerhard Schröder and Adenauer's open pledge to resign by 1963 led to FDP to join into a coalition with the governing CDU. For the first time Adenauer had been forced to give in to a demand by a coalition partner.

More importantly, however, his own party had started to split into two wings, namely, the Atlanticist one, led by foreign minister Schröder, Ludwig Erhard, and the FDP ministers and the Gaullist one, advocating closer relations with France, headed by Adenauer himself and his defense minister Franz-Joseph Strauss. Suddenly the deferential party, which used to back up Adenauer on every decision had disappeared, in turn starting the decline of the primacy of foreign policy. For the first time since his election as Chancellor of West Germany back in 1949, Adenauer was not able to impose his foreign policy views on his party.

What had happened? Why had this split occurred? To answer this question, we have to go back to the period of the late 1950s, which gave us de Gaulle and the second Berlin crisis!

On June 1, 1958, Charles de Gaulle had returned to power in France. Adenauer now feared that de Gaulle would destroy his efforts towards European unification, which in the light of the General's previous anti-European statements, was very possible. Not only had the General opposed the EDC and the EEC, which he had vowed to destroy, but also had he been a hard-liner in 1945/46 favoring a German confederation over a new German state. In addition Adenauer's fears of a new Franco-Russian detente had been heightened by the refusal of the Communist Party of France to oppose de Gaulle's return.¹¹ It was, therefore, with mixed feelings that Adenauer traveled to France to meet de Gaulle on September 14, 1958. In the following meeting, Adenauer was delighted to see that de Gaulle not only shared his anti-communist hard-line views, but also supported the EEC. As Adenauer points out in his memoirs, he was just overwhelmed by de Gaulle.¹² The two leaders soon became good friends and collaborators. A new era of Franco-German reconciliation, on which, according to Adenauer European integration was based, had begun. Adenauer, who was to meet de Gaulle fifteen times in the next five years, now placed Franco-German understanding on the top of his priority list. Therefore, the Chancellor neither criticized the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO on February 2, 1959, nor the denial of de Gaulle to allow American nuclear weapons on French soil (June 6, 1959). In addition to not wanting to jeopardize his friendship with de Gaulle, Adenauer was at that time involved in the Berlin crisis, where both Great Britain and

the United States were willing to give in, while only de Gaulle remained firmly on Adenauer's side. Adenauer was never to forget the General's help during the Berlin crisis.

While relations with France were at an all time high, those with Great Britain worsened. Already disturbed by Gaitskell's disengagement plans, the refusal of Britain to join the EEC and the ongoing criticisms he received from the British press for his hard-line towards the Soviet Union, Adenauer was never to forgive British Prime Minister McMillan for his trip to Moscow and the soft position Britain took during the Berlin crisis. He, therefore, teamed up with de Gaulle in the establishment of higher EEC tariffs, rejecting Britain's free trade proposals thereby ruling out free trade with the British led European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Again, Adenauer had put foreign policy objectives, in this case reconciliation with France, before economic considerations, namely the opening of the EFTA markets to German exports.

In 1959, when "Europeans" were more and more demanding political integration through the establishment of a European Parliament, de Gaulle showed his true face. He now called for a "Europe of the Fatherlands," based not on a supranational organization, but on close coordination of policies between the respective countries. On October 13, 1959, the General called for the establishment of a Secretariat in Paris, through which the six EEC members could consult on political matters. However, agreement could only be reached on quarterly foreign minister meetings. Ironically de Gaulle never

challenged the EEC itself, accepting the economic benefits derived from it gratefully.

In May 1960 de Gaulle went a step further by proposing a political union in the form of a confederation and not a federation. The six EEC members were to form a political association through cooperation and coordination of their foreign, economic and social policies to balance out Eastern Europe and establish a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. However, this new union would be based on the cooperation of sovereign states and not on a supranational authority. The new concept, challenging both NATO and the EEC, was vetoed by the smaller members of the EEC fearing France-German domination of the new confederation. From then on de Gaulle was determined to go ahead alone with Germany, where Adenauer had declared his willingness to go along with de Gaulle's proposals.

After another attempt to establish a European confederation had been vetoed by Belgium and the Netherlands in July 1962 and Adenauer had received a triumphant reception by the French people in his visit to France, de Gaulle traveled to Germany in September 1962, with the intent to propose a formal friendship treaty between the two nations. Adenauer accepted the announcement of a friendship treaty euphorically, stating that the German people wanted a formal friendship treaty, while de Gaulle proclaimed that France and Germany must combine to face the Soviet threat and to form the core of a new Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Despite constant reassurance by Adenauer that he still supported European integration and

membership in the Western alliance, both the United States and the Benelux countries feared a Bonn-Paris axis. For Adenauer, however, the treaty presented the final step towards the elimination of Franco-German hostilities, the culmination of his life work and the last great success before his resignation.

Another important factor towards the signing of the treaty was, what I will refer to as the Kennedy factor. Adenauer had been deeply disappointed by the Kennedy administration's move towards detente, leading to the elimination of the quest for reunification by the United States. Furthermore, the emphasis on a conventional build-up, to eliminate the fear of escalation into a strategic nuclear war from the use of tactical nuclear weapons, by the Kennedy Administration, disturbed Adenauer. When would the tactical nuclear weapons now be used? Only when Europe had been overrun? Besides, a conventional attack would be for Germany as destructive as a nuclear one. In Adenauer's opinion, the promise to react only conventionally to a Soviet conventional attack would equal an invitation for an attack. Deterrence could only be maintained if the potential aggressor would have to speculate about the defenders choice of weaponry. However, Adenauer chose to follow Kennedy's demands and increased the draft from twelve to eighteen months to beef up conventional forces. At the same time Adenauer became more and more receptive to French claims about the untrustworthiness of the Kennedy Administration. Adenauer's sentiments towards Kennedy are most clearly expressed in

the following quote: "Kennedy is a cross between a young marine officer and a catholic boyscout."¹³

Thus, after having accepted the idea of a friendship treaty, the final draft was presented and signed by Adenauer on January 22, 1963. Under the Treaty's provisions, regular meetings between the heads of the two nations and the respective ministers were set up. More importantly, the treaty required consultation on foreign policy matters prior to any decision by the respective nations.

However, by the time of Adenauer's signature another controversy had emerged. Namely the British application for membership to the EEC. On July 31, 1961, Great Britain had applied for membership in the EEC. At first the application was welcomed by the six, the Council of Europe and especially minister of finance Erhard, who expected the other EFTA members to join the EEC, too, creating more markets for German exports. Very soon, however, Great Britain demanded concessions including the keeping of subsidiaries for British agriculture and preferential ties with the Commonwealth and EFTA, which struck at French interests. In addition, de Gaulle feared a balancing of the Franco-German leadership in the EEC and the involvement of the United States through its protégé, Great Britain. When Adenauer remained silent, not openly demanding the admission of Great Britain to the EEC, de Gaulle vetoed the British application on January 14, 1963.

De Gaulle's veto angered many German "Europeans," who were now afraid that de Gaulle would totally destroy the European integration

movement. They, therefore, decided to amend the treaty, by adding a Preamble. Despite Adenauer's objections the Preamble, welcoming reconciliation and friendship with France, but also requesting the government to strengthen the defense within NATO and to further the unification of Europe, passed. For de Gaulle the treaty had hereby become useless and he was to violate it first in 1964.

Thus, ironically, by 1963 it had been the SPD, which had become the true champion of NATO, supporting Kennedy's proposal of increasing the size of the conventional forces in Europe. The CDU, being internally split between Atlanticists and Gaullists, had become paralyzed. While the Atlanticists headed by Erhard and Schröder pressured for the integration of Britain into the EEC and closer cooperation with the United States, the Gaullists led by Adenauer himself supported pro-French policies.

With Adenauer's resignation on October 15, 1963, and his replacement by the new Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the Atlanticist wing emerged victoriously. However, the Gaullist wing, still lead by Adenauer until his death in 1967, proved to be powerful enough to sabotage Erhard's policies and to even force him from office in 1966. Therefore, the intra-party conflict endured, undermining the position of the new Chancellor, until it were de Gaulle's policies themselves, his attempt to destroy the EEC and his sudden switch towards a more amiable policy towards the Soviet Union, which ended the conflict within the CDU. By 1968, no one in the CDU openly articulated a pro-French policy at the expense of a pro-American one anymore.

In 1963, however, the Atlanticist wing of the CDU, headed by Chancellor Erhard, and backed by the FDP and SPD was still fighting against the CDU Gaullists. Interestingly, both of them were out of touch with the true interests of France and the United States, as the following quote demonstrates:

The Gaullists, while eager to move closer to Paris, did not at all see eye to eye with President de Gaulle's Eastern policies and were rather frightened of his visions of a Greater Europe embracing the Communist East. The 'Atlanticists' were lured by the dream of German participation in nuclear defense and of a kind of 'special relationship' between the United States and the Federal Republic, even long after it had become clear that Washington had dropped the MLF concept and was as interested as de Gaulle himself in furthering an understanding with the Soviet Union and with Moscow's Eastern European allies. To a large extent, the controversy between these schools of opinion was something like a tragi-comedy of errors: the German clients of France and America still fought out battles which their foreign friends had already abandoned.¹⁴

It was the failure of the MLF negotiations, which undermined Erhard's position as a foreign policy leader, coupled with an economic recession, which led to his ouster in October 1966. Only an economic down-turn undermining his credibility as an economic miracle maker, and the failure of his Atlanticist foreign policies, enabled the right-wing of his party to oust him, even though he had barely missed receiving an absolute majority in the 1965 general elections.

This clearly demonstrates the increased power of the CDU parliamentary party, which was now able to oust even the Chancellor himself. I would thus advance the claim that it was the split in the

CDU, which led to a greater power position for the parliamentary party, which in turn undermined the Chancellor's position. By the early 1960s, the CDU parliamentary party had clearly emancipated itself, now not being willing to be dominated by a Chancellor anymore. This, of course, also meant an end for the primacy of foreign policy as the driving force behind German foreign policy. Suddenly, the political parties became important players in German foreign policy, going against a Chancellor's wishes, an example being the previously mentioned addition to the Franco-German treaty of 1963. Here, it is important to remember that the party in government, in Germany the parliamentary party of the major parties, does represent and is, therefore, more dependent on the public itself. The public at this point of time, in the mid-60s, started to become more and more concerned with economic policies. For the first time a recession hit the West Germans, in turn leading to an emphasis on economic concerns over foreign policy ones. This fact alone would have probably been enough to destroy the primacy of foreign policy concept. This trend also proved not to be temporary, but throughout the next decades, up until today, economic issues have become more important to the German public than foreign policy issues. In turn this trend has led to the replacement of the primacy of foreign policy doctrine by the primacy of domestic policy doctrine.

After Erhard's fall in 1966, the CDU leadership decided to enter into a "Great Coalition" with the SPD. It was not only the current economic crisis and the unsuccessful conduct of foreign policy by

Erhard, but also the rise of the far right with the National Democratic Party (NPD) which led to that decision. In addition, it gave the CDU leadership a chance to punish its unreliable coalition partner, the FDP, which was sent into the opposition. On the other hand, the SPD was finally represented with a chance to demonstrate to the voter its reliability as a governing party. Furthermore, the CDU made heavy concessions, agreeing not only to give the SPD the foreign and economic ministries, but also renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons and agreeing to a more flexible foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. Soon, however, clashes over foreign policy issues started to emerge. While the SPD demanded the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the abolition of the Hallstein doctrine, the right wing of the CDU demanded the opposite. Especially the question of whether the Germans should sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, led to a rift in the coalition. The SPD on one hand fully supported the treaty, while the right-wing of the CDU, led by Franz Joseph Strauss, who considered the treaty a Versailles of cosmic proportions,¹⁵ was violently opposed to a ratification of the treaty. Not surprisingly a stalemate occurred leading to a postponement of the decision until after the 1969 elections. It was, however, not this issue, but the revaluation of the German mark, demanded by France and the United States, which signaled the end of the Great Coalition. Staunch opposition by the CDU, under Chancellor Kiesinger, to any kind of revaluation led to the introduction of austerity measures in France,

in turn toppling the regime of General de Gaulle. By the fall of 1969, the public, tired of the ongoing stalemate was ripe for a change. It wanted to see a more flexible policy towards the East. Thus, in a very close election the SPD and FDP received enough votes to enter into a coalition, replacing the CDU after it had ruled Germany for twenty years, in turn leading to the previously discussed changes in the organization of the CDU, further increasing the power of the parliamentary party elites, while undermining the power of the Chancellor.

The results of the watershed 1969 elections are presented below:

TABLE 4.4¹⁶

	Percentage of votes	Bundestag Seats
CDU/CSU	46.1	242
SPD	42.7	224
FDP	5.8	30
NPD	4.3	--
Others	1.1	--
Total	100.0	496

Percentage of electorate voting: 86.7

As can be seen the FDP barely topped the five percent mark, necessary to be represented in Parliament, while the NPD, draining votes from the right-wing of the CDU, especially in the rural areas, barely failed to gain representation. However, the coalition received enough votes to form a new government, in turn allowing the SPD leader Brandt to become Germany's new Chancellor. It was he, who

then started the famous Ostpolitik, opening up the East to Germany. (This process will be discussed in the chapter on individuals, when we will deal with Willy Brandt.) Next, it is now time to deal with some of Adenauer's coalition partners. First, I will discuss the FDP, then the DP and lastly the major refugee party, the BHE. Then, the second largest party in Germany, the SPD will be discussed and some of the changes it has undergone, turning it from a strictly marxist party, appealing to only a minority of Germans, into a mass party, taking power in 1969, will be analyzed.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP)

Like the CDU, the FDP was a newly established party after the end of the Second World War. Its historical ties were with the old national liberals and the more left liberals of the Weimar era. Interestingly the FDP presented the renewed fusion of the two major German liberal parties, which had broken up during the 1870s. From the beginning the party was split into two factions at the extreme end, with a small moderate one in the middle. On the right one could find the remnants of the National Liberals, stressing reunification, the regaining of the lost territories in the East and even a belief in Germany becoming a third force in Europe again. On the left, issues like anti-clericalism, especially anti-catholicism were emphasized. However, all factions shared a common belief in economic liberalism, federalism and anti-communism. It was the FDP, which was supposed to be the party of the middle classes and the Civil Service. In 1949, under the leadership of Theodor Heuss, the FDP joined

Adenauer's coalition, in turn elevating Heuss to the position of Federal President. Only the fear of communism and socialism had moved the FDP to this decision, because in reality there existed major disagreements between it and Adenauer. Not only did the FDP oppose his stringent Catholic views, but also did it object to some of his Western integration policies, which it perceived as a handicap to the chances of reunification. For example, the FDP did oppose the EDC treaty and by 1954 when Thomas Dehler, by then an ardent foe of Adenauer took over the party leadership, relations with the CDU government hit an all time low. Furthermore, the FDP also objected to the ECSC and the EEC, because it wanted some of the Protestant nations included into it, examples being England and the Scandinavian countries and because it feared that German exports to non-EEC countries would be hurt.

As soon as an FDP/SPD coalition toppled the CDU governor (Ministerpräsident) of the state of Northrhine-Westphalia in 1956, did the CDU push for the reforming of the electoral law, which would have decimated the parliamentary party of the FDP. (The CDU wanted to increase the number of directly elected members of parliament from fifty percent of all members of parliament to sixty percent, a move which clearly favored the larger parties, the CDU and the SPD.) It was, however, the decision of the Northrhine-Westphalian FDP to join the SPD which tore the party apart. Interestingly, it was the center of the party, sixteen members of Parliament, including four cabinet ministers which left the party and joined the CDU, while the two

extreme factions numbering thirty-eight members of Parliament left Adenauer's coalition. For the next four years the FDP now considered itself to be a third force in German politics. However, the 1957 elections, which the FDP had entered with the slogan: "Opposed to conservative dogma, clericalism, socialist experiments and ideological-utopian reformism,"¹⁷ ended in a crushing defeat. With the ascendance of Erich Mende in 1960, the FDP thus decided to move back towards a coalition with the CDU, in turn abandoning its third force concept. However, as the 1961 campaign slogan demonstrated, it was to be with the CDU but without Adenauer. As previously discussed, the 1961 elections resulted in the loss of the absolute majority for Adenauer, forcing him to again enter into a coalition with the FDP, which, however, was now in a position to demand the replacement of his foreign minister and even his promise to resign in 1963. For this, the right-wing of the CDU was never to forgive the FDP leadership. In turn the FDP aligned itself with the Atlanticist wing of the CDU under Erhard and Schröder to oppose the Gaullist wing of the CDU, led by Adenauer and Strauss. The FDP now thought to include Great Britain into the EEC and abandoned any ideas of Germany becoming a third independent force between the two great powers. By 1962, the FDP had officially endorsed German membership in NATO. As soon as Erhard took over the Chancellorship in the fall of 1963, the FDP provided solid support for his economic program and pressured for a less dogmatic foreign policy towards the East. When the right-wing of the CDU reasserted itself in 1966, toppling the Erhard government

and starting the "Great Coalition," the FDP went into the opposition. By 1969, however, the liberal wing of the party, headed by Walter Scheel, had become dominant, opening up the way for a coalition with the SPD, in turn making Willy Brandt Chancellor of Germany and allowing a new Ostpolitik to take place. This decision at the same time led to a mass exodus of the national conservative element of the party, which went over to the CDU/CSU.

Was the FDP thus able to hinder Adenauer's foreign policies? As was pointed out, there existed grave differences between the FDP and Adenauer on his foreign policy. Why then did the FDP not try to stop or influence Adenauer's policies? There are several reasons! First, the FDP was more or less forced into a coalition with Adenauer's CDU, because the SPD in 1949 had not yet changed its program, still advocating the nationalization of industries, co-determination and especially a planned economy. Clearly for a free trade party like the FDP, the SPD presented the greatest threat to Germany. Therefore, the joining of Adenauer's government was for one major reason, namely, the fear of socialism. In other words, Adenauer's CDU was the lesser of two evils. This, in turn, meant that even though the party was opposed to some of Adenauer's foreign policies and had no influence on foreign-policy making in turn, the alternative to him was a SPD government advocating even more detrimental policies. Only when Adenauer did possess a solid majority in Parliament after the 1953 elections could the FDP safely leave the coalition, without having to fear an accession of the

social democrats to power. As soon as the SPD, however, changed its program, abandoning marxism, it became a hypothetical coalition partner, because on foreign policy issues the two, FDP and SPD, had always been close.

However, during the heyday of the primacy of foreign policy, the FDP did and could not attempt to confront Adenauer.

Next, I will now briefly discuss two minor parties, a part of Adenauer's coalition early on, which, however, had been absorbed by the CDU by the time the 1961 election came around.

The German Party (DP)

The German Party, a member of Adenauer's coalition governments from 1949 until its demise in the early 1960s, represented traditional German conservatism. Its program called early on for a renewed great power status of Germany, for massive rearmament and for rapid reunification. It opposed Western integration, because it believed that Germany should go back to becoming a balancer between the superpowers. In other words, it wanted a renewal of traditional German "Schaukelpolitik." The German Party stressed traditional issues like nationalism and the idea of "Heimat." For example, it not only opposed the Basic Law, but also refused to recognize the new black, red and gold German flag. In its campaigns its posters still displayed the old imperial colors. As its historical duty it saw the fight against bolshevism, socialism, liberalism and clericalism. Interestingly, the DP proved to be the most loyal of Adenauer's allies in Parliament, which Adenauer repaid in 1957 when he urged CDU

voters to help the DP out by voting for it. By 1961, the DP had, however, declined to a point where even a joining with the refugee party (BHE) could not save it from extinction.

Der Bund der Heimatlosen und Entrechteten (BHE)

As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, over ten million Germans from the German Eastern territories fled from the advancing red army troops in 1945. This not only presented an economic problem for the Western zones of occupation and later on the West German state, but also social problems. Not everywhere were the refugees received with open hands. Most importantly, however, a political problem arose. About twenty percent of the entire population of West Germany had lost its home and belongings, constituting a dangerous base for demagogues.

Interestingly, it was only in 1950 that the refugees founded their own political party to push for their own interests, the primary one, of course, being the regaining of their lost homelands. The BHE thus was first founded in 1950 in the state which housed the largest refugee population, Schleswig Holstein, and soon became a political force to be reckoned with. In 1953 it gained representation in the German Parliament and consequently joined the CDU government under Adenauer. Not surprisingly, differences with Adenauer soon occurred on foreign policy issues. For the BHE which pressured for the regaining of the 1937 borders, Adenauer's policies of Western integration must have seemed like treason. Thus, the BHE left the governing coalition in 1955, which led most of its members

of Parliament to leave the party and join the CDU, in turn crippling it. By 1961, when it out of desperation fused with the DP, the BHE had ceased to be a political force in Germany.

In reality the BHE never stood a chance against Adenauer. By 1961, the refugees had been economically and socially integrated into West German society, while at the same time the policies of strength, Adenauer's anti-communist rhetoric and his quest for rearmament led them over to the CDU. Only one more time, during Brandt's new Ostpolitik did the refugee movement show its muscle again, almost bringing down the Brandt government in 1972.

Now it is time to turn to the major opposition party of the first twenty years of the history of the Federal Republic, namely, the SPD. The German Communist Party (KPD) will be ignored in this work, because it has ceased to be a political force in German politics, never again gaining representation after the 1949 elections.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD)

The SPD was one of the few parties which could trace its history back to the era of the Empire. It also proved to be the only one of these to be still around today. (Both the Center Party and various local parties, for example, the Bavarian People's Party were soon absorbed by the CDU.) While this fact proved to be advantageous in certain areas, an example being organization, it also brought severe handicaps with it. The major one was the fact that the SPD failed to adapt to the changing times, continuing to adhere to an outmoded form

of marxism, which advocated the nationalization of industry, a planned economy and the redistribution of income. In addition, it chose to remain a class party, relying totally upon the working class and advocating policies only beneficial to it. With its stringent anti-clericalism it alienated the catholic population, while its economic proposals threatened the middle and industrial classes. This dogmatism, the refusal to become a mass party, like the CDU had, meant that at no time, apart from the 1949 election, had there been a chance of an SPD victory. It is estimated that the SPD during the 1950s could only rely upon thirty percent of the German people, namely, the non-catholic working class. Ignoring the Christian social working class proved to be fatal as the crushing defeats of 1953 and 1957 would show. Coupled with this handicap, the SPD also faced the problem of having early on a very dogmatic leader, namely, Kurt Schuhmacher, who put the SPD into intransigent opposition in Parliament, in turn ruling out any SPD participation or influence on policy-making.

Thus, even though the SPD had an organizational advantage over the CDU and other parties, being strongly centralized, in contrast to the CDU which was a loose federal organization, and having a massive organized membership behind it, in the form of the DGB, it failed to become the dominant party in Germany during the 1950s and 1960s. What then were the party's political aims. Domestically, as already mentioned, the goal was a socialist economic order, driven by a planned economy, requiring mass nationalization and income

redistribution. Foreign policy aims were, however, more complex. First, the SPD demanded the rapid reunification of Germany. It had been the party, which had lost most of its traditional areas of support with the annexing of German territories by Poland and the Soviet Union. Reunification became thus the priority for the SPD early on, leading to its opposition to Adenauer's policies of Western integration. Consequently, the SPD was opposed to the ECSC, the EDC, the EEC and, of course, Germany's joining of NATO. It especially feared the restoration of a Catholic, conservative Carolingian Western Europe, from which the more Protestant and socialist nations of Scandinavia and Great Britain would be excluded to which it perceived itself to be ideologically closer to. In turn the SPD advocated the establishment of a "socialist" Europe united by one overarching ideology. Adenauer's policies on the other hand seemed to undermine that ideal. Not only did the SPD perceive them to be harmful to the top priority goal of reunification, but they also contributed to the re-establishment of a capitalist, free trade system in Western Europe. Especially Adenauer's American ties worried the SPD leadership. Early on, therefore, he was dubbed by them the "Allies Chancellor."¹⁸ However, as much opposed as the SPD was to the neo-liberal order, its opposition even hatred for communism was greater. Having experienced the destruction of the SPD in the Soviet zone of occupation, the West German SPD became an ardent foe of Soviet-style communism. On the other hand, in its quest for reunification, the SPD was a lot more open to Soviet

proposals. More accommodation with the East Bloc was advocated and German neutrality, in the case of reunification was widely accepted by the SPD leaders. At the same time the SPD believed that it was the duty of the four occupying powers to work out a peace treaty for the Germans, in turn reunifying the country. This was precisely the point with which Adenauer disagreed the most. He was ever afraid that such a deal between the big four would hurt the Germans, a belief very rational when one considers their last meeting, the Potsdam Conference. Eventually, the successes of Adenauer backfired on the SPD. Having been opposed to all his activities, the SPD, of course, couldn't share in his successes either. For example, the SPD ardently opposed the ECSC. As soon as it started to pay off for the Germans it switched sides. In addition, the SPD tried to do everything possible to undermine the Paris treaty, making Germany a member of NATO and restoring its sovereignty. After having failed to block the treaty and Germany again becoming an independent nation, it was difficult for the SPD not to acknowledge its enthusiasm for the end of the occupation period. Furthermore, as soon as Adenauer's policies paid off economically, resulting in the economic miracle, it was difficult even impossible for the SPD to criticize Adenauer for not instituting a planned economy in its place. Especially union members faced heavy cross-pressures. On the one hand they were traditionally close to the SPD and its policies. On the other hand they were by now handsomely profiting from the new social-market economy, which the SPD wanted to abolish. After the crushing defeat

suffered by the SPD in 1953, now under the leadership of Erich Ollenhauer, who had replaced Schumacher after his death in 1952, the first calls for reform could be heard. It was especially the moderate wing of the party led by Carlo Schmid, Fritz Erler and Willy Brandt which now demanded reforms. For example, the replacement of the red flag, used by Adenauer to associate the SPD with the communists, as the party's banner, was advocated and the abolition of the party's marxist dogma was demanded. However, at the 1954 party convention the moderate reformist wing of the party lost out to the doctrinaire left. It took an even worse defeat in 1957, when Adenauer achieved an absolute majority in Parliament, to finally convince the rest of the SPD that it could never gain power unless it changed. Ironically, the CDU now became the model for the SPD of how to become a mass instead of a class party. The following year, 1958, at the party convention, held in Stuttgart, the party then reformed itself on domestic issues. As finalized in 1959 at a conference in Bad Godesberg, the SPD now stood for the following policies: First, the rigid anti-clericalism of the party was abandoned, making it possible for Catholics to support the party. Second, the neo-marxist economic programs were replaced with neo-Keynesian ones, upholding the idea of government intervention into the market economy, but abandoning the concept of a planned economy. In other words, socialism and liberalism were fused. Thus, in 1959, the SPD abandoned the last remnants of marxism on domestic issues. It took another year for the SPD to change its foreign policy program. For

example, the party did support during the late 1950s disengagement plans like the Rapacki Plan, while being violently opposed to the idea of the equipping of the German army with nuclear weapons. However, the Soviet refusal to even discuss the SPD advanced "Germany Plan" in 1959 changed all that. In 1959 Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler had traveled to Moscow to propose to the Soviet Union a new plan leading to German reunification. They had proposed a step by step reunification of the two Germanies, while foreign troops in both parts of Germany were to be withdrawn, even before an agreement for reunification had taken place. The Soviet Union's answer, of course, being negative, then finally showed the SPD leaders that reunification was not possible at that point of time anymore. Herbert Wehner in a speech given to Parliament on June 30, 1960, then outlined the party's new foreign policy program. From now on the SPD supported German membership not only in the EEC, but also in NATO. In addition, the party now pledged full support for the German armed forces. Suddenly the party had become attractive to the middle classes, which were not threatened anymore by its program. As a result the SPD candidate in the 1961 elections, the mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt received thirty-six percent of the vote, the best showing of the SPD up to date.¹⁹

During the 1960s, the SPD then proceeded to attempt to show the German voter that it was indeed a responsible party. It became one of the staunchest supporters of NATO, while at the same time advocating a new foreign policy towards the East. While the CDU was

internally split, resulting in non-action and dogma, the SPD advocated a change for the better. It was, however, the CDU decision to enter into a "Great Coalition" with the SPD in 1966, which finally showed the German electorate that the SPD was ready to govern. While the CDU was still being torn apart internally, the SPD minister of finance, Carlo Schmid, worked out a program to heal the German economy. It took, however, the rise of an extreme right party, the National Democratic Party (NPD) to take enough votes away from the CDU in the 1969 elections, to bring the SPD, under Willy Brandt, to power.

Did the SPD thus present a problem for Adenauer's use of the primacy of foreign policy concept. The answer is clearly no. During the heyday of the Adenauer era, from 1949 to 1959, the SPD was totally excluded from the foreign policy decision-making process, having no influence on foreign policy. Especially starting in 1953 when Adenauer had his two-thirds majority in Parliament to amend the constitution if necessary, even the SPD's use of the Federal Constitutional Court to block Adenauer's policies like rearmament became meaningless. In conclusion, the SPD presented no handicap for Adenauer in his use of the primacy of foreign policy as a guiding light in foreign policy-making.

In the final portion of this chapter I would like to deal now with the impact of interest groups on foreign policy and how they can allow for or impede the primacy of foreign policy model from being

the major driving force behind the conduct of foreign policy. My hypothesis would be the following:

Only if the major interest groups in a country are either internally divided, uninterested in foreign policy or supportive of the Chancellor's conduct of foreign policy, will the primacy of foreign policy be able to succeed.

If, however, they pressure for short-term domestic benefits in direct opposition to long-term foreign policy goals, then it will be impossible for a Chancellor to neglect their wishes. In Germany, a corporatist state, it will be sufficient, at least for this project, to look at four major interest groups. First, I shall take a look at the "Bund Deutscher Industriellen (BDI)," the major German business association. Then, I shall focus on the major German union, the "Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)." In addition a brief discussion on the two major German churches, the Catholic and Protestant ones, shall follow. To begin, let us look at the BDI.

Der Bund Deutscher Industriellen

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the BDI was the only business group interested and involved in foreign policy. Both of its rival organizations, the BDA (Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeber) and the DIHT (Deutsche Industrie-und Handelstag), were organizations specializing in domestic politics, especially the fight against the SPD and the DGB. Adenauer had early on recognized the importance of the business community and moved rapidly to assure himself of its support. First, he allowed the BDI to circumvent the parties and to talk directly to him about policies. In addition, he also provided the BDI with its

headquarters in Cologne and soon established a close relationship with the President of the BDI, Fritz Berg. Fritz Berg, who dominated the BDI, shared all of Adenauer's views, believing in close cooperation with the United States and Western integration. Not surprisingly, being the leader of German business did he perceive that only the West could guarantee continued credits, needed to rebuild the German economy, while at the same time providing a huge market for German goods. While not only assuring the Chancellor of the support of German business in his foreign policy dealings, Berg himself became involved in helping Adenauer. For example, he founded a Franco-German committee of industry. Through Berg, Adenauer knew that he could rely on German business to back him up. Not surprisingly a majority of the German business community not only supported German membership in the ECSC and later on the EEC (European Economic Community), but also provided, vital support for Adenauer's rearmament policies.

In conclusion, the German business community first of all supported Adenauer's pursuit of the primacy of foreign policy by not opposing it, even when his policies did seem to actually hurt business, an example being the previously discussed payment of reparations to Israel and the recognition of the pre-war debts of the Reich. Second, it was clearly the business community itself which profited most from Western integration, which in turn led them to fully support Adenauer.

Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund

One might imagine that the DGB, closely aligned with the opposition Social Democrats, would have resisted Adenauer's policies. However, the opposite was the case, at least until the man, who dominated the DGB, as Adenauer dominated the government, Hans Böckler, died in 1952. Under his leadership the unions not only supported the Petersberg agreements, but also the ECSC and even German rearmament. According to Arnulf Baring, Böckler, not very interested in foreign policy, had traded his support for Adenauer's foreign policies, for Adenauer's support of co-determination in industry. His successor, Christian Fette, appointed by Böckler on his death bed, then continued to support Adenauer's policies to the anger of the Social Democrats. Only Adenauer's refusal to honor his agreement with Böckler after his death, enabled the SPD to remove Fette and replace him with a more ideologically compatible leader, Walter Freitag. (Here, it should be mentioned that Adenauer had to break his word, due to major opposition by the FDP, which threatened to withdraw from the governing coalition. Adenauer, of course, knew that if he would support them against codetermination at home, they in turn would be subservient on foreign policy issues.) Under Freitag's leadership the DGB shifted away from openly supporting Adenauer and his policies. However, it did not become as ideologically rigid and dogmatic as the SPD, from now on taking a neutral role in policy questions.

In conclusion, the DGB did not present any major problems for Adenauer, by not openly opposing him on foreign policy issues, which in turn contributed to the primacy of foreign policy becoming supreme.

The Catholic Church

Not surprisingly, the Catholic Church turned out to be one of the staunchest supporters of Adenauer's policies. Finally, a Catholic had assumed the highest office in Germany, and pursued policies favorable to them. In addition, there was no Catholic spiritual leader specializing in foreign affairs, which meant that Adenauer could take over, without encountering any opposition from his fellow Catholics. Furthermore, Adenauer enjoyed the open support of Pope Pius XII, who not only openly welcomed Adenauer's anti-communist policies, but also supported West German rearmament so that the Germans could defend themselves against the communist atheist threat.²⁰

That support in turn assured Adenauer of the majority support of all Catholics, even for his more unpopular policies, an example being rearmament. Not surprisingly, the church enthusiastically supported Adenauer's policies of Western integration, meaning closer collaboration with the heavily Catholic portions of Western Europe, especially France, Italy and Belgium. Here it should also be mentioned that the dogmatic anti-clerical position of the opposition Social Democrats, at least until 1958, did leave Catholics no choice but to support the CDU under Adenauer.

Religion thus played a two-fold role in German foreign policy making. First, the total support of the Catholic Church enabled Adenauer to succeed in his foreign policy aims and, second, the Catholic religion itself was a major contributor to Adenauer's formulation of his foreign policy, a fact that will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Protestant Church

Until the defeat in 1945, the German Reich had been predominantly Protestant. About 2/3 of the people adhered to the protestant belief, while about 1/3, concentrated in Southern Germany, were Catholics. With the division of Germany and the loss of the Eastern territories, the new West German state found itself to be evenly split between Catholics and Protestants. While the Catholic Church thus gained power, the Protestant Church lost some of it. Not surprisingly the Protestant Church tended to be a lot more nationalistic, demanding speedy reunification to recover the lost Protestant territories. This in turn meant that the Protestant Church was less inclined to support Western integration which was perceived as harming the chances of reunification.

However, early on, the Protestant Church split into two rival camps. On the one side the majority of Protestant Germans, conservative and supportive of Adenauer, under the leadership of Bishop Otto Dibelius could be found. They were opposed by the smaller left wing of the Church, opposed to rearmament and hostile to the United States, headed by Martin Niemöller and former minister of

the interior Gustav Heinemann. According to Heinemann, who had left Adenauer's cabinet in 1950 out of protest against possible German rearmament, Adenauer's policies of Western and Atlantic integration not only endangered reunification, but also made a future war more likely. Heinemann even went as far as to found his own political party the "Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei" (GVP), which, however, received only 1.2 percent in the 1953 elections, thereby not being able to gain representation in the German Parliament.²¹

Even though a majority of the Protestant population and their leaders supported Adenauer, the minority through its domination of the EKD "Bruderrates" and the EKD's foreign office tended to proclaim its position as the official one of the German Protestant Church. By 1955, however, the conservative wing of the church had managed to purge the left wing and from then on the church presented no further problems for the Chancellor and his policies until the late 1950s when the issue of nuclear equipment for the new German army split the church anew. However, by being divided, the full weight of the church could not be thrown against Adenauer, allowing him to be able to ignore the church.

In conclusion, it can be said that while big business and the Catholic Church supported Adenauer, the Protestant church was too divided to be able to oppose him. The unions at the same time, benefiting from Adenauer's economic policies were at first supportive and then proceeded to take a more neutral stand after 1952. Neither

of the four, however, managed to impede Adenauer's pursuit of the primacy of foreign policy.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to look at some of the institutional variables influencing the triumph of the primacy of foreign policy during the Adenauer era. First, I have examined the German constitution to see where the power the Chancellor enjoys in policy-making has its origin. Then I analyzed how the Chancellery did become an integral part of Adenauer's use of the primacy of foreign policy concept. Next, I looked at the major German political parties to perceive how the weakness of the CDU party organization enhanced its dependence on the Chancellor in turn allowing him to ignore the party and its leaders on major foreign policy issues. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the SPD, as the major opposition party, mostly through its self-imposed isolation had no visible impact on foreign policy. Lastly, the role of interest groups during the heyday of the Adenauer era was researched, and the findings do demonstrate that while two of the big four, namely, the Catholic Church and the BDI, supported Adenauer, the Protestant Church was internally divided and the DGB remained neutral. This in turn allowed Adenauer to triumph.

Finally, changes, especially in the CDU party organization were analyzed to be able to see how they make the renewed triumph of the primacy of foreign policy less likely in the future.

ENDNOTES.

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⁶Anselm Döring-Manteuffel. "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Ära Adenauer-Aussenpolitik und Innere Entwicklung 1949-1963" (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), p. 145.

⁷Bundesanzeiger, November 24, 1977, pp. 1-6; December 4, 1981, pp. 2-6.

⁸Source: Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU, Recklinghausen, 1982 (Arranged by author).

⁹David S. Conradt, The German Polity (New York: Longman, 1982), p. 122.

¹⁰Kurt Sontheimer, The Government and Politics of West Germany (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 95.

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¹³Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1955-1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967), pp. 425-426.

¹⁴Fritz Allemann, "The Changing Scene in Germany," The World Today, February 1967, pp. 49-62.

¹⁵Wolfram Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis - Two Decades of German Foreign Policy (London: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 185.

¹⁶Ibid, p. 190.

¹⁷Döring-Manteuffel, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Ära Adenauer, p. 160.

¹⁸Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis--Two Decades of German Foreign Policy, p. 130.

¹⁹Döring-Manteuffel, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Ära Adenauer, p. 160.

²⁰Baring, Im Anfang war Adenauer, p. 348.

²¹Ibid, p. 361.

CHAPTER FIVE

PARTY LEADERS

In this chapter the role of individuals in the German foreign policy process will be analyzed. Special emphasis will be placed upon Konrad Adenauer, Federal Chancellor from 1949 until 1963, and Willy Brandt, Chancellor from 1969 until 1974, because both of them set the stage for present German foreign policy. Adenauer, of course, integrated West Germany into the Western alliance, while Brandt opened up relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In addition, the second portion of this chapter will focus on the foreign policies of the Schmidt (1974 until 1982) and Kohl (1982-present) administrations. Furthermore, the reader will find an analysis of German Ostpolitik from 1949 until 1989 integrated into this chapter.

It is imperative to focus on Konrad Adenauer as an individual so that my hypothesis that the primacy of foreign policy was dominant during the Adenauer era can be successfully tested. We have already seen that both public opinion and the structure of the state were conducive towards the primacy of foreign policy. This is, however, hardly sufficient if the leader of a nation, in this case West Germany, does himself not possess the personality and will to push for the triumph of his own foreign policy ideas. In other words, the Chancellor himself must believe that the concept of the primacy of

foreign policy should be the guiding force behind the countries actual conduct of foreign policy.

Thus, a closer look at Konrad Adenauer is necessary.

Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963)

Before looking at Konrad Adenauer's foreign policy goals it is necessary to go back in time and take a look at the socio-economic environment Adenauer had grown up in and which in turn had shaped his political ideas.

Adenauer had been born into the Second Empire (1871-1918), but instead of becoming Prussianized, he always remained loyal to his home state, the Rhineland. Born in the city of Cologne, his thoughts were shaped by the Rhineland. Being a devout Catholic, remembering the persecution of the Catholic Church by the Prussian regime, he soon started to despise everything associated with the dominant state of Prussia. He always felt closer to Paris or Brussels than to Berlin. For him the heart of the Christian occident was Western Europe, the area between Loire and Weser. Everything east of the Weser, he considered to be Asiatic. For example, in the 1920s he secretly admitted that for him the Asian tundra started beyond the city of Braunschweig. Furthermore, he stated that when in the Prussian city of Magdeburg he would always close the curtains of his hotel room and that when he crossed the Elbe, he would spit out of the window.¹ Clearly there was no love lost between Adenauer and Prussia. Once, when looking at a portrait of himself, he remarked that he looked like a Hun. "Not very surprising," he said, "I did

have a grandmother, born in the Harz."² Ironically, even though he despised the Prussians, he took over some of the qualities associated with the Prussian bureaucracy. For example, he insisted on punctuality and was extremely ambitious. His style was widely considered, not only by the French, but also his fellow citizens in the Rhineland to be Prussian.

He, however, associated Prussia with nationalism, militarism, marxism and materialism, all concepts he disliked. So, for example, the SPD was for him a "Prussian" party. Therefore, he always believed that the Rhineland should separate itself from the Prussian Empire. For him, not France, but Prussia was the real enemy of the Rhineland. As soon as the German Empire had been defeated in 1918, Adenauer, then mayor of Cologne, tried to separate the Rhineland from Prussia. According to Arnulf Baring, Adenauer wanted the creation of a "West German" state with Cologne becoming the capital. That in turn would have made the mayor of Cologne the new leader of this West German state.³ In a speech given to local politicians on February 1, 1919, Adenauer said the following:

After the experiences Germany has had with the hegemonic state of Prussia, a hegemony which has not accidentally led to disaster, but necessarily so, will the hegemony of Prussia never again be tolerated by the other federal states . . . Prussia is a state which is constructed out of different tribes and economic areas. East Prussia and the Rhineland are as different as East Prussia and Bavaria . . . I believe, that even those of you, Ladies and Gentlemen, who are deeply convinced admirers of the old Prussia, will not be able to ignore the fact that there exists a movement towards separatism in the West, whose strength one should not underestimate under any circumstances; which also has not been

instilled into the public artificially through agitators, but which has developed naturally out of the people.⁴

As we all know, Adenauer was not able to realize his dream of a separate "West German" state in 1919, because Prussia was still too powerful to have tolerated such a move. Instead, Adenauer remained mayor of Cologne in the 1920s, establishing the city's university, and even though he was in the close circle of candidates from which the Catholic Center Party picked its nominees for Chancellor, he never made it. Refusing to subordinate himself to the Nazi Regime he was forced out of office and spent the next twelve years in internal exile. It was only after the Second World War, when he returned to the political scene in Germany, by co-founding the CDU in the British Zone of occupation that he was to realize his political goals. What then were Adenauer's political goals after 1945, and how successful was he in realizing them during his fourteen year tenure as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany?

The Origins of Adenauer's Foreign Policy Goals

When looking at Adenauer's foreign policy goals, one should keep in mind that all of them were complementary and mutually reinforcing as will be demonstrated shortly. In addition, it is also possible to differentiate between "old" ideas of Adenauer, more specifically, goals that he had already advocated in the 1920s as mayor of Cologne and a leading figure in the old Catholic Center Party, which now had taken on even more significance, an example being reconciliation with France through economic integration, and "new" ideas, which directly

resulted from the German defeat. The re-establishment of sovereignty together with the readmission into the world of free nations as an equal partner can be counted among the latter.

It was, therefore, not mere anti-communism that led him to pursue so vigorously a policy of Western integration and European unification.⁵ As early as 1919 Adenauer had proposed economic integration with France, to not only assure her of German goodwill, but also to put the war industries of both nations under a common system of supervision, ruling out future wars between the two nations.⁶ After having reentered the political scene in Germany, by co-founding the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the British zone of occupation, and uniting Catholics and Protestants for the first time in history into one political party, Adenauer went back to his old ideas. In his opinion only a common economic interest between France and Germany could guarantee peace in Europe. However, the changing international environment had given Western integration and European unification as foreign policy goals additional significance. As early as 1945 Konrad Adenauer had recognized that the Soviet Union was not cooperating with the Western Allies, leading to a worsening of inter-Allied relations, which would make reunification a long term project, depending not only on the strength of Germany, but also on that of the whole free world, which he hoped to enlist into the process of reunification through his policy of integration.

Another important aspect in favor of European integration was the new Soviet threat Western Europe was facing. According to Adenauer, only a free United States of Europe could muster sufficient resources to face the common threat from the East. In Adenauer's words:

A Soviet hegemonial system has been created in Eastern and Central Europe; the Western European states must put up their own block against it-- the best way would be in the format of an economic and political union.⁷

The foundation of the United States of Europe, as Adenauer envisioned it, was to be a Franco-German reconciliation process. Other positive side effects of close collaboration, even integration, with the West, were the removal of any chance of new Franco-Russian flirtations, as in the past, and a removal of any possibility of a newly resurrected war alliance between the victorious powers, which would solve the German problem at Germany's expense.⁸ This so-called Potsdam complex never left Adenauer during his whole period as Chancellor.

In direct contrast to the "old" idea of European integration stood the "new" one of the reestablishment of German sovereignty. Adenauer had early on recognized that only patience, the accumulation of political influence over a period of time, could regain German sovereignty on a step-by-step basis. Only cooperation coupled with patient negotiations would create the amount of confidence necessary to convince the Allies to revise the Occupation Statute slowly. He clearly expressed this sentiment in his first declaration before the Bundestag on September 20, 1949:

For the German people there is no other way of obtaining freedom and equality of rights than in concert with the Allies. There is only one path to freedom. It is the attempt to extend our liberties and prerogatives step-by-step and in harmony with the Allied High Commission.⁹

Helped by the Cold War, which had put Germany in a much courted position, due to the fact that the United States now needed a strong West Germany in its alliance against the Soviet Union as a precondition for its newly adopted policies of containment, and by Adenauer's willingness to cooperate, while extracting the highest political price for it, Adenauer was now determined to use all the power he had to revise the Occupation Statute.

After having become Chancellor in September 1949, Adenauer became a compulsive joiner of supra-national institutions. They not only gave him a chance to influence policies within them, but also provided a way to lead Germany back into the world of nations. Clearly recognizing that all nations within supranational institutions were subject to the same rules and supervision, European integration not only provided a way for Adenauer to achieve his "old" goal of economic and political integration, but also a chance to reestablish Germany into the free world of nations as an equal partner, thereby reducing limitations on German sovereignty.

Another foreign policy goal of Adenauer, security, had taken on a totally different meaning, compared to previous German ideas concerning security, through the emergence of a new bipolar world structure. Traditionally, the German role had been one of a bridge broker between East and West, not being committed to either side.

Now with the destruction of a previous multipolar world through the Second World War, Adenauer recognized that brokerage was no longer possible. In his opinion survival was only possible through the alignment of Germany into an alliance with the West. Being directly threatened by the expansionist Soviet Empire, only integration with the West seemed to secure the western part of Germany. Not surprisingly Adenauer recognized that only the United States could guarantee German security and, therefore, made U.S. relations a central aspect of his foreign policy. Soon, under the threat of the Cold War, a convergence of views between the United States and Germany took place. Germany on the one hand needed a strong partner to guarantee its security, while the United States on the other hand needed allies for its fight against communism. Adenauer clearly expressed the sentiments he felt towards the United States in the following speech:

I do not believe that once in history, a victorious nation has tried to reconstruct a defeated country like the United States has Germany.¹⁰

He was, therefore, willing to accept unequal treaties, because he knew that time and the ongoing Cold War would take care of them. Torn between security and freedom on the one side and reunification on the other, Adenauer decided to opt for the West. With a fifth column of 100,000 men, who were trying to subvert the Western zones from the inside, and the external Soviet threat, Adenauer recognized that only a federal West German government with close Allied

collaboration, could guarantee freedom and security for the most vulnerable frontier state.¹¹

Next on the list of Adenauer's foreign policy goals was the speedy economic recovery of Germany. This goal was complementary with European and Atlantic integration. As Adenauer saw it, there was a choice between the continuation of a life in misery, waiting for reunification, which he had deemed a long-term process, or the working for integration into a united Europe by the Western part of Germany, which would not only reassure continuing American funds, but also open up the European markets for German exports. Especially the United States, which heavily favored European integration and which had poured 3.3 billion dollars into West Germany under the Marshall Plan, of which one billion was repaid later by Germany, could guarantee West Germany the integration into its free market international system, deemed necessary by Adenauer and Erhard for future German exports.¹²

Where did all this leave the question of reunification?

First of all, Konrad Adenauer was, contrary to academic opinion, a true patriot!¹³ He never gave up his total opposition to the annexation of the Ruhr or Rhineland by France or supported any kind of German confederation. However, he had early on recognized that the Soviet Union had turned her zone into a communist clone, making reunification in freedom impossible. With the start of the Cold War, German reunification had been turned into a long-term goal, neither side now being willing to give up their zones. Adenauer, therefore,

created a unique political theory, namely the policies of strength, to not only reassure public opinion, but also himself, that only integration into the West could make reunification possible. According to his theory, any security policies towards the Soviet Union had to be defensive. Soviet expansionism, enforced by nationalism, had to be counterbalanced by a united free world, which due to its superior economic, political and moral system would engage the Soviet Union into a defensive struggle, until the Soviet Union would not be able to cope with Western strength anymore and, therefore, would have to settle with or fold before the West. Only then would German reunification in peace and freedom be possible. This theory clearly ruled out any chance of neutrality for West Germany and had a strong anti-communist policy of the Western Alliance as its basis. Any policy of detente had, therefore, to appear to Adenauer like treason by jeopardizing reunification.

As will be seen, Adenauer did not only pay lip service to reunification, but clearly put it on his list of long-term goals to be achieved after he had integrated Western Germany into Europe. As David Calleo points out correctly, there actually never existed a chance of reunification, because both powers needed their portion of Germany for the establishment of a hegemonic world system.¹⁴ It is, therefore, to Adenauer's credit that he had recognized that fact early on and did use the international situation to his advantage in establishing a free, democratic state. Luckily for Germany, the greatest German statesman of the twentieth century appeared at the

time of greatest disaster, on the German political scene. In the beginning there was Adenauer.¹⁵

What kind of leader was Adenauer? In contrast to the commonly painted picture of being extremely dogmatic, resistant to any kind of change in foreign policy, we find that there are two sides to Konrad Adenauer. One, does fit the above described picture of him being a rigid anti-communist. Every time the four powers met to discuss the "German" question or disarmament, Adenauer tried to sabotage those meetings, because he believed that they threatened his goal of the integration of Germany into the West. For example, when the four great powers met in Berlin in 1954, he feared for the impending re-establishment of sovereignty for the new West German state. Thus, he sabotaged the meeting by demanding that a revision of the present-day borders in Eastern Europe be put on the Western agenda. On the other side, he proved to be extremely pragmatic when issues favoring Western integration were concerned. Here he even accepted terms which did not favor the West German state and, thus, had to override public opinion in several cases. The previously discussed reparation agreements with Israel and the Saar dispute between France and Germany do provide relevant examples.

As soon as sovereignty had been regained and the ties to the West were firmly established, Adenauer then was even willing to change his dogmatism towards the East, becoming increasingly flexible on the "German" question, as will be shortly analyzed.

As has been previously pointed out, Adenauer's world view was shaped by his devout Catholicism and his upbringing in the Rhineland. These were qualities he would never abandon. On the other hand, his "Prussian" qualities soon surfaced after he had assumed office in 1949. For the next fourteen years, he was to rule Germany with an iron fist. Believing that the German people were his children and he their patriarch, it was Adenauer who made foreign policy on their behalf. Not only did he disregard their wishes in certain cases, overruling them if he believed that they didn't know what was good for them, but he also did fear for them as soon as he left office. Thus his policies of Western integration were designed to prevent "his children" from making the mistakes of the past again. The gravest of them had been brokerage between two power centers.

In conclusion, Konrad Adenauer had been born at a time when the concept of the primacy of foreign policy had been the dominant paradigm in German foreign policy-making. He readily seized upon that concept when he finally gained power in 1949 and then proceeded through its use to make his foreign policy goals reality. In doing so he took the structure of the state, for example, the Chancellery, and transformed it to fit his model. On the other hand, the new constitution, the domestic situation and especially the international environment were all conducive towards his aims, at the end allowing him to triumph. K. D. Bracher, when discussing Adenauer and his policies probably puts it best when he states the following:

Adenauer's strength were his tactical skills, with which he maintained and even expanded the position of the state of 1949 against all other

possibilities. Externally, total integration with the West, against neutralism and reunification experiments; domestically, the restoration of the bourgeois democratic state against radical-democratic and socialist alternatives. A policy of an efficient administrative and economic order, secured in an anti-communist security alliance, which in fact accepted the division of Germany and put a priority on the stabilization of a sovereign Federal Republic--that was the political world view of the era Adenauer.¹⁶

In the next section of this chapter I will now turn to another Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, who had an equal amount of influence on German politics by opening up the East, namely Willy Brandt.

In previous chapters we have already discussed the history of the SPD up until 1969. Now it is time to focus on the first social-democratic Chancellor of post-war Germany and his foreign policy goals, usually labeled "Ostpolitik."

Willy Brandt (1969-1974)

In contrast to Konrad Adenauer, who spent the twelve years of the national-socialist era in internal exile, Willy Brandt, being a member of the SPD, fled Germany and actively opposed the Hitler regime from abroad. (Having been born as an illegitimate child with the name Herbert Frahm in the city of Lübeck in the state of Schleswig Holstein, Brandt, a name he assumed while in exile in Sweden and Norway, had been a long-time socialist activist when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor in 1933.)

After the war Brandt returned to Germany and became active in the SPD again. During the 1950s he was associated with the reformist wing of the party, opposing the doctrinaire socialism of the party, which led from one defeat to another. As mayor of West Berlin, Brandt was the unsuccessful candidate of the SPD for the Chancellorship in 1961 and 1965, even though he managed to increase the social-democratic vote in every election. Interestingly he early on favored a coalition with the FDP, but was overruled by the party chairman Herbert Wehner, leading to the SPD joining the CDU/CSU in a "Great Coalition" in 1966. As foreign minister of the "Great Coalition," Brandt was advocating a rapprochement with not only Eastern Europe, as the CDU had early on, but also closer ties with the Soviet Union and even East Germany.

By 1969 he was able to triumph over Wehner, who was still advocating a continued coalition with the CDU/CSU after the 1969 elections. The first sign of that victory came in the 1969 election for Federal President, when a SPD/FDP coalition succeeded in electing Gustav Heinemann to become the first social-democratic President in a very close race. (Heinemann won on the third ballot, receiving 512 votes to Gerhard Schröder's (CDU) 506 votes.)¹⁷ As previously shown, the 1969 elections then barely gave the new SPD/FDP coalition a majority, making Willy Brandt the fourth Chancellor of West Germany, in turn allowing him to initiate a major change in Germany foreign policy.

Ostpolitik (1955-1963)

Before being able to analyze the major break the new Brandt government made with traditional German foreign policy, it is necessary to look at Adenauer's foreign policy towards the East. I will start my discussion on Adenauer's Ostpolitik in 1955, because only after Adenauer had achieved sovereignty, was it possible for him to conduct an active Ostpolitik. Any attempts, previous to sovereignty, would have been rejected by the Western powers. Now, however, Adenauer was in a position to conduct an active Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union on an equal footing. Being a "Realpolitiker," Adenauer knew that the Soviet Union, after having established hegemony over Eastern Europe, was a great power pursuing its self-interest. His Ostpolitik had, therefore, two dimensions;¹⁸ first there was the political, ideological one, in which Adenauer appeared to be a dogmatic anti-communist, objecting to any kind of detente with the Soviet Union, before a reunification settlement in peace and freedom had been achieved. With this strong stand against communism, he not only attracted public support, integrating the minor right wing parties and the refugees into his own party, but also established an ideological cohesion with the American foreign policy line under Dulles. Second there was Adenauer the "Realpolitiker," who proposed personally several solutions to the German problem to the Soviet Union. Using traditional diplomacy and the Chancellor Democracy, Adenauer conducted an active Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union until his resignation in 1963.

The Geneva Conference had just ended in failure when Adenauer received an invitation from Premier Khrushchev to visit the Soviet Union on June 7, 1955 to discuss diplomatic, economic and cultural relations. Adenauer recognized at once that the Soviet Union wanted to negotiate with Germany alone, trying to get the acceptance of the post-war frontiers and the recognition of East Germany by the West. However, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also have its advantages. First, the USSR, having a decisive say on reunification under the Inter-Allied agreement of 1945, could not just be neglected, but had to be negotiated with. Second, the information monopoly East Germany had enjoyed in Moscow would be eradicated. In addition economic ties with the Soviet Union would silence the Eastern Committee of Trade, founded by influential businessmen in 1952 and pressuring for an opening of the Eastern markets to Germany.¹⁹ For Adenauer, however, an increase in economic possibilities would have never been a decisive factor, but he saw in a trade agreement the chance to use economic incentives as a political weapon.

Before agreeing to the journey he demanded that two issues, reunification and the repatriation of German prisoners of war still held in Russia, be put on the agenda. By agreeing, the Soviet Union not only recognized reunification as a legitimate goal of German foreign policy, but also the "Alleinvertretungsanspruch."

In Moscow Adenauer reiterated his position on the possibility of negotiations with East Germany. Only free elections could lead to

any contacts with the East. However, he promised that in case of reunification he would keep the Soviet Zone militarily neutral and would further limit the German Army to twelve divisions not to be equipped with nuclear weapons.²⁰ The Soviet Union, disregarding Adenauer's offer, restated its position. Germany by joining NATO, had made reunification impossible as long as a reunified Germany would join the Atlantic Alliance. When Adenauer decided to cut his trip short, the Soviets suddenly gave in. They proposed now a release of all German prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union, about 10,000 in 1955, if Germany would enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. For reasons already discussed Adenauer agreed to the Soviet proposal, stating that diplomatic relations with the Soviets would by no means equal an acceptance of East Germany as a sovereign state. For that purpose Professor Wilhelm Grewe worked out the Hallstein Doctrine in December 1955, declaring the recognition of East Germany by foreign powers an unfriendly act towards West Germany, resulting in the severing of all diplomatic and economic relations with West Germany. The doctrine proved to be a powerful weapon, especially in Third World countries hoping to receive West German aid, leading to an isolation of East Germany.

Having relations with the Soviet Union and not with the rest of Eastern Europe was explained by the fact that Eastern Europe was not in a position to conduct an independent foreign policy and that it would, therefore, be sufficient to talk to the Soviet Union alone.

This was the source of Adenauer's often criticized Moscow-centered Ostpolitik.

After the Moscow visit Adenauer knew that reunification had become a long-term event. He, therefore, modified his policy of strength theory. From now on negotiations were included in the theory, in the case of the Soviet Union not collapsing economically as a result of the arms race, as Adenauer had and was still hoping for. Further, believing that only a powerful nation could negotiate with the Soviet Union, Adenauer was now pushing for nuclear equipment of the Bundeswehr.

Reacting to the possible nuclear equipping of German forces, the Polish foreign minister Rapacki, revived an old Gromyko proposal, and presented it to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957. The Soviet Ministerpresident Bulganin tried to convince Adenauer to accept the Rapacki plan in a letter on December 10, 1957, directly threatening that a nuclear Germany would attract a Soviet nuclear strike. Adenauer, unmoved, rejected the Rapacki plan at once. First it would have recognized East Germany as a separate nation, thereby not only leading to a German acceptance of the post-war frontiers, but also to the destruction of the Junktim. In addition it would undermine Adenauer's wishes to bargain from a position of strength with the Soviets. Franz Joseph Strauss clearly demonstrated this point in the following speech: "Tough negotiate can only he, who can rely on someone, either Allies or himself."²¹

However, Adenauer's greatest fear was that the Rapacki plan would have destroyed NATO, upon which German security was based, and would have undermined Western integration. His reasoning was that by denying tactical nuclear weapons to Germany, Germany would be put into a special status within NATO. Why would American troops remain on German soil, if they were equipped with inferior weapons? He, therefore, feared that isolation and neutrality would follow the Rapacki plan, leading to the destruction of European integration.

At the same time he accepted a Soviet invitation to talk about economics, if the Soviets were prepared to discuss the repatriation of 100,000 German nationals still held in Russia. After the Soviet Union had agreed to repatriate the Germans, Adenauer signed a three year treaty in the amount of 3,150 billion which gave the Soviet Union "Most Favored Nation Treatment." Again he had employed the economic weapon successfully.

On March 7, 1958, Adenauer went a step further. In a meeting with second Ministerpresident Smirnov he proposed an "Austria" settlement to the East German question. After East Germany had become neutral, he promised Smirnov that disarmament would take place. Despite the Soviet rejection of Adenauer's offer, similar ones were to follow.

First, however, Adenauer was in for a rude shock, when Khrushchev started the second Berlin crisis, on November 27, 1958. To Adenauer's shock, the Western Allies did not respond harshly to the situation, but agreed to meet with the Soviets in Geneva in 1959.

The British Prime Minister even undertook a trip to Moscow during the time. Only Charles de Gaulle stood firmly by Adenauer, which the Chancellor was never to forget. In January 1959, the four powers met in Geneva to discuss Khrushchev's revised proposal for a peace treaty. After having ended in a stalemate, the four powers adjourned, not to discuss the question of reunification again for the next thirty-one years.

With the advent of the Kennedy administration in 1961, American-German relations deteriorated. The abandoning of the quest for reunification by the United States, fearing that it would hinder the process of detente, was totally unacceptable to Adenauer, driving him further into the arms of de Gaulle.

In East Germany at the same time, the process of collectivization was started all over again. From January 1 to August 15, 1961, 159,730 East Germans fled the new oppressive measures putting the total number of refugees from East Germany in the last sixteen years at well over two million.²² This presented the East German government not only with the problem of a "brain-drain," but also with one of damaging international prestige. To stop the flow of refugees the "Wall" was erected on August 13, 1961.

Adenauer, having no legal rights whatsoever in West Berlin, could do nothing but watch how his Allies deserted him. The three Western Allies, responsible for West Berlin, did not react forcefully, only defending their right to have access to and be present in the city. On the contrary, Allied troops were even used

to keep angry Berliners away from the Wall so as not to provoke the Soviets. Another blow was dealt to Adenauer by Kennedy in September, when Adenauer was denied the right to travel with Johnson to West Berlin to present a united force opposing the Wall, because the Kennedy administration, did not want to take sides in the upcoming October election.²³ The personal relationships, which had been a basis for German-American understanding for the last twelve years, were now destroyed.

The October elections of 1961 dealt Adenauer a serious blow, and only his personal skills kept him in power for two more years.

From now on Adenauer was determined to achieve reunification alone, without even consulting the Allies. In late 1961, the German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hans Kroll, told the Soviets that Adenauer was prepared to recognize East Germany, if the question over Berlin could be settled in a mutually satisfying way. Khrushchev's response, in a memorandum to Adenauer, was to propose direct negotiations between the Soviet Union and Germany, excluding the Western Allies. Only the intervention by Foreign Minister Schröder, one of the leaders of the Atlantic wing of his party, coupled with the loss of power Adenauer had experienced, was able to prevent Adenauer from accepting the note.

After Adenauer's proposal of a renunciation of force treaty between West Germany and the Soviet Union, made in November 1961, was turned down by the Soviets, because it did not include the recognition of East Germany as a separate nation, Adenauer declared

his willingness to discuss many things if the living conditions of the people in the Soviet zone were improved. Out of this declaration derived the famous "Burgfriedensplan" of June 1962. Adenauer fearing a sell-out of Berlin by Kennedy, after Kennedy had proposed a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in addition to the establishment of a thirteen member Assembly, including East Germany and Ost-Berlin, to rule over Berlin, proposed the "Burgfriedensplan" to the Soviet Union in June 1962. Planning to soften the Soviet position, Adenauer promised detente for a period of ten years, after which the German question was to be solved democratically. During those ten years both Germanies were to have the same legal rights. Then, the question of reunification was to be put to the people in a referendum.

If the people should oppose reunification, two separate independent states would emerge. If, on the other hand, the vote would favor reunification, a joint, duly elected Assembly would elect a Chancellor for all of Germany. In addition, the plan proposed that in the case of a reunified Germany joining NATO, the Eastern zone would stay demilitarized. In the case of the newly reunified country joining the Warsaw pact, the Western zone would respectively remain demilitarized. Furthermore, the use of force to get the lost territories back was to be renounced. All parties were to be allowed to compete in the election, which was to be supervised by the United Nations.

Finally, Berlin would become a free city, ruled by an elected Senate and occupied by a 5,000 man United Nations force for the next ten years. If the German people should opt for reunification, Berlin would once again become the capital of Germany. If, however, the vote should result in another outcome, the Berliners would have a choice to retain the free city status or join either West or East Germany.

As can be seen, this proposal would not have jeopardized Western integration or membership of NATO, because it would have been unlikely that the Germans would have opted against reunification or NATO. The Soviet Union recognizing the same fact turned the proposal down.

In October 1963, days before his resignation, Adenauer made one last proposal to the Soviet Union, offering no discussions of reunification for five years, if the Soviet Union would ease restrictions on the East German people. Without being successful in his last attempt to bring about a better life for the East Germans, Konrad Adenauer resigned on October 15, 1963, at the age of eighty-eight after having been at the helm of the German state for fourteen years.

Is it, therefore, analytically plausible to argue that Adenauer conducted an active Ostpolitik? Based on the previously mentioned empirical facts it would seem so. Especially from 1958 to 1963 Adenauer tried in vain to achieve normalization between the two German states. Indeed, he proved to be very flexible, shifting in

his later years away from an emphasis on reunification along Western lines, now basing his proposals on human rights and living condition improvements in East Germany.

When looking at the "Austria proposal" (1958) and the "Burgfriedensplan" (1962) this becomes clearly evident.

It was especially after 1958 that Adenauer put Ostpolitik on his priority list, resulting in active negotiations with the Soviet Union to solve the East German question. Indeed, Ostpolitik did take place under Adenauer.²⁴

Ostpolitik (1963-1969)

When discussing Ostpolitik after the Adenauer era, it is imperative to point out that changes in the policies towards the East did not start under Brandt in 1969, but earlier, when the CDU/CSU government was still in power, but Adenauer had achieved his goal of Western integration. It was then that he turned towards the East with several proposals, which have already been discussed earlier, in which he tried to lift the burden of the East German citizens by reducing tensions between the Soviet Union and West Germany.

A new era of Ostpolitik then started with the forced resignation of Heinrich von Brentano and his replacement by Gerhard Schröder after the 1961 elections. From now on, three different positions on Ostpolitik could be found in Germany. First, there were the inflexible conservatives, who rallied around Strauss and Adenauer, who were previously referred to as German "Gaullists." Next, one could find the flexible leftists around Bahr, who advocated sweeping

changes in German foreign policy and, lastly, the "Atlanticists" had emerged on the political scene. It were the "Atlanticists," including large elements of the CDU, FDP, and SPD, led by Schröder, Schmidt and Scheel and backed by big business, the unions and both churches, who emerged victorious from the struggle.

In a speech given to the CDU annual party convention, in 1962 Schröder outlined the new policy priorities:

The people of the Warsaw Pact also belong to Europe. I think it would be good, when the communist hate propaganda and the ongoing resentments, which disturb the relationship between the Eastern European people and the German people would be reduced.²⁵

First Rapprochements

Essentially the new policy had two main objectives. The first one was to isolate East Germany from its Eastern neighbors. The new policy was, therefore, not oriented towards Moscow but towards its client states in Eastern Europe. Bilateral economic relations and not diplomatic ones were sought. Resulting from the new initiatives West German trade missions were established in Poland, Hungary and Rumania in 1963. All three nations recognized West Berlin as an integral part of West Germany in their trade agreements. Again economic weapons had to be used to achieve political objectives. However, despite the new trend in German foreign policy, the main objectives remained reunification and the refusal to accept the post World War II status quo. Furthermore, it was unthinkable for Schröder to give in to any kind of Soviet demands without getting

concessions in return. So, for example, all questions concerning disarmament were still being tied to a successful solution of the German question.

Only when it becomes clear, that the Soviets are willing to loosen up their current dogmatic positions, can the West determine which material gestures its basic positions will allow. However, the basic position must be: No concessions, without concessions.²⁶

The Soviet Union alarmed by the new economic relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe and under heavy pressures from East Germany, which was afraid of being driven into isolation,²⁷ proved to be increasingly inflexible to German economic overtures. As early as 1964 Chancellor Erhard had extended an invitation to the Soviet Premier to visit Germany and discuss trade. The Soviet Union refused the invitation and made it clear that no negotiations were possible until Germany was prepared to recognize the post World War II status quo, including the independence of East Germany and West Berlin. Increasingly, West Germany was attacked for supposedly being revanchist. Franz Joseph Strauss saw that new attacks against West Germany as the result of an increasing fear by the Soviets of the destabilizing effects of the new German policy. A common enemy had to be created to keep the Warsaw Pact intact.

Thus, between 1963 and 1969 German-Soviet trade declined extensively. The Soviet Union refused to sign any agreement in which West Berlin was shown to be an integral part of West Germany, while the German government insisted on it. Thus, the German government refused to give credit to the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviet

Union experienced balance of payment problems. Even when the German government decided to extend credit to the Soviet Union in late 1965, it insisted on the previously mentioned conditions.

The second objective of the new policy was to placate the United States. Since 1963 the Soviet Union and the United States had pursued a policy of detente and West Germany had become the last "Cold Warrior." Erhard considering security objectives based upon American friendship, therefore, decided to go along with the United States once more.

In 1966 Gerhard Schröder proposed a Peace Memorandum stating the willingness of the West German government to enter into nonaggression pacts with all countries which wished to do so. All Eastern European states, save East Germany, were eligible to enter into an agreement with West Germany. The Munich Agreement of 1938 was renounced, but West Germany repeated its claim to the 1937 boundaries. The Soviet Union denounced the memorandum for being revanchistic and forced its Eastern European client states not to sign it. In 1966, the "Grosse Koalition" under CDU Chancellor Kiesinger succeeded Erhard. For the first time since the creation of West Germany the SPD entered into the government. Willy Brandt, the mayor of West Berlin became foreign minister. Brandt's new policies towards the East were based on the relaxation of tensions. A compromise with the Soviet Union was to be achieved which would later hopefully result in German reunification. Within two months, diplomatic relations were established with Rumania (January 1967) and Yugoslavia (December

1967). Consequently, the establishment of relations with the East led to the abolition of the Hallstein Doctrine. Now, Moscow, observing growing German influence in Eastern Europe, became worried. In late 1967 a conference was held at Karlsbad where all Eastern European nations gathered, with notably absence of Rumania and Yugoslavia, which were punished for having established diplomatic relations with West Germany. During the conference, the Soviet Union reasserted its hegemonial power over Eastern Europe, in turn forcing the West German government to go back to Moscow to improve its relations with the East. Furthermore, Bonn's new policies were denounced as being revanchist and Prague, Warsaw and Budapest were forced to oppose West German attempts of establishing closer ties and to conclude friendship treaties with East Germany. Ironically, the tough Soviet response to West German attempts to reduce tensions happened in the same year when West Germany had shown for the first time a willingness to approach East Germany on political terms. This had occurred in April 1967, when the West German government presented a list of sixteen proposals to the East German government in the areas of traffic, transportation and scientific exchanges to ease tensions. The East Germans had responded by proposing a meeting between the two Premiers, Kiesinger and Stoph. Under heavy pressure from Moscow, which finally saw a possibility to achieve its security objectives, the East German government announced that a normalization of the two German nations would only be possible if Bonn would leave NATO, the Common Market and would promise to become a socialist

nation. After this announcement the CDU insisted that all further negotiations with East Germany would be broken off.

Then on August 2, 1968 the new policy of reducing of tensions came to an abrupt end when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia to put down a reformist movement. The Soviet Union searching for ways to legitimize its actions to the world, laid the blame on Germany, which was supposed to have initiated a fascist uprising in Czechoslovakia. True, there had been an improvement in West German-Czech relations, leading to a trade agreement in 1967, but the real reason behind the decision to invade probably centered around the growing tensions with China and the fear that the Czech reformist government would destabilize the Eastern Bloc. Moscow had to show the world that it was still able to exert hegemony over the Eastern European hemisphere. The Soviet Union revived a position of the Potsdam Conference, which provided the victorious powers with the right to intervene in any kind of fascist uprising. Bonn was formally charged with the initiation of the so-called fascist uprising in Czechoslovakia and there was a smell of war in the air between West Germany and the Soviet Union. Only when Washington announced that it would take immediate military action in case of a Soviet attack on West Germany did the situation cool down.

It shouldn't be surprising that German-Soviet economic relations declined during that period. The Soviet Union rejected all German proposals even those in which Germany agreed to get rid of some import restrictions and provide credit to the Soviet Union.

By 1969 it looked like German foreign policy regarding Eastern Europe would go back to the period of Adenauer's policies of strength.

An Opening to the East - The Policies of
Willy Brandt (1969-1974)

As previously stated, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia Russian-German relations had drifted back into the arena of the Cold War. Then suddenly the Soviet Union changed its policies towards West Germany. Having reestablished its hegemony over Eastern Europe and being in need of modern western technology the Soviet Union took a more conciliatory path in regard to the West German case. This was first apparent in February 1969 when the "Bundesversammlung" announced its plans to go to West Berlin to elect a new President. East Germany was furious and refused to let the West German delegation pass through East German territory. The Soviets, in an attempt to reconcile both sides, offered West Germans the right to visit relatives in the East, if the plan to elect the new President in West Berlin was abandoned. After the West German government refused the Soviet offer, the Soviets pressured the East German government into a passive position and on March 5, 1969, the new West German President was elected in West Berlin. Why this sudden change in Soviet policy? There are basically three explanations for it. The first centers around the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1969. Suddenly the south-eastern borders of the Soviet Union were threatened and good relations with the Western bloc were necessary to

decrease tensions on the western borders. In addition West Germany could now be replaced with China as the common threat to keep the Warsaw Pact in line.

The second explanation is based on the worsening of the Soviet economy. Being in desperate need for modern technology, a more conciliatory stance with West Germany was seen as a first step towards increased trade. In addition it was felt that a final solution to the German problem would stop Germany from intertwining political and economic relations. The third explanation is structured around the fear in Moscow of direct West German-Eastern European relations. It was seen as a necessity that the German eastern trade would go through Moscow.

Thus, all three events, coupled with a period of detente with the United States and the longtime wish to see West Germany become more autonomous from the United States, played a major role in the change of Soviet Foreign Policy in the late 1960s. Pursuing its new policy of reconciliation the Soviet Union approached the West German government and indicated its willingness to resume talks on a renunciation of force treaty. In addition, despite East German objections, it was declared that "Social Democracy" was no longer the chief enemy of communism.

Then, in 1969 the SPD took over the government in a coalition with the Liberal Party. Willy Brandt, the former mayor of West Berlin became Chancellor. Even before the election the SPD had already announced that it would be willing to enter into a new

dialogue with the Soviet Union. Brandt based his policies on the view that reunification had become impossible and that it was, therefore, necessary to secure the West German borders. Furthermore, Brandt believed that only in a climate of detente and peace, a chance for reunification existed. For him it was peace which was the foundation of a future process of reunification and not the reverse, as had been advocated by Adenauer. In addition the ongoing detente between the United States and the Soviet Union made a more autonomous foreign policy more acceptable to the United States. A pan-European union could now exist between the two superpowers and Brandt hoped that in the future Moscow would allow East Germany to join it. (Interestingly, it has been often stated that the SPD/FDP coalition was formed for one major purpose, namely, to change German foreign policy. As Brandt said: "We must have no fear before experiments."²⁸) In addition, it needs to be pointed out in this context that both, public opinion and the major interest groups, big business, the unions and the two churches were by 1969 ready and even actively calling for a new policy towards the East. However, economic objectives, often cited as a major cause of the new policy, played, according to Brandt, only a minor part in his decision to fundamentally change Ostpolitik.²⁹ True, there had been business pressures in the past for opening up the Eastern market, but the Soviet Union possessed at that point of time neither hard currency to pay for imports, nor goods which could be exported to Germany.

Thus, a few weeks after the election Brandt signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibited West Germany from having nuclear weapons of its own, and whose signing had been one of the preconditions set by Moscow to enter into a new dialogue. Having handed Moscow an olive branch, Brandt visited Moscow and a renunciation of force treaty was discussed. Moscow having nothing to lose, agreed to it and in August 1970, the "Renunciation of Force Treaty" with the Soviet Union was signed. In the treaty both nations pledged to maintain international peace and renounced the use of force. In addition the two nations accepted all contemporary boundaries and disavowed all territorial claims. The Soviet Union had finally achieved its major objective, the recognition of the post World War II boundaries by Germany. Bonn also agreed to conclude similar treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. East Germany was to be recognized as a second German state within German territory. To claim to represent all Germans was given up by West Germany. However, the ratification of the treaty was made dependent upon a satisfactory settlement over the question of the status and access to West Berlin. After the Berlin question was solved in a four power conference in 1970, resulting in the Berlin Agreement of September 1971, which guaranteed Western access to West Berlin, Germany had, therefore, accepted the status quo in Eastern Europe.

Brandt's rationale behind the treaty, as previously stated, was that West-East German relations could only be improved by reconciling the Soviet Union first. In addition a clause within the treaty

provided West Germany with the chance to change the status quo through peaceful means.

The treaty, violently opposed by the CDU and the various refugee movements, passed Parliament, but encountered a lot of hostility not only in West Germany, but also in Gaullist France and even in some branches of the United States government, which feared an increasingly autonomous West Germany. Brandt unmoved by the hostility then proceeded towards normalization with East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe. In December 1970 a treaty, in which West Germany recognized the "Oder-Neisse" line and renounced the use of force, was signed with Poland.

The most important agreement achieved by Brandt was the "Basic Treaty" regulating relations with East Germany. The treaty recognized the internal and external sovereignty of both states and committed both nations to respect each others territorial integrity. One could conclude that from that point on, November 1972, there were two German nations in the world. A few months later both Germanies became members of the United Nations. In March 1974 diplomatic missions were established in both nations.

Brandt's new Ostpolitik had created as previously mentioned a storm of opposition from both the CDU and the refugee movements. A vote of no-confidence in 1972 failed by only one vote, but the German public expressed their confidence in Brandt's policies by giving the SPD a new majority in the 1972 elections. Interestingly it was the intransigent opposition of the CDU/CSU to the new Ostpolitik, which

led Brandt to reject some of the demands made by the Soviet Union. After intense CDU/CSU pressure, the Soviets agreed to recognize the European Economic Community (EEC) and forced East Germany to relax travel requirements. After these concessions the opposition parties then abstained from the vote on the treaties in December 1972. However, the state of Bavaria did challenge the "Basic Treaty" in court, but on July 31, 1973, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that there existed no violations of the German constitution. The ruling did, however, establish the following positions: First, the German Reich was still in existence, but was divided. Second, West Berlin was an integral part of West Germany and the borders between West and East Germany were to be treated as borders similar to those of the federal states making up West Germany. Finally, German citizenship was the citizenship of the Federal Republic and, therefore, all East Germans were automatically West German citizens.

While Brandt was pursuing his policies of reconciliation with the East, German-Soviet economic relations improved. Between 1968 and 1969 trade increased by 30 percent from \$565.7 million to \$739.9 million.³⁰

In 1970 an agreement was concluded in which private German banks provided the Soviet Union with a credit of \$400 million to buy German gas pipelines. The loan was to be repaid over a 20 year period at a 6.5 percent interest rate through the export of Soviet natural gas to West Germany. In the time period of 1969 to 1979 Soviet-German trade increased from \$739.9 million to \$6 billion³¹ and the Soviet Union

became West Germany's tenth largest trading partner. 2.3 percent³² of the total foreign trade was now going to the Soviet Union. West Germany on the other hand had become the largest western trading partner of the Soviets. By 1979 the Eastern European nations had accrued a debt of \$8 billion, owing West Germany alone \$2 billion.³³

As can be easily seen when looking at those figures both nations have become increasingly interdependent. A recent estimate shows that 500,000 German workers are now dependent upon German-Soviet trade.³⁴ The dependence is most heavily in the steel industries. The Soviet Union on the other hand needs German technology and machinery to foster its worsening economy.

This new interdependence can be looked upon as a direct result of the partition of economics from politics. During the 1950s Adenauer used the economic weapon frequently to foster his foreign policy goals, another example of his use of the primacy of foreign policy concept, while in the 1970s economic relations and political ones had been separated. One of the reasons for the separation had been the settlement of the question of West Berlin. As late as 1969 the Soviet Union had refused to sign any trade agreement in which West Berlin was mentioned as being an integral part of Germany. Then in 1970 in face of improving German-Sino trade relations the Soviet Union changed its position. It was now willing to accept a Berlin clause in a trade agreement, as had all Eastern European states done previously. The previously mentioned four power conference in 1971,

which provided for unimpeded access to the city and recognized its special ties with West Germany, then settled this question. (In East Germany, which was opposed to the agreement, Ulbricht was forced to resign by the Soviet Union.) Following the Berlin solution a new trade agreement between West Germany and the Soviet Union was signed in April 1972. In it West Germany reduced its import quotas from 40 to 16 percent. In 1973 the Soviet Premier Brezhnev visited West Germany. In his visit, the first of a Soviet Premier since the end of World War II, Brezhnev stressed economic relations. The Soviet Union, which had always placed heavy emphasis on bilateral relation between the two nations, which stood in contrast to the German view emphasizing multilateral and European relations, had therefore stopped using political pressure towards Germany. Having achieved all its objectives regarding Germany, it was now unnecessary to concentrate on anything else than economic cooperation.

Finally in 1973, a treaty was signed with Czechoslovakia, in which West Germany renounced the Munich Agreement of 1938. West Germany had now de facto recognized the status quo in Eastern Europe and Brandt had achieved his goal of peace and security through cooperation.

Suddenly, in 1974, Brandt's popularity decreased and his party lost elections in several states. The major cause of this decline, was the fact that his new Ostpolitik had heightened public expectations that West and East German relations would rapidly improve, which was, however, not the case. The final blow to his

career came later that year when it was revealed that one of his closest advisers had been an East German spy. Brandt resigned on May 6, 1974 and was replaced by Helmut Schmidt.

The Schmidt Era (1974-1982)

In contrast to Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt had a solid middle class background and had served in the German army during World War II. After having been a cabinet member in the city state of Hamburg, Schmidt had been elected into the Bundestag in 1965, where he experienced a rapid rise through the party echelons. By 1966 he had been appointed minister of defense and in Brandt's new government he became the so-called "Crisis Minister," controlling subsequently both the finance and economic ministries. Soon he was to enjoy high international prestige, being labeled the first true "European" statesman, since de Gaulle and Adenauer.

Being a direct beneficiary of Brandt's Ostpolitik, which had decreased German dependence on the Western Allies by eliminating the need to beg for constant backing in the quest for the reunification of Germany along the lines of the 1937 borders, Schmidt was able to embark on a more independent and assertive foreign policy. Soon this new German foreign policy was to lead to political disputes between Germany and its Western allies. For example, in 1975 Schmidt forced his fellow EEC members to cut the EEC budget by twenty percent, while refusing to continue to shoulder most of the EEC's agricultural policies. (All CDU Chancellors in the 1960s had consented to a German subsidy for the EEC's agricultural policies, to assure

continued EEC and especially French support, for Germany's policies against the status quo in the East.)

In addition, Schmidt successfully opposed new agreements with the United States in the area of offset payments for American troops stationed in Germany and emerged victoriously from a two year battle with successive American administrations concerning the sale of a nuclear reactor to Brazil. Under an agreement signed with Brazil in June 1975, the German government had agreed to sell a nuclear reactor, enrichment facilities and a reprocessing plant to Brazil for four billion dollars. Especially the sale of the last two items, which can be used to develop nuclear weapons, was vehemently opposed by the Carter administration which tried to pressure Germany into withholding the shipment of the aforementioned portions of the sale. However, Chancellor Schmidt, in contrast to Adenauer who had given in to U.S. pressures in 1963, by deciding to prohibit the shipment of pipelines to the Soviet Union, stood firm, handing President Carter a major foreign policy defeat. Why was there a sudden change towards a more assertive foreign policy? According to Helmut Schmidt there were three reasons for this change:

Our margin of diplomatic maneuver, the Chancellor told the Bundestag in 1975, has been extraordinarily enlarged. First of all, the Eastern treaties have largely . . . liberated our country from its role as a client . . . who believed almost incessantly that he needed yet another pledge of assurance from his patron powers Secondly, our treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, East Berlin and so forth, as well as the Four-Power Agreement have greatly reduced the numerous reasons we had in those days to seek, and beg for continuous reassurance.³⁵

The third reason for West Germany's new found self-confidence was to be found in the country's increasing economic power.

Thus, it was the great success . . . of Germany's economic course and its economic policy that had increased our weight.³⁶

Other clashes with the United States were to follow. They concerned the handling of the Vietnam War and especially the handling of American fiscal policies. Again and again Schmidt was to lecture President Carter on what he perceived to be a totally inadequate American economic policy. With the introduction of the European currency in 1979, further reliance upon the United States dollar decreased. According to Paul Noack, it was especially the Carter administration and the following insecurity in American foreign policy which led Schmidt to become a "Gaullist," refusing to continue to let West Germany be a client state of the United States.³⁷ A more independent foreign policy towards the West had indeed taken place.

Schmidt's Ostpolitik on the other hand was a continuation of the policies set by the Brandt administration. According to Schmidt only a "Policy of Small Steps" could be used to ameliorate the lot of the East Germans. Thus, a slow increase in social and economic relations was sought after. In 1975 at the Helsinki Conference, which had grown out of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Helmut Schmidt had a chance to meet the East German Premier Erich Honecker for the first time. While the two leaders were able to agree on more cooperation between the two Germanies, the Helsinki

Conference provided Helmut Schmidt with a major foreign policy success, when he was able to put into the final agreement that the post-World War II status quo could be changed by peaceful means. Furthermore, provisions of the agreement, examples being the freer flow of ideas and people, and the improvement of economic relations between East and West could be used to improve inter-German trade relations. Concluding one could therefore say that the Helsinki Conference provided both Germanies with the opportunity to improve relations.

However, overall expectations of better relations with East Germany and the Soviet Union as a result of Ostpolitik were disappointed. For the Soviet Union, now satisfied with the German recognition of the post-War status quo, Germany had lost in its importance, while East Germany was dissatisfied because it had failed to gain full recognition as an independent state in the Basic Treaty.

On the other hand minor improvements of relations between the two Germanies did take place. For example, greater freedom for travel for both East and West Germans was accomplished and an increase of cooperation on environmental, social scientific and technological issues did take place. Overall, however, German priorities shifted back to the West, where the current sources of domestic political problems could be found. Not only had the first and second oil crisis to be tackled, but economic, monetary, and military-strategic matters assumed a new priority. All of these

issues did, of course, fall into the arena of Westpolitik. For example, in the late 1970s largely as a result of Soviet expansionism in the Third World, and a massive arms build up, the notion of detente lost in importance, especially in the United States. However, it were the Europeans, increasingly worried about the continuing deployment of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Central Europe, who first called for a major NATO rearmament program. Under the leadership of Helmut Schmidt, who clearly perceived the direct threat to West Germany, brought about by the Soviet deployment of fifty SS20s annually, NATO thus embarked on its dual-track decision. According to Schmidt these missiles, incapable of reaching the United States, but with enough range to reach all of Western Europe, posed a separate threat to Europe, and they were potent "instruments of pressure."³⁸ In Schmidt's words:

Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military superiority if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. . . . The Alliance must be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy.³⁹

In other words, NATO would have to take countermeasures to balance the Soviet deployment, unless the Soviets would agree to dismantle their weapons. This was the decision taken at a NATO conference held in Brussels in 1979, resulting in the NATO dual-track proposal.

However, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the same year all hopes for a renewed detente were destroyed and a new Cold War

began. At the same time, the NATO dual track decision was to contribute to the downfall of the Schmidt government. Re-elected in a very close election in 1976 and by a wide margin in 1980, it looked like Germany was ready for a continued SPD/FDP coalition government in the 1980s. However, both internal and external factors were to bring the Schmidt government down. Domestically, a new party had been formed out of the concern for the continuing destruction of the German environment, while the SPD under the leadership of the old guard, headed by former Chancellor Brandt, moved to the left. More and more the Chancellor found himself isolated within his own party, which started to oppose him on the issue of the deployment of new missiles to counter the Soviet threat. In addition, the second oil crisis led to an economic downturn in Germany, resulting in the highest number of unemployed, namely, over two million, since the creation of the republic. Even the area of foreign policy suddenly created insurmountable obstacles. While detente had allowed for a more independent foreign policy, the new Cold War presented the Germans with the problem of having to select between security, deterrence and Ostpolitik. Hans Apel aptly made that point when he stated that the margin of movement of lesser alliance members becomes limited when superpower tensions increase.⁴⁰ Thus, a choice between security and better relations with the East, especially East Germany had to be made. Schmidt, however, tried to avoid these hard choices by reverting back to the traditional role of Germany, namely, one of becoming a bridge-broker between East and West. During a trip to

Moscow in the summer of 1980 he tried to divide the issue of detente by differentiating between Europe and the rest of the world. While a new Cold War had begun in Africa and Asia, Schmidt argued that detente in Europe could be preserved. Thus German criticism of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland were almost unheard of. Unluckily for Schmidt, the international environment did not prove so divisible. Any disturbance of the balance of power, in Africa or Asia, had to be felt in the United States which in turn had to drag Europe, being dependent on the United States, into the new Cold War. The logic of a bipolar world system was to triumph again.

When the Soviet Union continued to refuse to discuss the removal of its SS20 missiles, hoping to spur anti-nuclear movements all over Europe, opposed to the deployment of NATO missiles, Schmidt decided to go ahead with the deployment. By then, however, more and more state parties of the SPD had voted against deployment, further undermining the Chancellor's position. When the left wing of his party pushed for increased deficit spending in the fall of 1982, the FDP, being staunchly in favor of the deployment of IRBMs and favoring a curtailing of budget expenditures, broke away from the coalition. After a vote of no-confidence, forcing Schmidt from office, Helmut Kohl (CDU) became the new Chancellor of Germany in October 1982. The end of Schmidt's political career came on October 26, 1982, when Schmidt decided not to lead his party into the 1983 elections. Roy Macridis describes the sad end of a great statesman best in the following section:

The final humiliation came on November 22, 1983 when a huge majority of the SPD's deputies voted to reject the impending deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles against Schmidt's pleas. They did so in the presence of the former Chancellor as he vented his frustration by sailing paper airplanes into the debating chamber of the Bundestag.⁴¹

The Kohl Era (1982-Present)

With the accession of CDU leader Kohl to power, the major question was whether he would continue the new line of Ostpolitik pursued by his social-democratic successors or revert to Adenauer's policies of strength. A closer look at Kohl's political career would have provided an answer early on. Kohl, active in CDU politics since the time he was seventeen, had worked his way up the party ladder. After having been a CDU member in the state legislature of the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, he became the youngest CDU governor of the same state. Afterwards he moved on to the Bundestag and as the head of the CDU led the party into the 1976 elections, where he narrowly missed receiving an absolute majority. Written off by many political observers after his defeat, he staged a surprising comeback after the 1980 election, which had resulted in the defeat of the right-wing of his party. It was Kohl, experienced in years of political bargaining and compromise, who led the negotiations with the FDP leadership, which resulted in the downfall of the Schmidt government. During these negotiations he also accepted the new style of Ostpolitik, which had been turned into a precondition for the switch by the FDP, in turn answering the question of whether he would return to

Adenauer's policies of strength. Voted into office in October 1982, Kohl called for elections in early 1983 to have the change of government confirmed by the German electorate. The election proved to be a personal triumph for Kohl, when he received the best showing of any CDU politician since Adenauer's 1957 electoral triumph. Table 5.1 will present the results of the 1983 elections, held on March 6, 1983.⁴²

CDU/CSU	48.8%	(244 seats)
SPD	38.2%	(193 seats)
FDP	6.9%	(34 seats)
Greens	5.6%	(27 seats)

Overall the new coalition enjoyed a fifty-eight seat majority in Parliament after the 1983 election.

Were there any noticeable changes in the conduct and direction of German foreign policy after the Kohl government had taken over. First, more continuity than drastic changes could be observed. Especially the FDP leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who remained foreign minister, a post he had held since 1974, provided for continuity. Even though often savagely attacked by the right wing of the CDU and especially the CSU, headed by Franz-Joseph Strauss, who himself had wanted the position of foreign minister, Genscher succeeded in continuing a policy very similar to that of the Schmidt administration.

Minor changes, however, did take place. There was a move back to a more pro-American foreign policy, while at the same time handouts to East Germany without noticeable concessions were curtailed. Not surprisingly the new government did vote to deploy the cruise missiles and Pershing II (IRBMs), as envisioned by the 1979 NATO dual-track decision, despite continued opposition from the SPD, the Greens and a growing peace movement. (The peace movement did, however, never enjoy majority support from the German people and the 1983 election was largely decided on economic matters.) After a heated debate in the fall of 1983, the first missiles then started to be deployed in 1984. This in turn further undermined already worsening relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union subsequently started to put pressure on East Germany to refrain East Germany from becoming too friendly with West Germany. Thus, East German leader Erich Honecker had to call off his planned visit to West Germany in 1984, while Gorbachev himself snubbed West Germany by refusing to visit it during a European tour in 1985. For the Kohl administration, however, priorities had been set:

Any estrangement from the Atlantic Alliance would render the Federal Republic incapable of conducting a Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik deserving of the name.⁴³

Interestingly, both Germanies did succeed in keeping a mini-detente going between themselves, while the two superpowers fought out "Cold War Two." For example, during the heyday of the new Cold War, CSU party chief Franz-Joseph Strauss, one of the most vocal

critics of Brandt's new Ostpolitik in the early 1970s, went to East Germany and personally guaranteed the government a one billion mark loan from a Bavarian bank. In turn, East Germany agreed to dismantle some of its "death machines" deployed at the German-German border. This was a clear example of the Kohl administration's new Ostpolitik. While better relations with East Germany were sought and more contacts were being established, the West German's now expected something in return for their economic aid. When another 950 million marks were given to the East Germans in 1984, they in turn had to agree to facilitate travel between the two Germanies.⁴⁴ In other words the new Ostpolitik was one of "quid pro quo" and not one of just handing over money. Ironically, the new Cold War let the two Germanies for the first time to perceive that they had common interests. Especially the missile crisis had brought the two closer together by pointing out the direct threat to the survival of the two Germanies in the case of a nuclear war. To quote Henry Ashby Turner:

Whereas the missile issue had heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, it seemed to lessen the distance between Bonn and East Berlin, revealing shared concerns on the part of the two German governments about the stationing of increasing numbers of foreign nuclear weapons within their territories.⁴⁵

However, it also needs to be pointed out here, that issues like reunification, the wanting of a peace treaty and even the revision of the Oder-Neisse line surfaced again in West Germany, leading in turn

to a massive Soviet propaganda campaign against a new German revisionism and even the rise of Facism by 1985.

As soon as the new or Second Cold War was officially ended by President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit of 1985, West German-East German relations started to become even better. East German leader Erich Honecker finally visited West Germany in September 1987 in the first state visit of an East German leader to West Germany. The same year, 1987, the German electorate confirmed the Kohl government in power. Even though Kohl's party, the CDU, suffered heavy losses, largely due to the party's decision to reach out to the moderates on the German political scene, thus alienating its conservative wing, which sat the election out, coupled with the cutting back of agricultural subsidies, which let farmers to leave the coalition, gains by its coalition partner, the FDP, assured another four years of conservative-liberal rule in Germany. By 1989, however, the coalition had fallen into disgrace with the German voting public, now being seriously undermined by a new ultra-conservative party which calls itself "Die Republikaner" and which managed to gain representation in the elections to the European Parliament in June 1989, receiving about seven percent of the vote. These events in turn led the CDU/CSU to move back to the right to try to regain its traditional core conservative supporters, who are essential for the party's continued electoral successes. In the realms of foreign policy, Hans Apels' previously cited remark that a detente between the great powers will allow their allies to be more

independent was proven correct again. As soon as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Premier Gorbachev in December 1987, both Germanies embarked on more independent foreign policies. While the West Germans, who had a few months earlier been forced to include their own, jointly controlled IRBMs into the INF Treaty, which led to not only the removal, but to the actual destruction of IRBMs deployed in Europe, being in turn the only real disarmament treaty ever, they now chose to resist U.S. demands to modernize the existing nuclear short range weapons in Germany. Even though pressures by both the Reagan and the succeeding Bush administrations were heavy, the Kohl government, knowing how unpopular the modernization of weapons, which would destroy both Germanies in the case of war, was, stood firm, refusing to follow American wishes.

The East Germans on the other hand refused to follow suit in introducing Soviet-style reforms. On an increasing basis the East German elite even began to openly criticize Gorbachev's reforms as being anti-socialist and destructive of the Soviet hemisphere. By October 1989, the East German regime then paid the price for its intransigence, when over one hundred thousand East Germans fled the country through Hungary, Czechoslovakia and even Poland, embarrassing the regime severely while it was getting ready to celebrate its fortieth anniversary, and leading to the end of the Honecker era.

However, despite the embarrassed East German government blaming West Germany for the mass exodus of its citizens, relations between

the two Germanies have continued to improve, raising fears of a possible reunification not only in Eastern but also in Western Europe.

Conclusion

This chapter had essentially two objectives. First, I tried to point out the impact of individual leaders on foreign policy. As was shown Chancellor Adenauer's personality was decisive not only in the success of the primacy of foreign policy, but also in the integration of West Germany into the Western Alliance. By the time Willy Brandt became Chancellor, however, too many of the previously cited variables had changed to allow him to pursue a foreign policy based on the primacy of foreign policy. Not only had German public opinion changed drastically, but especially interest groups were by 1969 no longer satisfied playing a secondary role to the Chancellor. Both churches, business and labor had now become active in foreign policy. At the same time no Chancellor succeeding Adenauer was able to dominate his party to the extent Adenauer had. Thus, even though Brandt believed in a new Ostpolitik, he could not have succeeded without the backing of major interest groups and especially the German public.

During the Schmidt and Kohl administration we then see the true emergence of the primacy of domestic politics, when domestic concerns dominate foreign policy. Even the 1983 elections were dominated by economic and not foreign policy concerns.

The second objective of this chapter was to trace German Ostpolitik from 1949 up until 1989. This was accomplished by integrating the analysis on German Ostpolitik into the four discussions of the Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl administrations.

The next chapter will now deal with the international environment and its impact on German foreign policy.

ENDNOTES

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³Ibid, p. 97.

⁴Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Adenauer in der Rheinlandpolitik nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), p. 220.

⁵Hans-Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik (Berlin: H. Luchterhand Verlag GMBH, 1966), p. 426.

⁶Ibid, p. 444.

⁷Ibid, pp. 425-426.

⁸Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), p. 607.

⁹Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, September 20, 1949, p. 29.

¹⁰Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit, p. 478.

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- ²¹Strauss, in: Verhandlungen, 9 Sitzung 23 January 1958, p. 380.
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- ²³Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit, p. 473.
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- ²⁹Dönhoff, Von Gestern nach Übermorgen, p. 295.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In the last chapter of this work I shall now focus on my fifth and final independent variable, namely, the international system and the influence it exerts on German foreign policy. Again, this chapter will have two objectives. First, I will discuss the restraints and opportunities imposed by the international environment itself. Next, the impact of the international system on the success of the primacy of foreign policy during the Adenauer era will be analyzed. We have already examined public opinion, the structure of the state and the role an individual will have to play, for the primacy of foreign policy to become triumphant. Now it is time to look at the international environment to see how it directly contributed to the success of the primacy of foreign policy during the Adenauer era.

The first twelve years of the existence of the newly created Federal Republic were characterized by a period of Cold War between the two superpowers. A multipolar world had been turned into a bipolar one by the end of the Second World War, in turn imposing new restrictions on new powers. While bridge brokerage or a continuous switching between two blocks, as, for example, Bismarck had been advocating, was possible in a multipolar system, the new bipolar world made such a policy impossible. With only two blocks in

existence, it becomes a matter of life and death for a second-rate power to ally itself with one superpower to insure its continued existence. Only one of the superpowers will be able to guarantee security to a secondary power against the other superpower. In addition, the freedom of movement enjoyed by powers in a multipolar alliance was gone. Now, it had become impossible to avoid being dominated by the superpowers who had created these alliances. Thus, being totally dependent on one of the two superpowers, one could label the new secondary powers, "Dependent Allies."

The German case illustrates the above-mentioned points most clearly. Totally defeated and partitioned, Germany had lost its traditional great power status. Only the alliance with one of the two superpowers could guarantee security against the other. Furthermore, occupation never left the Germans much of a choice. It was unrealistic to believe that either one of the superpowers would have allowed the West or East Germans to leave its camp. Even after joining NATO in 1955, West Germany knew of its dependence, both militarily and economically. Thus, to insure both its security against the East and free access to the international free trade system, established by the United States, the joining of an alliance became a matter of life and death. However, it should be pointed out that in the case of the relationship between West Germany and its protector, the United States, a convergence of views had taken place early on, lasting into the early 1960s. Major agreements on Western integration, rearmament, the joining of the Western alliance and a

very dogmatic foreign policy towards the East existed between the two nations, cemented by the close friendship between Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Thus, the dependence of West Germany on the United States often went unnoticed from 1955 until 1961.

The next two case studies will now show how the international environment can both restrain and allow for opportunities in foreign policy making.

The 1952 Soviet Proposal

By 1950 the Soviet Union had become increasingly worried that West Germany would not only be allowed to rearm but also would be integrated into the Western Alliance. It, therefore, revived the campaign for German unity and demanded the holding of a Four Power Conference to implement the Potsdam agreements. The Soviets further requested the convening of an All-German Constitutional Assembly, which would have been constituted of West and East German delegates on an equal basis. Adenauer refused to even discuss the proposal as long as there were no free elections included in it and the East Germans were to be overrepresented in a Constitutional Assembly.

In September 1951 East German President Grotewohl went a step further and offered free elections in all zones. When Adenauer inquired with the Soviets about the proposal, Moscow remained silent, making the proposal worthless.

Then suddenly on March 10, 1952, a few weeks before the German Treaty and the EDC were to be signed, Stalin sent his famous note to

the Western Allies, in which revisionist historians see a reexamination of Soviet policy, having made reunification possible.¹ In the note Stalin promised German reunification, within the 1945 borders, and an independent national German Army. However, Germany would have to sign a peace treaty, recognizing the Oder-Neisse line and would not be allowed to enter into any alliance with nations it had fought during World War II. Altogether this would have given Germany a neutral status, while recognizing the post-war status quo in Europe. On April 8, 1952, Stalin further declared his willingness to hold free elections in Germany, which were not to be put under the supervision of the United Nations, but were to be overseen by the respective Allied power in its zone.

Adenauer, immediately recognizing that the offer was a ploy to stall the EDC and the German Treaty, rejected the note. Looking at Adenauer's foreign policy goals, this was not surprising. First, acceptance of the note would have robbed Germany of any security against the Soviet Union. Without Allied troops on German soil, or a Euro-defense line, Germany would have been open to every Soviet pressure put on it, probably resulting in a Soviet takeover in the long term. According to Adenauer:

I considered neutrality between two power blocs as an unrealistic position for our nation. Sooner or later, one side, or the other would attempt to incorporate Germany's potential on its side . . . We had to join either one or the other side, if we wanted to prevent being crushed by both.²

Adenauer, therefore, took a hardline approach to the proposal, which would have destroyed all of his foreign policy goals. Besides security, acceptance of the note would have rendered German sovereignty impossible, because the Western powers would not have accepted it. As Adenauer knew, in the current world political situation, the loss of Germany would have been unacceptable to all three Western powers. Fearing the loss of confidence in his government, if Germany would delay its signature on the EDC and Germany Treaty, and the undermining of his European policies (a withdrawal of Germany from the European movement, would have meant its death), Adenauer pressured the Allies into not negotiating with the Soviet Union, until both the German Treaty and the EDC had been ratified. He expressed his sentiments most clearly in his "Erinnerungen": "One false step and we would lose the trust of the Western powers."³

As can be seen, the international environment did in this case constrain German foreign policy making. On the other hand, the international environment proved to be a close partner when Adenauer was pushing for German rearmament and in turn the restoration of full sovereignty.

The European Defense Community, NATO and the Restoration of Sovereignty

On June 25, 1950 North Korea had invaded South Korea. Not surprisingly Adenauer immediately recognized the parallels between Germany and Korea. Both nations had been divided into a Soviet and a

Western portion. In addition the Soviet Zone of occupation had raised an army of over 100,000 men, while West Germany was virtually defenseless.⁴ Adenauer now feared an East German Korea style invasion. In his memoirs he said the following:

The forces of the Western Allies in Germany were not strong enough, so far as I could judge . . . if the Russian Zone army were to attack with tanks, as had happened in Korea . . . the population of Western Germany would stay neutral . . . because the advancing troops would be Germans.⁵

He, therefore, revived his call for a German army, integrated into a European army, which he had first advocated in late 1949. Here, the international scene proved to be a good ally of Adenauer. The United States, being preoccupied with its war in Korea, now saw the need for a German participation in the defense of Europe. Not only could Germany compensate for the American and French troops needed in Korea and Indochina, but also Germany would be able to put a substantial amount of financial resources into the European defense system. After Winston Churchill had called for a German contribution to the European defense, in the format of a European Army, the NATO Council made the same demands in September 1950. The French, becoming increasingly worried about a new German national army, and under heavy U.S. pressure, proposed on October 24, 1950, a European Defense Community (EDC) with the Pleven plan, creating a European Army. Suddenly another dream of Adenauer had come true. Not only would a European Army provide Germany with additional security, but it would also be another step towards Western integration and European union.

In addition Adenauer was determined to use the leverage given to him by Korea, to push for full sovereignty. However, it should be mentioned here that Adenauer never wanted a German army, but always favored a European one.

At the Washington Conference, held in September 1951, in which all three Allied foreign ministers participated, agreement was achieved on the question of German entry into the European Defense Community. The same month negotiations started between Adenauer and the Allied High Commission. For six months, negotiations, in which Adenauer demanded full sovereignty for Germany, dragged on, resulting in the German Treaty, signed on May 26, 1952. The treaty, reestablishing full sovereignty for Germany, while giving the Allies the sole right to conduct negotiations on the German question, Berlin and a future peace treaty, was to enter into force as soon as the EDC treaty was ratified by the national parliaments. In addition, Germany agreed to pay for Allied troops stationed on German soil and the Allies retained for themselves the power to intervene in Germany whenever the democratic system was jeopardized.⁶ However, the Allies were obliged to inform the German government before conducting any negotiations on the German question and had to pledge to pursue reunification in any talks with the Soviet Union, establishing the famous Junktim.

By March 1953, the EDC treaty had been ratified by Germany. However, by that time, an anti-European, anti-German parliament had emerged in France. "Europeans," like Robert Schuman and Jean

Monnet, had left the government. In addition, the Cold War was beginning to die down after Stalin had died and the war in Korea had been ended. Why should one now allow the Germans to rearm? With the refusal of Great Britain to join the EDC, the French feared now that Germany would soon dominate the EDC and drag them into an offensive war in its quest for reunification. The French, therefore, started to make new demands on the Saar question, demanding the Europeanization of the Saar, to which Adenauer agreed. When the French began to push for special rights for the French forces in the EDC, which would have destroyed its supranational character, Adenauer refused to go along.

The worsening situation in Indochina, which preoccupied French policies in 1954, proved to be the death of the EDC, when Premier Mendès-France agreed to kill the EDC for Soviet help in solving the Indochina problem.⁷ On August 30, 1954, the French Parliament voted the EDC treaties down, killing in the process the German Treaty. Adenauer was outraged:

The result of the vote in the French National Assembly destroyed for us Germans, long-standing efforts to bring about the decisive step towards the reconstruction of Europe. Who had benefitted? Moscow had . . . but . . . The acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany into the circle of the free world of nations, the creation of a unified Europe has to be taken up again⁸

Equally disturbed was Adenauer's good friend, John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, who had favored both the EDC and the German Treaty. He stated that disunity only hindered Western Europe

from being an intellectual, political and economic giant.⁹ The American policies towards Europe, therefore, clearly supported European unification with West Germany integrated into it.

Having promised Adenauer that Germany would become independent and join NATO in any case, Great Britain and the United States now searched for a way out of the embarrassing situation created by the French vote. It was the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, who came up with a plan to solve the problem. The Brussels Treaty of 1948, created against future German aggression, was to be transformed into the Western European Union (WEU), including West Germany and Italy as new members. Great Britain would be joining the WEU, too, to calm down French fears about a German revival. In addition, both the United States and Great Britain agreed to keep troops in Europe for the next fifty years. Any attack on a member state would constitute an attack on all members, leading to joint actions against any potential aggressor, and Germany's compliance with the treaty would be supervised by an Armaments Control Agency set by the WEU. Following the joining of the Western European Union, Germany would become sovereign and join NATO.

At the September 1954 London Conference, Mendès-France agreed to the settlement. Another conference, to be held in Paris in October, was to work out the details, but before that an agreement on the Saar question had to be reached.

Adenauer met with Mendès-France on October 19, 1954, to work out the Saar agreement. Again it was the Chancellor alone who worked out

a settlement, turning the Saar into a European territory, subject to popular vote, until a peace treaty with Germany would be signed.

On October 21, 1954, the newly founded Western European Union approved the membership of Germany and Italy, followed by a NATO decision the next day to admit Germany and on October 23, 1954, the Paris Treaties based on the German treaty of 1952, were signed, ending the period of occupation.

As can be clearly seen, without the Cold War, brought about by the bipolar system itself, it would have been impossible for any German Chancellor to push for German rearmament and full sovereignty. Clearly, most nations in Western Europe and probably the United States itself would have rejected such a move.

The two case studies do provide us with two examples of how the international environment can and did restrain German foreign policy, while at the same time opening up opportunities.

How did the international system impact on the primacy of foreign policy. Here I would argue that without the assistance of the international environment Adenauer would have never been able to successfully pursue the primacy of foreign policy concept. As was already pointed out, the domination of Germany by the Allied High Commission did allow Adenauer to make his foreign policy alone, by negotiating himself, accompanied by a few trusted advisers from his Chancellery, with the three Allies, in turn being able to exclude Parliament and his own political party. The Chancellery itself, necessary for Adenauer to pursue his foreign policies, could only be

justified by the existence of the Allied High Commission.

Furthermore, the Cold War, a direct product of the new bipolar world, was used by Adenauer to justify his policies of Western integration to the German public. By being able to point out a common threat, namely, the Soviet Union, he could explain the joining of the Western alliance as a necessity to insure the survival of the new West German state. Another example of Adenauer's use of the new bipolar system was the previously discussed policies of strength.

Thus, the international system did play an important role in the triumph of the primacy of foreign policy.

The 1960s do provide us with other clear examples of the influences of the international environment on secondary powers. By then, the two superpowers were moving closer together trying to establish a detente between them. However, West Germany refused to go along with that new detente, doing its best to undermine it, in turn becoming one of the most dogmatic anti-communist nations in the world. This deviation from the policies being pursued by its protector, the United States, soon led to frictions. Not surprisingly West German attempts of a deviating foreign policy failed. The helplessness of a secondary power or dependent ally was most clearly demonstrated in the 1961 Berlin crisis, triggered by the erection of the wall. Without America help, the West German government had to sit by and watch the situation helplessly, in turn initiating the fall of the Adenauer government. Later on, the United States directly imposed its will on the Germans by vetoing the sale

of pipelines to the Soviet Union and by unilaterally retracting from its promise to set up a multilateral military force, which in turn substantially led to the fall of the Erhard government in 1966. German foreign policy during the 1960s was thus characterized by a refusal to join the United States in the process of detente and by the unilateral decision to isolate East Germany by establishing contacts with its Eastern European neighbors. As we have already seen this attempt failed, when the other superpower, the Soviet Union, cracked down on its Eastern European cronies, fearing the isolation of East Germany. Therefore, German foreign policy had failed by the late 1960s. Not only had Adenauer's theory of the policy of strength been discredited, because it had failed to lead to the hoped for reunification of Germany, but in contrast it seemed to have even decreased the chances for reunification in the short-term. In addition, Schröder's policies of isolating East Germany in the East had also not been able to reap the expected results, leaving German foreign policy in shambles.

Now, not only the SPD but also the FDP and various interest groups including big business, the two major churches and labor were ready to experiment. Furthermore, a drastic change in public opinion had taken place, allowing the new Brandt government to bring West German foreign policy back into line with that of its protector, the United States, by abandoning the dogmatic revisionism of the Adenauer era. This meant pursuing a policy of detente, abandoning the calls for reunification and the Oder Neisse line borders. Being backed by

the United States, Brandt then started his new policies towards the East, resulting in the German acceptance of the post World War Two borders in Europe.

Brandt's policies in turn led to an unexpected increase in independence from the United States. Thus, while detente had made the new Ostpolitik possible, it also brought about a more independent foreign policy. With the settlement of its Eastern problem, the Germans suddenly found themselves in a position where they did not need the continuing support of their Western Allies to back them up in their quest for a revision of the post-war status quo. Furthermore, this allowed for a more flexible foreign policy not only towards the East, but also towards the West. While Brandt himself, forced to resign over a spy scandal in 1974, was not able to use this increased independence, his successor Helmut Schmidt was able to do so. As we have already seen in our discussion on the Schmidt administration (1974-1982), Schmidt did pursue a more independent foreign policy leading to clashes within the EEC and especially with the United States. Now, for the first time, the West German government refused to give in to American pressure, as the case of the sale of a nuclear reactor to the Brazilian government has demonstrated. Furthermore, a new German-German foreign policy could take place, which now was allowed to be conducted on a bilateral basis, instead of the traditional multilateral one, where the Germans had tried to integrate the United States and the EEC members into the process.

The start of the new Cold War in 1979, triggered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was to rob the West Germans of their newly found independence in foreign policy making. Now the bipolar world structure moved back to its rigidity, reducing the room second rate powers have. For the West Germans this meant the choice between their protector nations or a continuing detente with the East. At first the Schmidt government tried to avoid that choice when it tried to revert to a role of bridge broker between East and West. As soon as the East was not willing to talk, however, the dependent ally was forced to step into line with its superpower. With the ascendance of the Kohl administration West Germany then moved back towards the dependent role it played during the Adenauer era. While Schmidt had refused Carter's demands to curtail the sale of a nuclear reactor to Brazil, Kohl under heavy pressure from the United States was forced to include IRBMs, jointly controlled by the Germans and the Americans, into the INF Treaty, which led to their removal and destruction. This move in turn further increased German dependence on the United States. Now total reliance had to be placed on the United States nuclear umbrella in the case of a Soviet attack.

The end of the new Cold War then did allow the Kohl administration to increase its independence from the United States by decreasing the Soviet threat to West Germany. This more independent foreign policy could be first seen in the fight over the modernization of short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in Germany. With SRBMs not having the range to penetrate Soviet territory, their

use would result in the destruction of either East German or even West German territory. Not surprisingly a vast majority of West Germans opposed the modernization of these weapons systems. As soon as the Kohl administration refused to agree to the proposed modernization, a political quarrel broke out between the United States and West Germany. Members of the U.S. Senate went even as far as threatening to withdraw American troops from West Germany, if the Germans would not agree to the modernization of American SRBMs located in Germany. This time, however, the Kohl government stood firm, knowing that a giving in to American demands would be political suicide.

To summarize, it is possible to state that the international environment does influence foreign policy making. In a climate of war, the dependent allies will not be able to move away very far from their protecting superpowers. If the international environment does, however, provide for detente, the dependence of the secondary powers will be reduced, in turn allowing them to conduct a more independent foreign policy towards their respective protector nations.

Germany, both in the West and East, does provide us with the clearest example of the previously stated theory. Having been a creation of the newly established bipolar world system, bipolarity had to play a major role in influencing German foreign policy. However, not only constraints, but also opportunities were provided. Thus, it would be empirically false to disregard the influences of the international environment or even to reduce it to secondary

status in any theory. This is the reason why the international environment has been used in this work as one of five equally important independent variables whose influence on foreign policy does vary from case to case.

In addition, a direct link between the impact of the international environment on a country's policies in regard to the concept of the primacy of foreign policy can be established. Only when the international environment provides for issues in the foreign policy realm which overpower domestic concerns, can a leader elevate the primacy of foreign policy to a guiding force behind foreign policy making. However, it should be remembered that the international arena is only one of five variables which has to be conducive towards the success of the primacy of foreign policy. Without the Cold War, Adenauer could not have succeeded, but even the Cold War would not have been sufficient to lead the primacy of foreign policy to triumph, if Adenauer himself had not been an ardent believer in the concept. Thus, all five variables are interrelated and all five have to be in the right constellation for the primacy of foreign policy to succeed.

In the concluding section of this chapter I would now like to express some thoughts concerning the conduct of current German foreign policy. I will take up the questions, raised in chapter three of this work, when I analyzed new and dangerous trends in German foreign policy, especially the rise of neutralism, coupled

with an almost obsessive idealism, which comes at the expense of a more traditional realism, in West German foreign policy.

The question thus is not only the following: How does the international environment affect German foreign policy making, but also what role should Germany play in it? To answer this question we have to look at the new, more independent, German foreign policy.

What then are some characteristics of that new, more independent, German foreign policy? First, there is the justified belief that Germany has increased in power, which in turn should lead to it playing a more assertive role in the international system. Coupled with that belief, we find a notion, especially among the left, that Germany should use its increased leverage to mediate between the superpowers. In other words, a return to the traditional policies of bridge brokerage are being advocated. This in turn demands less reliance upon the United States. A second characteristic of German foreign policy in the last two decades is its moral nature, involving the giving of advice to everyone, which has only earned increasing resentment in the world. Especially power politics is being criticized as being immoral, while peace has become an almost obsessive obligation in the conduct of foreign policy. This is not to criticize the noble goal of peace in the world, but in an arena of power politics, a nation must be ready to set aside morals in its quest for survival and be ready to use power politics whether it likes it or not. However, in Germany the term power and power politics still can't be rationally analyzed as a result of

having been discredited by the Third Reich. Therefore, power politics is missing among the choices of options open to German politicians, who do not realize that a responsible use of power, here meaning to get what you want against the wishes of other nations, can be the foundation of a more stable and less violent international system.

However, a feeling of defeatism, acquired after the disaster of the Second World War, coupled with a feeling of powerlessness, being a pawn in the hands of the superpowers, does contribute to the refusal to recognize the importance of power politics. In other words, World War II has turned Germans into a bunch of idealists refusing to look at reality. For example, out of a feeling that it was morally obligatory to extend and continue detente, the West German political elites, including the media and the academic community, refused to recognize aggressive Soviet policies in the 1970s. While peace research was emphasized, Soviet expansionism into Africa and Asia as well as the massive arms build-up of the Soviet Empire, especially the deployment of the SS20 IRBMs, was ignored. Not surprisingly the German public was shocked when suddenly the Schmidt government called for the counter-deployment of Western weapons in Germany. Again, the quest for international harmony, which, of course, rests on a harmonization of relations with the East, led to the erstwhile ignoring of reality in the international system.

Another example of the continued unwillingness to perceive the importance of power politics in a world dominated by power politics is the handling of West German economic aid. Not being justified on security grounds, it is in turn based on moral grounds, even though in reality it is geopolitical in nature. For example, top recipients of German economic aid over the last decade were such strategically important nations as Turkey, Somalia, Pakistan and Egypt. Other examples of a refusal to return to the arena of power politics would include the continued resistance to send German military advisors abroad, or even the long-time refusal to let German troops serve in the United Nations peace contingents. This kind of foreign policy is only possible as long as you have a superpower to back you up in the case of a threat to your security. However, in the case of tensions or war, a nation needs to have the willingness to use power politics to survive. As history has shown us over and over, weakness, idealism or moralism do not guarantee security, but do lead to defeat or even worse annihilation of a nation. Thus, it is imperative for the West Germans to be realistic, to be prepared for the worst, even if it might never happen, and especially to stop ignoring power politics at a time when it rules the world. A will to use power to maintain peace in the world is necessary if peace is to be maintained. In other words, if peace can be preserved through interdependence or multilateralism, this would be the optimal outcome. If, however, only power politics can preserve peace, then

there has to be a will to use it. This will is, however, lacking among West Germans today.

In the next section I will now further discuss the notion of power politics, by differentiating between different types of power politics. It is imperative to point out at this time that I am not advocating a return to Machtpolitik or the irresponsible uses of power of the Second or Third Reich. Instead, I am calling for a responsible power politics which would call for the use of power only in situations where other nations do pursue irresponsible power policies. When looking at German history it is interesting to notice that the Germans have a tendency to hover between two extremes, the first one being the brutal use of power politics, the second constituting an almost irresponsible pacificism. This pacificism, coupled with neutralism, which is on the rise in the present day Germany does present two problems. First, West Germany cannot have an autonomous foreign policy anymore, due to its geopolitical situation. Being a product of bipolarity and having been the major cause of the Cold War, present day Germany has become a dependent ally, having to rely on the United States for its security. Any kind of moving away from the United States will have to undermine West German security. This in turn means that the West Germans will have to adapt to changing American foreign policy goals.

As history has shown power politics will have to be countered with power politics. Only the deployment of Western IRBMs in Europe led the Soviets to come to the bargaining table, not any kind of

moralistic plea for peace. Interestingly, in the realm of economic policy we can see how a responsible power politics is being conducted by the Federal Republic. Here the West Germans remain closely aligned with the United States against changes in the international economic system which would benefit the Third World.

Thus, changes need to take place. First, politicians and academics need to show the people that a responsible power politics is still important. If elite opinion changes, public opinion will soon follow suit. Therefore, a double strategy as Hans-Peter Schwarz proposes is in order.¹⁰ First, internationalism and idealism, a moral foreign policy, should be used towards the West, and East, when they pursue a foreign policy based on the same ideals, while a foreign policy based on power politics should be only used when the opponent uses it too. In other words, be pragmatic and use whatever will be more successful in a specific case, a foreign policy based on realism or idealism.

At this point I will have to agree with Schwarz that the three major goals of German foreign policy, in the following order, should be first of all the survival of the state, followed by the retention of democracy. The last goal then would be the establishment of a peaceful global order.¹¹ To obtain these goals we need the reintroduction of a responsible use of power into German foreign policy.

Another closely related point concerns the question of whether the United States is still as committed to the defense of Europe as

it used to be. Increasing budget problems may well lead to a reduction of American commitments in Europe, in turn imposing more costs on the West Europeans themselves. Right now, the United States portion of total NATO member GNP is 44.5%, while the number for the European members of NATO sits at 34.18%.¹² However, if we look at military expenditure for NATO, the United States is responsible for 64.73%, while Europeans only contribute 29.45%.¹³ A clear imbalance does exist. It is estimated that the American government, despite having an acute budget deficit, financed by Western Europe and Japan, spends approximately one hundred and thirty-five billion dollars annually on Western European defense.¹⁴ Overall, American military expenditures account for six percent of American GNP, while the European allies only spend three percent of their GNP on defense.¹⁵ Ironically, despite being dependent on the United States for their security, European governments on an increasing basis criticize American foreign policy, opposing it from Central America to Asia and Africa. A very recent example of European ingratitude would be the case of American warships keeping the Straits of Hormuz open. While not being dependent on Arab oil itself, the United States kept the waterways open for the Europeans, who are dependent on Arab oil (the same goes for Japan), and who then refused to send military aid, a major exception being Great Britain and Italy, or pay for these services.

Not surprisingly, calls for a cutback of American troops are to be heard on an increasing basis in the U.S. Congress.

So far, especially West Germany, by refusing to acknowledge the fact that it has become a major power and, thus, is forced to return to a responsible use of power politics, has failed to contribute its fair share to the defense of Europe. What should be done to solve this problem. Arnulf Baring has come up with a four step solution:¹⁶ First, Europe has to take over some of the global responsibilities of the United States. Not only is an increase in European defense spending necessary to reduce the American budget deficit, but especially the Germans should increase their political zone of influence. However, if this should occur, the United States will have to recognize that it is not the hegemon anymore and will have to give more rights to the European members of NATO, especially West Germany which would have to carry the major costs of that new strategy. Thirdly, a closer familiarization of European leaders with American politics is necessary so that they can understand certain incoherent or changing policies, resulting from the American domestic environment. Lastly, the recognition that U.S. troops are needed in Europe to guarantee European security must be instilled in the European publics again, and a certain amount of offset payments for those troops should be paid for by the Europeans.

In conclusion, I am calling for a new recognition of the use of responsible power by the West Germans in world affairs. This, however, must be coupled with the continuing realization that West Germany is dependent on the United States for its security. Therefore, concessions will have to be made towards the American side

to help the protector nation out of a financial dead end. This in turn should lead to a more assertive German foreign policy, resulting in the West Germans being a less dependent ally of the United States.

ENDNOTES

¹Wolfram Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy - 1949-1979 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview press, 1980), p. 114.

²Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), p. 96.

³Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953-1955 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), p. 88.

⁴Aidan Crawley, The Rise of Western Germany (London: Collins Publishers, 1973), p. 141.

⁵Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953, p. 273.

⁶The Allies renounced this right in 1968.

⁷Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy - 1949-1979, p. 116.

⁸Marion Dönhoff, Von Gestern nach Übermorgen (Hamburg: Albrecht Knaus Verlag, 1981), p. 87.

⁹Hans-Gert Pöttering, Adenauer's Sicherheitspolitik 1955-1963 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1975), p. 19.

¹⁰Hans-Peter Schwarz. Die Gezähmten Deutschen - Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985), pp. 155-161.

¹¹Ibid, p. 162.

¹²Arnulf Baring, Unser neuer Größenwahn - Deutschland zwischen Ost und West (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), p. 209.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid, p. 207.

¹⁵Ibid, p. 208.

¹⁶Ibid, pp. 248-253.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This work has had essentially two major objectives. First, an overview of German foreign policy from 1949 to 1989 has been provided. This was, however, accomplished by integrating major events and foreign policy changes into the various chapters describing the importance of my independent variables. For example, German Ostpolitik from Adenauer to Kohl was discussed in the chapter on the influence of individuals on foreign policy. Westpolitik on the other hand was analyzed in the chapter on state structure and parties. Overall the reader should have a better knowledge of German foreign policy and the most important events and decisions taken in the last forty years. In addition, I have also attempted to provide some background information on the major German leaders and their parties. For example, I have traced the history of the CDU from a decentralized weak cadre party into a strong centralized mass party. Furthermore, the influence of Adenauer's strict catholic upbringing on later policy choices has been discussed.

Integrated into the text, one will also find brief analyses of the most important elections in German history, especially the 1969 and 1983 elections and their outcomes.

In the realm of German-American and German-Soviet relations, this work does provide a good overview of the major changes which

have occurred here over time. The change from a very dependent status on the United States to a more independent foreign policy was analyzed in detail, while restrictions on a decrease of dependence, especially the influence of the international environment, were pointed out. Furthermore, the benefits of the new Ostpolitik under Brandt, namely, a reduction of dependence on the United States, were shown and it was pointed out how German-Soviet relations after a brief period of verbal conflict over the deployment of new Western IRBMs in West Germany, have steadily improved up to a point where the Soviet leader Gorbachev is now more respected and admired than his American counterpart, President Bush.

The major portion of this work and the second objective I have tried to deal with, concerns questions concerning the primacy of foreign policy and its challenger, the primacy of domestic policy. This part of my work, more theoretical in nature than the first part, was based on my starting hypothesis that the primacy of foreign policy was the guiding force behind the policies of the Adenauer era (1949-1963), and that, however, the foundations on which a successful use of the primacy of foreign policy must rest have been destroyed over time, leading to the triumph of the primacy of domestic policy. Thus, it was necessary to first define the two opposing terms and look at the history of both of them, namely, their creators and the influence they have exerted on German foreign policy over time. This task was accomplished in the second part of chapter Two. Then I proceeded to establish the foundations on which a successful use of

the primacy of foreign policy must rest on. First, I took a look at public opinion and established the following hypothesis:

Public opinion must either be supportive of the concept or a wide disinterest in politics, coupled with a high level of prestige of the ruling Chancellor must exist, to allow a leader to follow the principles of the primacy of foreign policy.

This hypothesis was empirically verified by looking at public opinion polls during the Adenauer era.

Next, I analyzed the structure of the state to see how it was influential in allowing the primacy of foreign policy to take place. My findings were the following:

1. Interest groups must either be supportive of the Chancellor's policies or show a lack of interest in foreign policy.

2. The political party of the Chancellor and the top leaders of it must be weak, decentralized among various factions, so that the Chancellor can dominate it without interference of other top party leaders.

3. Some state structure has to exist, which will allow the Chancellor to circumvent his or her party and other state institutions, examples being both houses of Parliament, in the foreign policy making process. The state structure used by Adenauer to accomplish just this was, of course, the previously mentioned Chancellery.

The fourth variable contributing to the triumph of the primacy of foreign policy during the Adenauer era centered on individuals themselves. Here it is imperative that the individual in power, in

this case Adenauer, does himself believe in the concept, which in Adenauer's case, having grown up in an era where the primacy of foreign policy enjoyed the status of paradigm in political and historical thinking, was the case.

My last independent variable was the international environment itself. By using historical sociology as my theoretical foundation in this work, as outlined in the first part of chapter Two, I was able to fuse domestic and international variables, thus avoiding falling into a reductionist trap, focusing on only one of the two categories. As we have seen the international environment was a necessary variable in Adenauer's use of the primacy of foreign policy. Not only did it turn foreign policy issues into the overtowering issues of the Adenauer era, but it could be used to justify unpopular policies and the establishment of certain state structures, necessary for the success of the primacy of foreign policy, an example being the Chancellery. Which of these variables have changed to such an extent that the renewed triumph of the primacy of foreign policy in Germany has become questionable?

First, public opinion has experienced a dramatic change. Suddenly, the a-political even apathetic German public of the 1950s has disappeared. Now we find in its place a public, which is highly knowledgeable of foreign policy issues, and is not afraid to oppose the Chancellor's policies by democratic means. Furthermore, a direct change has taken place in the priority of policy issues. While foreign policy issues, especially reunification, were the attentive

public's top priority in the 50s, by now domestic concerns have overtaken foreign policy as the most important issues for the German public. For example, in 1983 not the deployment of IRBMs in Germany was the decisive issue in the general election, but domestic concerns like unemployment and inflation dominated. Lastly, not one Chancellor after Adenauer was able to enjoy such a level of high prestige among the German public while in office, contributing to a large amount of deference towards the Chancellor and his policies. Secondly, the nature of parties, especially the CDU, and interest groups has changed. While previously deferential, interest groups, especially business, labor and the churches, began to become active in foreign policy during the 1960s, now calling for a change in German foreign policy towards the East, in turn actively opposing current foreign policy. In addition, the structure of the CDU changed. Now being centralized, ruled by a top party elite, that party elite is more willing to challenge the Chancellor. Recent examples would include the challenge to Helmut Kohl and his policies by party leaders. No Chancellor in Germany today, be he from the CDU or SPD, could ignore his party like Adenauer did. Furthermore, the nature and personality of German leaders has changed. Gone are individuals grown up in the Second Reich, having been instilled by the values of their times, including autocracy and patriarchy.

Lastly, the international environment itself, being characterized for most of the 1960s, 70s and 80s by detente has undermined the primacy of foreign policy. By emphasizing terms like

interdependence, economic policy has been elevated to the top spot, over traditional high politics. In a climate of detente it is possible for people to focus on economic issues and not foreign policy. Not surprisingly democratic leaders will follow suit, resulting in the triumph of the primacy of domestic policy.

In conclusion all five of my independent variables have to be in the right constellation for the primacy of foreign policy to become the successful guiding force behind a foreign policy. One or two variable in the right constellation will not be sufficient.

In the present time, however, too many changes have occurred for the primacy of foreign policy to be successful. Only a major international crisis would seem to be able to reverse these changes, which have taken place over the last two decades.

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